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Introduction
1.1 General Introduction
Achieving economic growth requires both a healthy real economy, with firms inno-
vating and constantly improving their technologies, as well as a well-working financial
system that can provide credit to these firms (King and Levine, 1993). With most capital
restrictions being lifted in the last several decades and the financial sector being al-
lowed to allocate resources to the best performers, the world has seen an unprecedented
deepening in globalisation, trade and multinational activity. The collapse of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of transition economies in Eastern Europe has proved to
be a perfect opportunity for firms to expand their operations but also to bring with
them previously unavailable technology and know-how. This in turn has resulted in
the fragmentation of production chains and the emergence of European and global
production networks (see e.g. Timmer, Erumban, Los, Stehrer, and de Vries, 2014).
However, financial and economic deepening has come at a cost. Living in a more
interconnected world, financial and economic shocks are being transmitted more easily
and can have serious repercussions to almost any corner of the world. The existence
of multinational banks and multinational firms has facilitated the capital flow in good
times but also its withdrawal when countries experience economic downturns. These
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direct effects are especially clear in the case of banks, where parent banks have called
back capital from their subsidiaries abroad, potentially damaging the local economies
(de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2010; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012; de Haas and Lelyveld,
2014). In the case of manufacturing firms, where the data is just becoming available,
we do know that multinationals are more ‘footloose’ in times of crises (see e.g. Godart,
Görg, and Hanley, 2011), they will divest from location that are further away (Landier,
Nair, and Wulf, 2009; Abraham, Goesaert, and Konings, 2014), and if they do help their
affiliates in the crisis, it is mainly those that have important production ties with the
MNE (Alfaro and Chen, 2012).
Notwithstanding these negative externalities, multinationals have been a source
of growth and productivity improvements. We know that these firms are generally
larger, older and more productive (see e.g. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple, 2004). Studies
have shown that they create jobs, bring in new capital and have better technologies
than local firms, prompting governments to promote policies which will attract more
of these MNEs to locate in their countries. Their impact can be direct, via mergers
and acquisitions, where a domestic firm is purchased. However, more often than not,
the improvements brought by MNEs are indirect and unintended. These so called
spillovers occur via replication, demonstration or due to labour mobility from MNEs to
domestic firms and vice-versa. Moreover, their impact differs depending on whether
they take place between firms that are active in the same industry (horizontal) or in
industries that are linked via supplier/buyer chains (vertical).
The direct impact of MNEs are mostly studied via mergers and acquisitions, as an
MNE becomes the parent of a domestic firm and thus can directly control its operations.
Recent studies by Arnold and Javorcik (2009) and Damijan, Rojec, Majcen, and Knell
(2013) suggest that these productivity improvements are substantial, and that in a
reversed way, if an affiliate is sold off and becomes again domestic, its productivity
will decrease (see e.g. Javorcik and Poelhekke, 2014). Moreover, for a large set of ten
transition countries, Damijan, Rojec, Majcen, and Knell (2013) find that productivity
premia of foreign owned firms are as large as 9% and are due to direct technological
transfers from parent to affiliate. They suggest that horizontal spillovers have been
increasing in importance and that they might become even more significant than the
vertical ones.
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The indirect impact of MNEs on local firms have been extensively analysed since
Caves (1974). The results are however mixed, largely due to the multitude of channels
via which spillovers can manifest themselves as well as the indirect way we measure
this phenomenon (Görg and Greenaway, 2004). Nonetheless, a new strand in the
literature has tried to disentangle the effects of horizontal spillovers from the vertical
ones (Schoors and van der Tol, 2002; Javorcik, 2004). These studies have found that
while horizontal spillovers are difficult to measure and predict in a consistent way,
the backward spillovers are often positive due to the interest of the MNE in helping
its suppliers to deliver quality inputs. This therefore translates in higher productivity
improvements for domestic suppliers of multinationals.
Finally, with the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the interplay between banks
and real economic activity has become more evident. On the one hand we know
that, especially in Europe where banks play a major role in financing the economy
and ultimately economic growth, bank credit is relevant for firm survival (see Beck,
Degryse, de Haas, and van Horen, 2014). On the other hand, a bank’s balance sheet is a
map of which sectors are dominating the economy, and could be an indicator of future
growth. Globalisation and access to international markets, aided by the emergence
of complex financial products, allowed banks to expand in size. This however has
not proportionally translated into more loans to the real economy (see e.g. Bezemer,
2014). A recent paper by Rousseau and Wachtel (2011) sheds light on how increasingly
large financial sectors negatively impact growth. They suggest that the increase in
credit loans have resulted in the weakening of the banking system. Moreover, Cecchetti
and Kharroubi (2015) suggest that the growth of large banks and the decrease in
more costly relationship banking has led to an increase in the importance of collateral
based loans. However, this also resulted in lower productivity and less risky projects
being financed, therefore leading to a slower aggregate productivity growth as well
as harming innovation and R&D. It is therefore important to know what makes for a
stable and efficient financial system.
Against this background, the thesis will investigate several questions related to the
direct and indirect impact of MNEs on local firms and the role of financial linkages
for this impact. First, we are interested in how the indirect effect of MNEs’ presence
are measured and whether including previously unexplored factors could explain the
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mixed results seen in the literature. Second, given that multinational networks are be-
coming increasingly important in the global economy, we investigate the direct impact
of MNE parents on the performance of their affiliates. Moreover, as the emergence of
multinational firms has promoted the expansion of large multinational banks as well
(see e.g. Poelhekke, 2015), we will look at whether financial development in the country
of the parent has a beneficial impact on its affiliates. Lastly, to mirror the developments
on the firm level side, we look at how the banking system has changed over time,
what these changes meant for financial stability and how this is reflected into the real
economy via the balance sheets of these banks.
1.2 Data
To be able to answer these questions, we require a significant amount of firm level
data both at the balance sheet level as well as on the ownership level. Most of the data
used to answer these questions comes from Amadeus, a European firm-level database
collected by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing. From Amadeus we construct
two new datasets AUGAMA, a panel of European firms for the period 1996-2011, and
EUMULNET, a European Multinational Network data set. In Chapter 2 we document
the process of building these datasets from the raw Amadeus data for 26 European
countries. Moreover, we show that the data sets adequately approximate the structure
of the European economy across countries, regions, and industries as portrayed by data
from Eurostat (Structural Business Statistics) and Cambridge Econometrics.
1.3 Indirect impact of MNEs on local firms
Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation both tackle indirect effects of MNEs on domestic
firms. More specifically, Chapter 3 investigates additional factors that might impact
how spillovers are transmitted between firms. Previous literature often finds mixed
results of spillovers, especially in the case of horizontal ones. This however might be
explained by certain assumptions made when measuring the effect of multinational
presence. First, many papers assume that once MNEs enters a country, all domestic
firms will benefit from spillovers. However, this is not realistic, especially in bigger
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countries, where firms located further away might be impacted less by the presence
of the multinationals compared to firms close-by. This is in part due to the fact that
distance plays a significant role in how knowledge and technical improvements of
firms are transmitted (see e.g. Giroud, 2012). Second, often it is also assumed that this
indirect effect will be almost instantaneous. This is again highly unlikely, as learning
from multinationals might take time (see e.g. Merlevede, Schoors, and Spatareanu,
2014). The third chapter of this dissertation therefore combines the effect of distance
and time for looking at how foreign direct investment impacts the productivity of local
firms. We indeed find that for vertical spillovers distance is crucial, as local suppliers of
foreign firms will benefit if located at short distances from MNEs. A positive effect on
local competitors via horizontal spillovers is not significantly affected by distance but
requires the presence of mature foreign firms, as channels such as labour mobility and
competition work over a longer time horizon.
Having seen how important distance is for spillovers transmission, the fourth chap-
ter looks at the role of borders in how domestic firms are affected by multinational
presence. So far the literature has assumed that spillovers are bound to the country of
MNE’s location, but especially in the European Union, where we have seen a deeper
economic integration taking place, borders might be less of a barrier for spillovers
to materialize. To this end we use a panel of firms from Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries, where previous studies have confirmed the existence of country-wide
spillovers. We analyse whether borders are a strong enough barrier for FDI spillovers
from for example Austria and Germany to reach neighbouring countries such as Slo-
vakia or Poland, or whether borders are porous enough to allow for productivity
improvement to cross them. We find that national borders constitute an almost insur-
mountable barrier for horizontal and vertical spillovers from MNEs to the domestic
buyers of their products. In the case of vertical spillovers from MNEs to local input
suppliers, national borders significantly dampen cross-border spillover effects, but the
size of the impact of the border seems related to the regional and economic integration
in the border area, as proxied by the existence of the Schengen agreement.
All in all, our findings explain to some extent the mixed results found so far in
the literature concerning the horizontal spillovers, which require time to materialize.
Moreover, we shed light on how vertical spillovers spread from MNEs to their domestic
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suppliers. Mainly, we find evidence of importance of proximity as well as the existence,
albeit weaker, of cross-border spillovers in Central and Eastern European countries.
This points towards a greater integration of the European internal market, where
national borders play an ever smaller role in maintaining economic barriers between
countries and allow for cross-country technology diffusion.
1.4 Direct impact of MNEs on their affiliates and the role
of financial linkages
Chapter 5 explores the direct effects of MNE presence. Using the EMULNET
database developed in Chapter 2, we revisit the question of whether being owned
by a multinational is bad for affiliate survival or not, as MNEs are often found to close
their affiliates more easily than domestic firms (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 2007).
Moreover, the crisis has shown that MNEs will choose to keep some affiliates at the cost
of closing down others, as those with stronger vertical ties have done better. Therefore,
this chapter investigates what motivates MNE decision to divest and which character-
istics would best predict the exit of their affiliates. We not only consider traditional
affiliate characteristics such as age, size and productivity, but include firm-level parent
characteristics as well. Moreover, having just experienced a significant financial crisis,
which started in the banking sector and ultimately reached the real economy, this
chapter explores differences in affiliate performance through the cycle, that is both
before and after the crisis, to identify which characteristics of firms or parents improve
their chances of survival. Finally, since credit constraints of the parent might play a
role, we extend previous literature by investigating the role of financial development of
the parent’s country in predicting affiliate exit.
We find that once we control for parent performance, affiliates of multinationals and
more diversified parents decreases affiliate exit. Moreover, we find some evidence that
exit is less likely if affiliates are owned by parents from countries with more developed
financial markets, as proxied by domestic credit to consumers. While most factors
are robust to the crisis years, the role of MNE’s country financial development in
improving affiliate survival is less so. On the contrary, investment in affiliates seems to
be pro-cyclical, with the beneficial effect of having a parent with easier access to capital
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breaking down during the crisis years.
1.5 Bank size and the real economy
The recent Global Financial Crisis originated in the US, with devastating conse-
quences for both global trade and economic development (see e.g. Bems, Johnson, and
Yi, 2012). Given how important having a healthy financial system is for economic and
productivity growth, in Chapter 6 we look at the impact of banks on the real economy.
We do so by analysing the evolution of the size and correlation of returns on assets of US
banks, as that captures the wave of concentration and deeper interconnectedness that
has emerged in the US but also at the global level. Partly due to a wave of liberalisation
and deeper economic integration, we can track the evolution of ever larger banks and
relate that to an increase in systemic risk.
Our results suggest that the largest banks are too big for the system to be able to
absorb potential high increases in correlation between these banks, therefore posing
a risk for the entire system. Moreover, a closer look at their balance sheets suggest a
shift in the business models of larger banks towards non-interest income generated by
banking services and away from financing the real economy. We conjecture that the
financial sector would benefit from scaling down and pursuing more traditional bank
business models.
1.6 Suggestions for future research
This dissertation takes a view on the direct and indirect impact of multinational
firms on other firms, the role of financial linkages as well as the impact of banks on the
real economy. We identify important channels via which firms can absorb technological
improvements, learn from each other as well as what factors will impact survival of
firms in times of economic prosperity or crisis. We find that financial development
and internal credit channels between MNEs and their affiliates play a role in affiliate
survival but that, unfortunately, this relationship breaks down during the crisis. As the
literature on the role of finance for economic performance of firms is underdeveloped,
future research should focus on understanding better the role of banks in financing
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firms, as well as how internal capital markets of large multinational networks function.
Moreover, we can explore further the channels of technological transmission and how
to improve this process in order to benefit most from innovation and economic growth.
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Multinational Networks, Domestic, and
Foreign Firms in Europe?
2.1 Introduction
This chapter in detail documents the build of a large pan-European firm-level data
set, AUGAMA (‘Augmented Amadeus’), with the aim to serve as a reference for future
work. We extensively document our ‘augmentation’ that overcomes drawbacks -from
an academic point of view- related to the way the data-provider, Bureau Van Dijk
Electronic Publishing (BvDEP), issues the database. The advantage of our data is that it
covers cross-country comparable firm-level data for 26 European countries in a single
dataset. This allows for cross-country research at the firm level while maintaining
representativeness that is comparable to other recent efforts (see for example CompNet
(CompNet, 2014)). Our approach also improves the data with respect to exit and entry
patterns. The chapter further documents the build of a dataset of European multina-
tional networks, EUMULNET. This dataset uses raw data from the Amadeus database
by BVDEP as well. Both databases cover the following European countries: Austria, Bel-
?This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Bruno Merlevede, Karolien Lenaerts and Matthijs De
Zwaan.
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gium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Finland, France,
United Kingdom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Slovenia, and Slovak Republic.
We document representativeness across countries, industries, and regions. We then
enrich the database with a measure of total factor productivity using the Wooldridge-
Levinsohn-Petrin methodology (see Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), Wooldridge (2009),
and Petrin and Levinsohn (2012)).
In the final part of the chapter we present a set of empirical applications that makes
use of the datasets to test a number of results from the theoretical literature regarding
the productivity of multinational firms vis-a-vis domestic firms. Specifically, in line with
(Markusen, 1995), we show that foreign firms are more productive than their domestic
counterparts. We show that the TFP premium of foreign over domestic firms on average
amounts to 48% in AUGAMA. Theoretical work further suggests that only the most
productive domestic firms will engage in foreign direct investment (FDI) (see Helpman
et al. (2004) for horizontal and Antràs and Helpman (2004) for vertical investment),
because only the most productive firms are able to cover the costs associated with
this investment. Using EUMULNET we show these predictions to hold for European
multinationals. For a matched sample of foreign and domestic firms (following Alfaro
and Chen (2012)) we find that foreign firms grow faster than domestic firms both pre
and post crisis.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 documents the construction of
the AUGAMA database. In Section 2.3 we consider overall representativeness of the
data, while in section 2.4 the focus is on representativeness of the data in the industry
and region dimension. In Section 2.5, we introduce the EUMULNET data. Section 2.6
discusses the estimation of total factor productivity and in Section 2.7 uses estimated
TFP in different applications comparing total factor productivity (growth) of domestic
and foreign firms. Section 2.8 concludes this chapter.
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2.2 Database
2.2.1 The Amadeus database: basic data source
Raw data are taken from the Amadeus database provided by Bureau van Dijk
Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). The Amadeus database is a pan-European database
that comprises financial information on public and private companies. BvDEP gathers
data from different local, i.e. country-specific, data providers and assembles them into
a single database using a comparable format. Additionally, BvDEP assembles further
information from firms’ annual reports, media coverage, and other sources. It is not
clear whether this is done for all firms and countries, but a bias towards large and listed
firms seems likely.1 The Amadeus database is available in different flavours depending
on the application of some thresholds for firms to be included. Our data originate from
the ‘full’ version where no thresholds are applied and all available firms are included in
the database. The database contains both consolidated and unconsolidated accounts.
We only consider firms that report unconsolidated accounts. This involves discarding
less than 1% of firms (that only report consolidated accounts).
The Amadeus database provides the balance sheet and the profit and loss account of
firms, information is not available at plant or establishment level. Financial information
is aggregated up to a format that is comparable across European countries. Bearing in
mind cross-country differences (in Europe) in terms of accounting formats, detailed
items that potentially are available for specific countries are not included in Amadeus
(e.g. the social balance sheet in Belgium). In addition to the financial information the
database also provides us with information on the firm’s main activity, its location,
its date of incorporation, its ownership structure, and its affiliate structure (if the firm
has any). The database further provides us with an unique firm ID that allows to link
firms across different versions (cf. infra). A firm ID consists of 2-digit country initials
followed by a number which is typically a VAT number or a registration number.
1If some of the larger firms are missing, it could be due to the reporting standards in the country of
incorporation. (e.g In the United Kingdom and Ireland limited companies are not legally required to
report any form of accounts, allowing these to protect their finances from the public view. ) Moreover,
in this database we only look at unconsolidated accounts, which might overlook some of the larger
corporations reporting their accounts in a consolidated way only.
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2.2.2 Augmenting Amadeus using multiple issues
BvDEP regularly updates the Amadeus database. Aside from the continuously
updated online version, a physical DVD/BLURAY of the database is released monthly.
We use the following issues of the DVDs to create our data set: 60, 72, 84, 96, 108, 119,
132, 144, 156, 168, 180, 192, 204 (September issue of years 1998–2010) and issues 210 and
220. By making use of a ‘time series’ of DVDs we overcome a number of issues that
arise from the use of a single issue of the database. One may identify the following
three limitations of a single issue of the database.
The first limitation is that a single issue only includes at most the last ten available
years of financial information for an individual firm. We start from financial information
that is available from the most recent issue of the database (i.e. issue 220). We then work
our way back to earlier years using information from previous versions, starting with
the second most recent version and so on.2 For any given financial item and calendar
year our rule is to prefer information from an issue as recent as possible. This procedure
allows us to obtain a maximal time span of 18 years for an individual firm (i.e. years
1995-2012).3
Second, firms that go out of business are dropped fairly rapidly from the Amadeus
database.4 Our time series approach therefore allows for better tracking of exit and
short-lived entry over the period covered. Firms report their date of incorporation
which we use to determine entry and a firm’s age. We define the year of exit as ‘sample
exit’, i.e. the last year a firm reports basic financial information without showing up
in later years in the database. We take potential changes in firm IDs into account by
applying the ID changes listed on BvDEP’s dedicated website to earlier versions of
the database.5 Additionally, we check the help files of individual issues of Amadeus
to control for systematic changes in firm IDs.6 The updating of firm IDs from earlier
2The most recent issue is version 220 in the current version of our data set. However, we did use version
228 to fill out missing financial information for the year 2012 for firms not yet reporting balance sheet
and profit and loss account in the 220 issue.
3We have 18,732,383 observations available for 3,649,965 firms to estimate total factor productivity (TFP).
The average time span is 6.1 years.
4In recent versions of the database, a larger set of firms exiting the market more than two or three years
earlier seems to be available for some countries. This is not the case for earlier versions of the database.
5In Germany, Austria and Italy a firm’s ID will change if it moves to another region, while in Spain this
will happen if the firm changes legal form.
6For example, in Belgium the firm ID is based on the VAT number. Recently, the administration added an
additional zero in front of the existing 9-digit VAT numbers. For data retrieved from older issues we
added the additional zero that was introduced in the official VAT number to the ID to have a comparable
14
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versions avoids treating changes in firm IDs as exit. Moreover, aside from structural
changes, a very small amount of ID changes recorded are due to mergers and acquisi-
tions. Since we will update the ID of the firm to its most recent identifier, it is possible
that these firms are dropped out due to a conflict in financial information belonging to
the same identifier (e.g. acquirer and acquiree). Nonetheless, as according to Bureau
van Dijk this happens very rarely, we do not keep track of these firms. Therefore, an
exit in the data would only take into account those firms that stopped operating, due to
bankruptcy or other non M&A related reason.
Third, BvDEP updates individual ownership links between legal entities rather
than the full ownership structure of firms. The ownership information in a specific
issue of Amadeus therefore often consists of a number of ownership links. A single
issue of the database only contains the most recent information on ownership links
and therefore does not allow to track changes in ownership structure.7 Our ‘time
series’ approach remedies this limitation as it allows us to construct a time series of
foreign ownership. We use ownership information to separate foreign firms from
domestic firms (in Amadeus the variables are the following: ‘shareholder ID’, ‘shareholder
name’, ‘shareholder direct %’, ‘shareholder total %’, and ‘shareholder country’). We focus
on direct shareholder links to determine whether a firm is foreign-owned or not.8
BvDEP updates individual ownership links rather than the entire ownership structure,
therefore each ownership link in a given issue has a reference date which may differ
even up to a couple of years. Because ownership link information is updated irregularly,
there is not necessarily for each firm-owner-year combination information available.
Further, the BvDEP ownership manual suggests that the date of an ownership link is
not always updated when it is verified at a later point in time. We therefore assume that
all reported ownership information is valid at the moment when the specific version
of Amadeus is issued and assign all ownership information of a given version (that
sums to 100% in the vast majority of cases) to the year of the issue.9 In line with a
ID across different issues. For Romania we detected an even more drastic change from the Chamber of
Commerce number to the VAT number as a basis for a firm’s ID.
7More recent versions do contain some history on ownership links, but not all the way back to the late
1990s.
8For part of the firms an ultimate owner is also recorded, but this is often only the case for larger firms.
Quite often ultimate owners are individuals. For example, Lakshmi Mittal or the Mittal family are
sometimes recorded as ultimate owner of Mittal steel affiliates in Europe.
9In Merlevede et al. (2014) we experiment with a dataset at the firm-owner-year-level for Romania with
the available information on ownership links from Amadeus. There, we fill out missing firm-owner-
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common definition applied by e.g. the OECD and the IMF, we require that at least 10%
of shares are owned by a single foreign investor for a firm to be considered foreign.10
Foreign owners are owners with a known nationality that differs from the host country
nationality. If the country of origin is not known (in some countries not all small firms
report ownership) we consider these owners as domestic. We also keep track of the
percentage of shares owned by foreign firms. This allows us to separate majority from
minority foreign-owned firms or to apply a more stringent definition and only consider
firms as foreign if more than 50% of shares is foreign-controlled.
2.2.3 Industry classification
The raw Amadeus data provide us with a primary 4-digit code in the European
NACE classification of activities. NACE stands for “Nomenclature Statistique des Activ-
ités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes”. Our time series approach to the
database implies that we have annual industry codes for firms. We deal with potential
variation in industry codes by creating different versions of our industry classification
used in the data. If a firm reports the same code in the first and last year of information,
we use that code throughout the entire period. For firms where only the fourth or the
third (and fourth) digit are different between the first and last year’s code we use the
code of the last year. If a code is a clear outlier in the firm’s time series, that code-year
is ignored. For the remaining firms that show more ‘bumpy’ patterns (this is only a
limited number of cases) we consider three alternatives. First we simply use the most
recent code; second we use the most frequent code; and third we use the most recent
code but allow for ‘structural breaks’. A structural break is defined as a firm reporting
two different codes with a single break and the less frequent code appearing in at least
three years (versions) of the raw data. The first alternative serves as our basis, while
the others are available for robustness tests. As indicated above, this issue comes up
year-entries under restriction that the full ownership structure cannot exceed 100%. In case of time gaps
between entries for the same owner-firm combination but with a different share-size we assume that
changes show up immediately in the database. We then fill out the gaps with the older information.
In the end, this more elaborated but very cumbersome procedure (the majority of owners have no ID
number and need to be matched by names that tend to show lots of small variations across versions) does
reveal only marginal differences with our current approach. We therefore apply the more straightforward
procedure of assigning all ownership information (i.e. the ownership structure) to the year of the issue
from which the information is retrieved.
10A firm of which only 5% of shares are owned by one or more foreign firms is considered a domestic firm.
We observe 29,208 ownership changes from domestic to foreign or vice versa.
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only in a limited number of cases.
Our firms are classified according to revision 1.1 of the NACE nomenclature. Re-
vision 2 of the classification became the standard classification near the end of our
sample period. Because most of the firm-level information and most of our other data
(cf. infra) refer to NACE revision 1.1, we opted to convert the industry codes of young
firms at the end of the sample for which we only observe a NACE revision 2 code to
revision 1.1 codes (because they are only included in the later issues of the database).
For older firms we have a revision 1.1 code from the earlier versions. To convert the
codes we use a conversion table obtained from Eurostat. In the conversion table most
old codes match in multiple new codes (or vice versa). We deal with this issue in two
alternative ways. One way is deterministic in the sense that we start from the available
one-to-one matches and exclude these from multiple matches where these codes are
mentioned. Transforming this into an iterative procedure results in a large number
of one-to-one matches. For the remaining many-to-many matches we obtain a single
match by preferring manufacturing over agriculture and services. Our second approach
randomly matches a revision 2 code with one of the possible revision 1.1 matches from
the conversion table. Random matching is performed firm by firm, not industry by
industry. The deterministic approach serves as our basis, while the randomisation
is available as robustness check. Note that for the vast majority of firms we have an
original NACE revision 1.1 code from the Amadeus database.
Although a 4-digit code is available, we mostly rely on 2-digit (or slightly more
aggregated) industry classifications for practical implementation (TFP estimations for
example). In Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix a list of the industries used is provided.
2.2.4 Location of firms: Region classification
In AUGAMA regions are defined using the EU’s NUTS-classification (‘Nomenclature
of territorial units for statistics’) which is a hierarchical system for dividing the economic
territory of the EU. In Table 2.A.3 in the Appendix we list the main criteria and an
example of the NUTS-structure. Firms are assigned to a region on the basis of their zip
code, which is available in Amadeus. Eurostat provides tables mapping zip codes into
NUTS regions for most countries. For other countries we rely on national data sources
(the Eurostat website provides contact details). When a zip code is not available for a
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firm, we try to map the ‘region’-variable reported in Amadeus to the NUTS-classification.
As with the industry classification above, our time series approach to the database
implies that we have annual zip codes for firms. We deal with potential time variation
by creating different versions of the regional classification. If a firm reports the same
zip code in the first and last year of information, we use that code throughout the entire
time period. When a code is clearly a one-time outlier in the firm’s time series, that
code-year is ignored and replaced. For the limited number of firms that change zip
code, we consider three alternatives. First we simply use the most recent zip code to
assign the firm to a region; second we use the most frequent zip code; and third we
allow a ‘structural break’ for firms reporting two different zip codes with a single break
that implies that the less frequent code appears in at least three years of the raw data.
The first alternative serves as our basis, while the others are available for robustness
tests. As with the industry classification above, the large majority of firms consistently
reports the same zip code throughout the different versions.
We account for changes in the NUTS classification itself by means of conversion
tables retrieved from the Eurostat website. In our data we use the 2006 vintage of the
NUTS-classification. Where other data sources use a different version of the NUTS
classification (e.g. the Cambridge Econometrics data described below), we reclassify
the NUTS codes in the data. In most cases, codes change because of slight modifications
of the area definition, such as border shifts. Since these shifts are small and unlikely to
have important economic consequences, we rename the new code back to the old, and
merge with our data. In other cases, regions are split or merged. Where a one-to-one
correspondence between codes is straightforward to establish, we do so. Where it is
not (as for example in the case where two old regions are split into more than two new
regions), we distribute data values proportionally over those regions. In most cases, re-
gions are redefined at the NUTS 3 level, and have no impact at the NUTS 2 distribution.
Moreover, since such changes always involve bordering regions, regional differences
are never very pronounced. Eurostat discusses changes in the NUTS classification
in its publications on ‘Regions in the European Union’ (e.g. European Commission,
2011), and provides spreadsheets for changes between differences NUTS vintages at its
website.11
11http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/history_nuts
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2.2.5 Deflation and currency
The data retrieved from Amadeus are downloaded in units of national currency. In
order to make cross-country comparisons, these data are converted to Euro. Because our
price deflators refer to national currency, we first deflate the data in national currency
to obtain unit equivalents and then convert them to Euro using 2005 exchange rates.12
By making use of the 2005 exchange rate we avoid the exchange rate movements
driving our results in cross-country comparisons (see Gal, 2013). We choose 2005 as
reference year because it corresponds to the middle of our sample and we prefer to
avoid the later years when most of European economies experienced the the Global
Financial Crisis. We believe this choice provides the least unbiased TFP estimates.
For Euro-zone countries earlier data in the old national currency are converted using
the Euro-entry conversion rate. For countries adopting the Euro more recently (e.g.
Slovenia) financial information dating before Euro adoption was converted to Euro by
BvDEP using concurrent exchange rates. These data were converted by multiplying
them with the ratio of the Euro-entry conversion rate and the concurrent exchange rate.
Our main data source for output deflators is the EU KLEMS database. These
deflators have been incorporated and updated by Eurostat. We use EU KLEMS data up
to the year 2005 and then continue with Eurostat data. For the last three years of our
sample NACE revision (rev.) 1.1 price deflators are no longer available (nor are NACE
rev. 2 price deflators for the earlier years). We therefore apply the percentage change of
a corresponding NACE rev. 2 series to the later years of the NACE rev. 1.1 series (both
revisions do report similar broad categories such as e.g. food processing). We define our
capital deflator as the average of the following five NACE rev. 1.1 industries: machinery
and equipment (29); office machinery and computing (30); electrical machinery and
apparatus (31); motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (34); and other transport
equipment (35) (see Javorcik, 2004). We calculate an intermediate input deflator as a
weighted average of output deflators where country-time-industry-specific weights
are based on intermediate input uses retrieved from input-output tables. We obtain
most input-output tables from Eurostat.13 For countries for which Eurostat does not yet
provide input-output tables, we use input-output tables from the World Input-Output
12For comparison with Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics (SBS) database (c f . in f ra), data in national
currency are converted to Euro with annual exchange rates rather than 2005 fixed exchange rates.
13For most countries we have IO-tables for 1995, 2000, and 2005.
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Database which are slightly more aggregated in terms of industries (Eurostat tables are
at NACE 2-digit level) (Timmer, 2012).
Value added is double deflated, i.e. real value added is calculated as output de-
flated with an output deflator minus intermediate use deflated with the calculated
intermediate input deflator.14 Note that making use of industry-level deflators has
some implications for our measure of total factor productivity (cf. infra).
2.2.6 Variable definitions
We define the following variables. Output Y is measured as ‘operating revenue
turnover’, real output y is obtained by deflating Y by producer price indices of the
appropriate NACE industry (cf. supra). Value added VA is defined as output minus
intermediates M, i.e. operating revenue minus ‘material costs’ (from the Amadeus
database).15 Real value added va is double deflated and defined as real output y
minus real material costs m. The latter are defined as material costs deflated by the
intermediate input deflator defined above. Labour L is the ‘number of employees’ (end-
of-period). Capital K is measured by ‘tangible fixed assets’, real capital k is obtained by
deflating K by the capital deflator defined above. The age of a firm is calculated on
the basis of its ‘date of incorporation’. We have information on the number of months
accounts refer to. We use this information to convert flow variables (operating revenues,
material costs, and thus value added) to twelve month equivalents as far as the number
of months is not below 6 or above 24. Outside these boundaries variables are set
to missing. End-of-period variables such as tangible fixed assets and the number of
employees are unchanged. The number of non-12 months accounts is very small and
generally below 0.5% for a country-industry-year cell. We define labour productivity as
operating revenues divided by the number of employees and estimate a measure of total
factor productivity (TFP). We prefer total factor productivity to labour productivity as
the latter does not control for intermediate inputs usage and capital intensity differences
across firms (Gal, 2013).
The strength of AUGAMA is that it provides information for firms from many
14For Croatia we do not have detailed prices, nor IO-tables.
15Amadeus does contain value added figures for some countries that are either obtained directly from
the data-provider or are calculated using an accounting definition, but gauging from the manual, the
definition differs across countries.
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countries and industries for more than 15 years including the Great Recession and
Euro crisis period. These are important features as the CompNet Task Force notes
that “firm-level analysis in Europe is hampered by a lack of sufficient and comparable data
across countries” (CompNet, 2014). There are however some caveats one needs to bear
in mind when interpreting results obtained using AUGAMA in empirical analysis.
Regarding the measurement of real output, we have no data on output quantities
but can only observe output expressed in terms of revenue. As indicated above,
output is deflated with industry-level price deflators as we do not have firm-level price
deflators. This implies that we are only able to consider TFPR and not TFPQ (total
factor productivity in terms of revenue rather than quantity). According to Syverson
(2011) this approach is satisfactory when differences in prices only reflect differences
in product quality. When differences in prices also reflect differences in market power,
measured efficiency/productivity of firms will also reflect market power (Syverson,
2011). On the input side we have information on the total number of employees, but
not on the total number of hours worked nor on other employee characteristics, such as
skill levels.16 Estimated productivity levels should therefore be thought of as including
labour quality and capacity utilisation (Gal, 2013). The Amadeus database provides
data on the total stock of ‘tangible fixed assets’, but more detail is not available. Changes
in (capital) capacity utilisation can thus not be accounted for. Note that these issues
are not specific to our data set, but are faced by many micro-level data and studies (e.g.
CompNet, 2014, or Gal, 2013).
2.2.7 Basic data cleaning
First, negative values of the number of employees, tangible fixed assets, operating
revenue, sales, material costs, and value added (defined as the difference between
turnover and material costs) are set to missing. We then calculate growth rates of the
aforementioned variables and replace observations associated with growth rates below
16Total wage costs, ‘costs of employees’, are reported in Amadeus, and in principle could be used as a quality
adjusted labour input. The variable is filled out less frequently, however, and more importantly it is
also prone to cross-country differences in the regulatory framework (e.g. social security contributions).
Therefore it is likely to be a good reflection of actual labour costs, but cross-country comparisons in terms
of ‘quality’ are not recommendable. Further, it is not always clear from the Amadeus manual whether
the definition of ‘costs of employees’ is similar across countries (e.g. whether management compensation is
included or not). For this reason, we restrict ourselves to the number of employees as labour input.
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Figure 2.1: Number of firms in Europe according to Eurostat SBS (Structural Business
Statistics) and AUGAMA (1995–2011)
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Notes: AUGAMA: all active firms and all firms with WLP-TFP available are displayed. Countries
included are AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, SE,
SI, and SK (HR is not available in SBS).
(above) the 1st (99th) percentile with missing values (cf. CompNet (2014)). Further
cleaning, e.g. after TFP estimation, is done in function of specific applications of the
data for specific research questions.
2.3 Representativeness
In this Section we discuss AUGAMA in terms of coverage and representativeness.
Our main comparison base is the Structural Business Statistics database (SBS) provided
by Eurostat.17 SBS data in NACE revision 1.1 are available for the period 2002–2007
(2003–2007 for some countries). We use this period to infer the representativeness of
our data set. We consider firms in the ‘business economy’ (mining, manufacturing,
construction, and services, excluding financial services), i.e. NACE 2-digit codes 10
to 74, excluding 65 to 67. Table 2.A.1 in the Appendix lists all the 2-digit industries
17We think of the SBS data as providing the population of firms. Do note that SBS data are retrieved from
surveys with incomplete coverage of the population of firms for some countries, which might result
in ratios above 100% (CompNet, 2014). Furthermore, it is not always clear whether SBS data consider
only companies or a larger set of business entities which also includes sole proprietors. Nonetheless, we
think a comparison is warranted since its statistical unit, the enterprise, is defined as “an organizational
unit producing goods or services, which benefits from a certain degree of autonomy in decision-making,
especially for the allocation of its current resource” (see European Council (1993)), thus providing a good
estimate of European economic activity.
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Figure 2.2: Number of firms reporting employment and number of firms with WLP-TFP in
AUGAMA (1995–2011)
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Countries included are AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, NL, NO, PL,
PT, RO, SE, SI, and SK (HR is not available in SBS).
included in AUGAMA. In order to get a first broad overview Figure 2.1 plots the
number of firms over time.18 The SBS data count more than 20 million firms in Europe
(some countries do not report numbers in 2002, hence the ‘jump’ in 2003). We see a
gradual increase in the number of active firms recorded in Amadeus from about five to
fifteen million firms from 1995 tot 2011. In 2007 this accounts for 55% of SBS firms, up
from 45% in 2003. These numbers are smaller when we only count firms that report
the variables necessary to obtain a measure of total factor productivity based on the
Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin estimator, WLP-TFP (see Wooldridge, 2009 and Petrin
and Levinsohn, 2012; c f . in f ra). From Figure 2.2 one can infer that the number of firms
for which we are able to estimate TFP also steadily increases to more than 1.5 million
observations from 2007 onwards (from 5% (2003) to 6.9% (2007) of the number of SBS
firms). The number of firms that at least report employment is considerably higher
(12.7% of SBS firms in 2007).
Table 2.1 shows further numbers illustrating representativeness in columns two to
five. The entries in Table 2.1 are based on AUGAMA corrected for outliers following the
procedure described above. The percentages shown are averaged over industry-time
cells by country. A country-industry-time cell in this case is defined by the host country,
18Countries included are: AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, NL, NO, PL,
PT, RO, SE, SI, and SK. HR is not reported in SBS.
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a broad NACE category (SBS does not report finer detail, see Table 2.A.1), and the
year of observation. Based on the information from AUGAMA, a firm is assigned
to a cell. After assigning firms to cells we calculate cell aggregates (total number of
firms, employees, total turnover, and total labour costs) and create the ratio with the
corresponding aggregate from the SBS data. The numbers in Table 2.1 are obtained by
averaging over industry-time cells by country. Note that calculations are based on all
firms that report the indicated variable and that ‘coverage’ in this respect may differ not
only between countries, but also within countries across variables. Table 2.1 reveals that
coverage in terms of the number of firms ranges from a low of 5.2% for the Netherlands
to a high of 86.9% in Estonia. On average over countries we observe a quarter of
SBS firms. The coverage in terms of total employment, labour costs, and turnover is
higher and indicates that AUGAMA typically includes larger firms. Averaged over
countries, AUGAMA accounts for about 60% of employment and turnover and 53% of
wage costs. The last four columns of Table 2.1 reveal that our data set is slightly biased
towards manufacturing firms in comparison to what is reported in SBS statistics (count
of firms), but the discrepancy falls within very reasonable margins.19 Table 2.2 shows
the distribution of firm size according to both SBS data and AUGAMA. AUGAMA
is generally biased towards larger firms (especially firms with between 20 and 249
employees). In most countries this bias increases when we focus on firms for which
WLP-TFP is available, but not to a large extent.20
The dispersion across countries in representativeness in terms of the number of
firms found, and to a lesser extent in terms of the number of employees, turnover and
wage costs (see Table 2.1) is mainly due to differences in the coverage of small firms.
When we focus on a sample of firms with on average more than 20 employees (as in e.g.
Gal, 2013 and CompNet, 2014), the sample becomes more balanced in cross-country
terms. Figure 2.3 plots the difference between a country’s share in the number of firms
according to SBS data and its share in the number of firms according to AUGAMA
in 2007, against the resulting change in the share in the number of firms according
to AUGAMA when a cut-off of at least 20 employees (on average by firm) is applied
19To account for these firm, industry and country misalignments from the population a reweighing of the
sample could be used, by which under-represented firms are given a larger weight.
20For AT, BE, DE, and LV we record larger changes. In Belgium, for example, this is due to the fact that
most smaller firms file an abridged account and are not obliged to report material costs.
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Figure 2.3: The impact of a 20 employee cut-off on the distribution of firms across countries:
Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (SBS) and AUGAMA in 2007
Difference between a country’s share in number of firms in SBS compared to AUGAMA plotted against
the change in a country’ share in AUGAMA when a 20 employee cut-off is applied.
to the data. There is a clear relation between a country’s share falling short of the
SBS share (more to the right on the horizontal axis) and an increase in its share when
applying the cut-off (more to the top on the vertical axis). This brings the cross-country
distribution closer to the SBS data. Figure 2.4 shows the number of firms with more
than 20 employees for SBS and the number of firms with more than 20 employees and
WLP-TFP available for AUGAMA.21 By 2007 our TFP-sample accounts for a quarter
of the number of firms with more than 20 employees. Tables 2.A.5 and 2.A.6 in the
Appendix list the annual number of observations in the TFP sample for all firms and
foreign firms separately.
21DK, GB and IE are not included in the figure because one of the variables for TFP-calculation is missing
for all firms. GR and LT are included but only have a very small sample of TFP firms, either limited in
the time dimension (GR) or limited in coverage (LT).
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Figure 2.4: Number of firms when applying a 20 employee cut-off in Eurostat Structural
Business Statistics (SBS) and AUGAMA (2002–2007)
17%
19%
21%
23%
25%
27%
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(1) # Firms with more than 20 Employees (SBS)
(2) # Firms with more than 20 Employees and TFP available (AUGAMA)
(3) # Firms as share of SBS # Firms ((1)/(2); secondary axis)
AUGAMA: only firms with WLP-TFP available are considered. Ratio of number of firms in AUGAMA
and SBS displayed on secondary axis on the right.
2.4 Representativeness of economic activity across indus-
tries and regions
In this Section we focus on representativeness of AUGAMA in terms of the distri-
bution of economic activity across industries and across regions (within individual
countries and within ‘Europe’). Representativeness across industries is presented as
the correlation of total industry activity recorded in AUGAMA with the total activity
reported in SBS statistics. Industries are defined as 21 ‘broad’ industries grouping
sometimes several NACE 2-digit industries (see Table 2.A.1 in Appendix) as this is the
level of aggregation reported in the SBS statistics. The period considered is generally
2002–2007, which is determined by the availability of SBS statistics in NACE revision
1.1. As indicators of activity we consider output, employment, wage costs, and material
costs. Table 2.3 contains the pairwise correlations for all countries in the sample. The
correlations are always positive and statistically significant. The majority of correlations
is well above 0.75. This especially holds for output and employment. For wage costs
and material costs correlations are generally somewhat lower, but still statistically
significant. Table 2.3 clearly indicates that the distribution across industries found in
AUGAMA is very well aligned with the distribution derived from SBS statistics.
We compare the regional distribution of economic activity found in AUGAMA
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Table 2.3: Pairwise correlation coefficients of economic indicator totals for broad industries
as calculated from AUGAMA and recorded in Eurostat SBS
Output Employment Wage costs Material
costs
AT 0.76 0.87 0.65 0.64
BE 0.97 0.97 0.79 0.98
BG 0.94 0.87 0.82 0.88
CZ 0.97 0.98 0.82 0.95
DE 0.92 0.91 0.77 0.93
DK 0.92 0.94 0.81 -
EE 0.96 0.91 0.64 0.82
ES 0.98 0.99 0.71 0.99
FI 0.77 0.88 0.74 0.55
FR 0.95 0.96 0.84 0.91
GB 0.97 0.94 0.69 -
GR 0.80 0.84 - -
HR - - - -
HU 0.75 0.81 0.74 0.72
IE 0.81 0.90 0.26(a) -
IT 0.86 0.96 0.82 0.67
LT 0.81 0.83 - -
LV 0.97 0.92 0.41 0.54
NL 0.80 0.71 0.50 0.83
NO 0.94 0.98 0.63 0.93
PL 0.90 0.95 0.68 0.83
PT 0.75 0.51 0.50 0.65
RO 0.98 0.99 0.88 0.89
SE 0.97 0.98 0.85 0.65
SI 0.96 0.98 0.71 0.96
SK 0.95 0.89 0.88 0.90
Period 2002-2007, except for BE and HU 2003-2007. All correlations are statistically significant at 5% level
except (a) where 0.26 is not significant (if we exclude the year 2002, we obtain a statistically significant
correlation of 0.47).
with the regional distribution we derive from the Cambridge Econometrics Regional
Database.22 We consider both within-country and Europe-wide regional representative-
ness of economic activity. The Europe-wide regional distribution might be affected by
differences in coverage across countries (see Table 2.1 above) while the within-country
regional distribution is not. For country-by-country or country-specific analysis within-
country distribution comparisons are relevant, whereas for Europe-wide regional
analysis the Europe-wide distributions’ comparison should be considered. Economic
22This database has been used in academic research by Becker et al. (2010, 2012), among others.
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activity is measured by the total number of employees and the total amount of gener-
ated value added in a specific region. Because before we detected a tendency towards
better representativeness of larger firms in countries with a lower overall coverage in
terms of the total number of firms, we may expect the distribution of economic activity
to be less affected as larger firms will account for the bulk of economic activity.
We consider two samples of industries: i) the business economy, i.e. NACE 2-digit
codes 10 to 74 (see Appendix), and ii) ‘broad’ manufacturing, i.e. NACE 2-digit codes 10
to 42. In case of the former Cambridge Econometrics data also cover financial services
(NACE 2-digit codes 65 to 67) which we do not consider in our data (cf. supra). As far
as the financial services sector’s regional distribution is more or less in line with the
distribution of other activity this should not have sizeable implications. Nevertheless,
one should bear this in mind interpreting comparisons below. Therefore we also
consider a more narrow definition labelled ‘broad’ manufacturing23 which is the most
detailed level provided in the Cambridge Econometrics database.
As a first indication we plot a map for the year 2005 in Figure 2.5 representing NUTS
2-digit regions’ share in total Europe-wide employment according to the Cambridge
Econometrics database (left panel) and AUGAMA (right panel). In Germany, the
Netherlands, and the UK the shares of the NUTS 2-digit regions seem smaller for
AUGAMA than for the Cambridge Econometrics data. In Figure 2.6 we plot similar
maps for German NUTS 3-digit regions’ share in total German broad manufacturing
employment. The comparison of both panels suggests that AUGAMA very reasonably
approximates the distribution of German economic activity for this sample.
In Tables 2.4 and 2.5 we quantify the information visualised in the maps by cal-
culating the amount of economic activity (employment) that needs to switch region
to align the distribution of regional economic activity obtained from AUGAMA with
the distribution according to the Cambridge Econometrics data. In Table 2.4 numbers
are obtained as the sum of absolute values of a region’s share in total European em-
ployment according to the Cambridge Econometrics data minus its share according
to AUGAMA divided by two.24 Over time the number is quite stable. For the sample
23‘Broad’ manufacturing includes Mining (10-14) and Utilities (41-42) in addition to ‘narrow’ pure manu-
facturing (15-37).
24There are a few regions where AUGAMA records zero (no) activity. Deleting or retaining these regions
from/in both databases prior to calculation does not affect conclusions.
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Figure 2.5: NUTS 2-digit regions’ share in total European employment in 2005 according to
the Cambridge Econometrics database and AUGAMA
Countries included: AT, BE, BG, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, HU, IE, IT, LT, LV, NL, PL, PT, RO,
SE, SI, and SK.
Figure 2.6: NUTS 3-digit regions’ share in total German employment in 2005 according to
the Cambridge Econometrics database and AUGAMA
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Table 2.4: Annual share of European employment that needs to switch region for the
AUGAMA regional distribution to equal the Cambridge Econometrics distribution
All available TFP Sample
Business Broad Business Broad
economy manufacturing economy manufacturing
2003 24.5 22.1 28.3 28.1
2004 23.6 21.5 28.6 27.4
2005 22.9 20.7 27.2 25.4
2006 20.4 18.6 24.1 22.5
2007 19.6 17.2 25.0 23.1
2008 20.5 17.5 25.4 23.3
2009 23.2 19.6 26.3 24.0
2010 21.6 18.6 27.9 25.7
Numbers are obtained as the sum of absolute differences between Cambridge Econometrics and
AUGAMA region shares divided by two.
of TFP firms about 25% of employment needs to switch regions across Europe for the
distributions obtained from the Cambridge Econometrics data and AUGAMA to be
equal. This suggests that to a large extent the distribution of activity in AUGAMA
follows the distribution of overall economic activity. For the ‘broad manufacturing’ in-
dustries numbers are generally smaller than for the business economy sample. Table 2.5
suggests that the bulk of this number refers to cross-country movement of employment.
Table 2.5 lists the amount of activity that needs to switch regions within a country to
match both distributions for the year 2005. For most countries this number is much
smaller than the average in Table 2.4. Only for Bulgaria, the Netherlands, and Portugal
the number is higher; only in Bulgaria this is the case for all samples considered.
Figure 2.7 is a scatter plot of within-country shares in employment of NUTS 2-digit
regions according to the AUGAMA database (horizontal axis) and the Cambridge
Econometrics database (vertical axis) for the year 2005. The Figure suggests a high
correlation between both measures. This is confirmed in Table 2.6 where pairwise
correlations (also for 2005) are listed for NUTS 3-digit regions’ share in within-country
economic activity (measured either as employment or value added). Using all regions
in all countries (i.e. row headed with ‘Europe’) the correlation varies between 0.71
and 0.87 according to the sample and activity measure. The correlation is always
statistically significant. If we calculate the correlation for the 24 countries as a whole
(in the NUTS classification these can be thought of as ‘0-digit’ regions) we obtain a
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Table 2.5: Share of employment that needs to switch region within-country for the
AUGAMA regional distribution to equal the Cambridge Econometrics distribution
All available TFP Sample
Business
economy
Broad man-
ufacturing
Business
economy
Broad man-
ufacturing
AT 14.5 10.3 20.5 17.5
BE 12.0 9.8 15.9 12.2
BG 34.6 27.0 36.4 29.7
CZ 12.6 7.0 12.4 7.1
DE 20.1 19.9 23.2 26.2
EE 15.1 14.9 14.9 17.1
ES 11.9 8.0 10.8 8.0
FI 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.6
FR 17.5 23.3 13.6 23.0
HU 9.1 12.1 11.2 11.8
IT 20.2 17.0 20.0 17.1
LV 13.7 9.2 17.6 17.5
NL 6.7 15.6 26.9 30.8
PL 15.0 11.2 19.5 15.9
PT 31.4 24.5 25.6 24.5
RO 18.7 15.8 18.0 15.7
SE 13.2 8.2 7.0 8.7
SI 5.5 6.5 5.8 6.5
SK 14.4 9.8 14.9 10.4
Numbers are obtained as the sum of absolute differences between Cambridge Econometrics and
AUGAMA region shares divided by two.
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Figure 2.7: Within country share in employment of European NUTS2 regions according to
the AUGAMA database and the Cambridge Econometrics database in 2005
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correlation coefficient of 0.96 for the sample used in the first column in Table 2.6 .
In the other rows of Table 2.6 we show the correlations over NUTS3 regions by
country. For most countries these correlations are high and statistically significant,
also for the countries with a larger number of regions.25 Only in the cases of Bulgaria,
Lithuania, and the Slovak Republic, the regional distribution of AUGAMA is less well
aligned with the one from the Cambridge Econometrics database. For Bulgaria and the
Slovak Republic this seems especially driven by the construction and services sectors
as the correlation becomes positive and statistically significant if we only consider
broad manufacturing. Though positive and significant, the correlation remains smaller
than that for most other countries. Overall, we conclude that AUGAMA captures the
regional distribution of economic activity fairly well. Bearing in mind some smaller
caveats highlighted by the above numbers, the use of AUGAMA for regional firm-level
analysis seems warranted.
25The conclusions from Table 2.6 are unchanged when we recalculate correlations after excluding -by
country- the most concentrated region that often looks like an ‘outlier’ compared to the other regions
(typically the most concentrated region is also the home of the capital).
34
2.4. Representativeness of economic activity across industries and regions
Ta
bl
e
2.
6:
P
ai
rw
is
e
co
rr
el
at
io
ns
of
w
it
hi
n-
co
u
nt
ry
sh
ar
es
of
N
U
T
S3
re
gi
on
s
in
ec
on
om
ic
ac
ti
vi
ty
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
A
U
G
A
M
A
an
d
C
am
br
id
ge
Ec
on
om
et
ri
cs
Bu
s.
Ec
on
.
Br
oa
d
m
an
uf
.
Bu
s.
Ec
on
.
Br
oa
d
m
an
uf
.
Bu
s.
Ec
on
.
Br
oa
d
m
an
uf
.
L
#r
eg
L
#r
eg
L
#r
eg
L
#r
eg
VA
#r
eg
VA
#r
eg
Eu
ro
pe
0.
80
3*
12
39
0.
75
3*
12
55
0.
87
2*
97
5
0.
83
2*
10
49
0.
72
3*
97
5
0.
70
9*
10
49
A
T
0.
98
5*
35
0.
97
4*
35
0.
96
4*
24
0.
94
1*
34
0.
98
6*
35
0.
85
7*
35
BE
0.
96
5*
44
0.
89
5*
44
0.
94
2*
39
0.
86
0*
44
0.
97
2*
44
0.
87
4*
44
BG
0.
15
4
28
0.
49
6*
28
0.
20
0
17
0.
44
8*
28
0.
34
6
28
0.
53
3*
28
C
Z
0.
92
3*
14
0.
73
7*
14
0.
92
3*
14
0.
74
4*
14
0.
97
0*
14
0.
86
4*
14
D
E
0.
87
1*
42
9
0.
73
0*
42
9
0.
85
8*
39
2
0.
78
8*
42
5
0.
75
8*
42
9
0.
60
1*
42
9
D
K
0.
93
6*
11
0.
93
5*
11
-
-
-
-
EE
0.
97
7*
5
0.
94
5*
5
0.
96
5*
5
0.
88
4*
5
0.
99
3*
5
0.
98
4*
5
ES
0.
97
3*
52
0.
99
1*
52
0.
97
9*
52
0.
99
0*
52
0.
96
8*
52
0.
98
4*
52
FI
0.
98
3*
6
0.
98
5*
6
0.
98
7*
6
0.
98
3*
6
0.
97
9*
6
0.
97
2*
6
FR
0.
90
7*
96
0.
62
3*
96
0.
90
3*
96
0.
62
8*
96
0.
91
3*
96
0.
77
1*
96
G
B
0.
66
4*
12
0
0.
40
2*
12
2
-
-
-
-
G
R
0.
99
1*
46
0.
99
3*
51
-
-
-
-
H
U
0.
97
9*
20
0.
90
2*
20
0.
96
6*
20
0.
87
1*
20
0.
98
9*
20
0.
90
8*
20
IE
0.
99
3*
8
0.
92
6*
8
-
-
-
-
IT
0.
95
4*
10
7
0.
94
7*
10
7
0.
95
5*
10
7
0.
94
7*
10
7
0.
95
6*
10
7
0.
94
3*
10
7
LT
0.
58
9
8
0.
59
6
8
-
-
-
-
LV
0.
99
5*
6
0.
99
1*
6
0.
94
8
3
0.
66
2
6
0.
82
7*
6
-0
.1
67
6
N
L
0.
98
3*
40
0.
84
1*
40
0.
88
6*
38
0.
74
7*
39
0.
85
8*
40
0.
70
6*
40
PL
0.
90
8*
66
0.
79
0*
66
0.
89
4*
66
0.
75
1*
66
0.
96
6*
66
0.
77
6*
66
PT
0.
95
0*
16
0.
83
0*
25
0.
96
7*
14
0.
83
7*
25
0.
98
2*
28
0.
89
4*
28
R
O
0.
91
7*
41
0.
86
8*
41
0.
92
4*
41
0.
87
1*
41
0.
93
9*
41
0.
86
3*
41
SE
0.
96
8*
21
0.
98
3*
21
0.
99
3*
21
0.
96
1*
21
0.
98
9*
21
0.
94
6*
21
SI
0.
99
7*
11
0.
99
6*
11
0.
99
6*
11
0.
99
5*
11
0.
99
4*
11
0.
98
6*
11
SK
-0
.5
68
*
8
0.
75
7*
8
-0
.5
43
8
0.
75
2*
8
-0
.1
56
8
-0
.0
22
8
L
st
an
ds
fo
r
em
pl
oy
m
en
t,
VA
fo
r
va
lu
e
ad
de
d,
#r
eg
re
fe
rs
to
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
re
gi
on
s.
Th
e
‘B
us
in
es
s
Ec
on
om
y’
co
nt
ai
ns
al
lN
A
C
E
2-
di
gi
ts
ec
to
rs
fr
om
10
to
74
,w
ith
th
e
ex
ce
pt
io
n
of
fin
an
ci
al
se
rv
ic
es
,‘
br
oa
d
m
an
uf
ac
tu
ri
ng
’c
on
ta
in
s
al
la
ll
N
A
C
E
2-
di
gi
ts
ec
to
rs
fr
om
10
to
42
.‘
A
ll
un
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
’r
ef
er
s
to
th
e
sa
m
pl
e
of
fir
m
s
th
at
re
po
rt
th
e
nu
m
be
r
of
em
pl
oy
ee
s
in
un
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
ac
co
un
ts
.‘
TF
P
sa
m
pl
e’
re
fe
rs
to
al
lfi
rm
-y
ea
r
ob
se
rv
at
io
ns
fo
r
w
hi
ch
w
e
ar
e
ab
le
to
ob
ta
in
a
W
LP
-T
FP
m
ea
su
re
.
35
2. DOMESTIC FIRMS AND MNE’S IN EUROPE
2.5 EUMULNET - A European Multinational Network data
set
In addition to our ‘regular’ panel of European firms, AUGAMA, we have also
created a separate data set on European multinational networks based on Amadeus
(EUMULNET henceforth). EUMULNET contains parent-affiliate combinations for
which we have information both on the side of the parent and its affiliate from Amadeus.
For every firm, Amadeus contains information on whether or not the firm has any
affiliates. For firms with affiliates, Amadeus provides a list of affiliates with a limited
amount of further information. The basis for EUMULNET is that affiliates available
as separate entries in Amadeus are identified by their unique ID number. For these
affiliates we are able to retrieve the full information set from their own entry in Amadeus
rather than being limited to the information provided through the parent’s entry in
the database. EUMULNET is then the dataset of those parent-affiliate combinations for
which both firms are listed as separate entries in Amadeus with full information. For
affiliates not listed in Amadeus, we do have information on their existence and country
of operation from the parent’s entry in the database. There are two more potentially
useful variables in the parent’s entry in the database: operating revenue turnover of
and employment at the affiliate.26 However, this information from the parent’s entry is
not always filled out. Therefore this information is not very useful for further analysis
compared to the full entry information. We do retain a variable indicating whether
the parent has extra-Europe affiliates or not and focus on parent-affiliate combinations
where both firms are listed in Amadeus with full information. This also implies that
the resulting data set is limited to the the European network of the parent should it also
own non-European affiliates.
To create EUMULNET we use the following procedure. First, we extract parent-
affiliate ID number combinations (plus the actual share owned by the parent in the
affiliate) from every issue of the database.27 This creates a time series of parent-affiliate
26These variables became available only in later versions of the database. Furthermore, with respect to the
timing of the information it is also unclear what the calendar year is, since the variable refers to the latest
available year.
27We limit ourselves to European ID numbers. For some affiliates there is a non-European ID number that
refers to other Bureau Van Dijk products. This however applies to a very small number of firms. We also
do not consider affiliates in Russia and Ukraine at this point.
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links. We then restrict our attention to those combinations where the parent owns
at least 50% of the affiliate at some point in time. We then replace ‘direct′ parents
that are found to be affiliates themselves with the ‘ultimate′ parent as detected in
Amadeus. In the resulting ‘ultimate′ parent-affiliate-year data set we then fill out the
AUGAMA information both on the parent and affiliate side. For earlier/later years
when the link does not exist, we do fill out information for parent and/or affiliate from
AUGAMA when available.28 Our final data set forms a traditional panel data set in
the affiliates-year dimension with full information on the parent side attached to each
affiliate-year entry (as such duplicating parent-year information when the parent has
multiple affiliates).
Table 2.7 lists the annual number of links of more than 50% between a parent and
its affiliate that both have an Bureau Van Dijk ID number. From column (1) one can
infer that the number of links we retrieve considerably increases over time, which is
influenced by increased coverage over time. For about 4.1% of these links we are able
to obtain a TFP measure (cf. infra) for both parent and affiliate. When we consider the
evolution over time of this subset of links in column (2), we still observe an increase in
links, but from 2002 onwards, and even more so from 2004 onwards, the number of
links is fairly stable. From 2002 onwards between 10 and 17% of these links is between
a parent and affiliate in a different European countries (see column (3)).
Table 2.8 focuses on the cross-country distribution for the year 2007. The first column
lists the number of parents with a given nationality in the data set. This number is
affected by cross-country differences in coverage, but only to a limited extent since
we do not require any financial information to be provided by a firm to obtain these
numbers. Most parents are found in the UK and the Netherlands, followed by Germany
and France. The second column shows the number of affiliates owned by these parents
(irrespective of the host country). Across countries, parents on average own between
1.4 and 2.9 affiliates. When we restrict the data to those parent-affiliate combinations
for which WLP-TFP is available on both sides of the link we retain 34,847 observations
in 2007, about 15% of these affiliates is located abroad.29 For Denmark, the UK, Ireland
28Occasionally a link is not reported in the year t issue of the database, while it is in the t− 1 and t + 1
issues, we then assume the link to exist in t as well.
29These numbers should be interpreted with care as they are partly driven by differences in both pure
coverage and data quality (i.e. reporting variables necessary to obtain WLP-TFP) across countries. For
example, for the Netherlands and Germany we only retain 0.4% and 3.5% of reported links because of
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Table 2.7: Total number of parent-affiliate links over time
parent-affiliate links with. . .
All links . . . double TFP . . . of which
abroad
(1) (2) (3)
1997 24,385 1,221 150
1998 49,795 3,385 455
1999 93,637 7,664 1,021
2000 144,031 13,314 1,444
2001 272,807 19,306 2,064
2002 469,312 23,674 2,983
2003 542,621 24,806 3,378
2004 726,771 29,280 3,899
2005 808,268 32,038 4,168
2006 835,149 34,895 4,719
2007 898,022 34,847 5,127
2008 1,016,984 34,099 5,537
2009 1,139,099 38,969 6,485
2010 1,125,608 38,275 6,504
2011 1,197,820 46,191 6,604
Only parent-affiliate links where the parent owns at least 50% of the affiliate at some point in time are
considered. Column (1) shows all links that fulfil these requirements. Column (2) presents the number of
these links for which TFP is available and column (3) shows links for which TFP is available with an
affiliate abroad.
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and Latvia we are not able to compute a measure of total factor productivity because a
necessary variable is missing for all firms.30 For Greek firms we were able to obtain
total factor productivity, but only for a limited number of firms for a limited number
of years (late 1990s, early 2000s; not 2007). The last three columns of Table 2.8 focus
on the number of affiliates located in the country indicated by the row heading. The
correlation with the number of affiliates owned by parent firms from the country is
fairly large (abstracting from the requirement of WLP-TFP availability), indicating
that a lot of these affiliates are typically domestically-owned. The overall share of
foreign-owned affiliates is 15% like the share of affiliates owned abroad before.
Finally, Table 2.9 considers the distribution of affiliates per parent for the sample
without WLP-TFP restrictions (column (1) in Table 2.8) for the year 2007. The general
conclusion from the Table is that a small number of parents owns a disproportionally
large share of affiliates. Columns (1) and (2) reveal that 61% of parents owns a single
affiliate, while another 19% owns two affiliates. In total 94% of parents owns five or
less affiliates. Columns (3) and (4) reveal that parents owning affiliates in a foreign
country are exceptional: 91.4% of parents does not engage in cross-border investment.
5.3% of parents owns a single foreign affiliate, 3.3% owns two or more foreign affiliates.
In columns (5) to (8) we consider the number of affiliates rather than the number of
parents. The 65% of parents with a single affiliate account for 26% of the total number
of affiliates. 35% of affiliates is owned by parents that own more than five affiliates. The
distribution of foreign affiliates looks fairly similar. Foreign affiliates typically belong
to multi-affiliate parents. More than 70% of foreign affiliates are owned by parents that
have at least two affiliates, 38.4% of foreign affiliates are owned by parents that have
six or more affiliates.
poor reporting of financial information. This also accounts for the fact that a large share of the affiliates is
located abroad, i.e. in a country with better reporting of financial information.
30UK firms do report value added in Amadeus but not material costs.
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Table 2.8: Cross-country breakdown of parents and affiliates for the year 2007
# parents # affiliates
owned
# parent–affiliate
links
# affiliates
in country
# parent–affiliate
in country
with
dou-
ble
TFP. . .
. . . of
which
abroad
with
dou-
ble
TFP. . .
. . . of
which
foreign-
owned
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
AT 5,783 14,063 319 187 14,261 272 140
BE 16,429 30,271 1,344 362 27,373 1,378 396
BG 3,931 12,803 866 1 13,011 903 38
CZ 463 648 164 27 1,363 318 181
DE 38,438 110,832 3,863 1,351 111,305 2,857 345
DK 25,168 44,179 - - 41,185 - -
EE 715 1,134 110 3 1,635 241 134
ES 20,945 47,127 7,659 465 49,564 7,998 804
FI 3,584 8,764 1,985 302 8,552 1,756 73
FR 35,244 87,867 5,776 739 86,972 5,915 878
GB 82,929 227,790 - - 232,883 - -
GR 1,113 2,195 - - 2,408 - -
HR 442 818 365 10 1,073 427 72
HU 506 789 206 36 1,655 354 184
IE 4,834 11,376 - - 11,791 - -
IT 8,848 24,335 5,859 840 22,406 5,498 479
LT 247 364 - - 643 - -
LV 146 225 3 1 563 7 5
NL 86,083 171,895 703 510 165,703 256 63
NO 17,333 36,105 1,713 111 37,347 1,740 138
PL 1,803 3,586 228 11 6,471 613 396
PT 2,862 6,161 953 53 6,962 1,152 252
RO 2,733 4,043 1,238 3 6,470 1,620 385
SE 25,745 50,453 1,446 84 46,162 1,478 116
SI 73 134 39 27 77 23 11
SK 33 65 8 4 187 41 37
Column (1) show the number of parents in each country, with columns (2)–(4) providing information
about their affiliates and the parent-affiliate links (when TFP is available, affiliate located abroad or not).
Columns (5)–(7) hold information on the number of affiliates in each country and the parent-affiliate
links (when TFP is available, domestically-owned or foreign-owned).
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Table 2.9: Distribution of the number of affiliates per parent for the year 2007 (without TFP
restrictions).
# parents with total # affiliates owned
X affiliates X foreign affiliates all foreign
X (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1 234,360 60.6% 20,573 5.32% 234,360 26.1% 20,573 26.2%
2 72,427 18.7% 5,252 1.36% 144,854 16.1% 10,504 13.4%
3 30,261 7.8% 2,456 0.64% 90,783 10.1% 7,368 9.4%
4 15,712 4.1% 1,385 0.36% 62,848 7.0% 5,540 7.0%
5 9,164 2.4% 891 0.23% 45,820 5.1% 4,455 5.7%
6 5,778 1.5% 591 0.15% 34,668 3.9% 3,546 4.5%
7 3,859 1.0% 409 0.11% 27,013 3.0% 2,863 3.6%
8 2,726 0.7% 319 0.08% 21,808 2.4% 2,552 3.2%
9 1,984 0.5% 239 0.06% 17,856 2.0% 2,151 2.7%
10 1,507 0.4% 157 0.04% 15,070 1.7% 1,570 2.0%
>10 8,652 2.2% 906 0.23% 202,942 22.6% 17,532 22.3%
0 - 353,252 91.41% - -
Total 386,430 386,430 898,022 78,654
Columns (1)–(4) show the number of parents who own a certain number of affiliates (domestic or abroad),
columns (5)-(8) show the number of affiliates owned (by domestic or foreign parents, also considering
the number of (other) affiliates this parent owns).
2.6 Total Factor Productivity
2.6.1 Estimation framework
This Section is devoted to the estimation of total factor productivity (TFP). As input
choices of firms are likely to be based on their productivity, the estimation of total factor
productivity will be biased if the endogeneity of inputs is not addressed (Griliches and
Mairesse, 1995). A number of alternative estimation procedures have been suggested
in order to tackle this issue. The most popular alternatives are the semi-parametric
approaches developed by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
(LP), in which a proxy is introduced to handle the endogeneity bias. Olley and Pakes
(1996) use investment as a proxy. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argue that investment is
lumpy and does not react smoothly to productivity shocks and propose to use material
inputs as a proxy instead. In a more recent contribution, Ackerberg et al. (2008) (ACF)
present an alternative semi-parametric procedure that deals with potential collinearity
issues in Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Wooldridge (2009)
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shows a method to implement OP/LP in a GMM framework with several advantages
over ACF: i) estimators are more efficient; ii) the first stage of the algorithm contains
identifying information for the parameters on the variable inputs, and iii) fully robust
standard errors are easy to obtain. In short, Wooldridge (2009) derives two equations
with the same dependent variable (output) and fixed and variable inputs as explanatory
variables. The difference between both equations is the approximation of unobserved
productivity which provides a different set of instruments for identification of the
production function parameters. We use the implementation of Petrin and Levinsohn
(2012) of this methodology (referred to as WLP-TFP henceforth).
2.6.2 Estimation and coefficients
The production function to be estimated is given in its logarithmic form in (2.1)
with ωit the unobserved productivity shock known to the firm but not to the researcher
and va double deflated value added (cf. supra). The sum of the constant term, β0,
and ωit captures Hicks-neutral TFP. eit is a standard i.i.d. error term incorporating
unanticipated shocks and measurement error. As indicated above, we use the GMM-
approach advocated by Wooldridge (2009) as implemented by Petrin and Levinsohn
(2012). The trade-off we face is between allowing βl and βk to vary maximally across
countries and industries and retaining enough data points to estimate βl and βk.
ln vait = β0 + βl ln lit + βk ln kit +ωit + eit (2.1)
We first estimate equation (2.1) by country-industry pair using all available years.
Industries are defined as 21 ‘broad’ NACE aggregates capturing one or more NACE
2-digit categories (listed in Table 2.A.1). Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10 show box plots31 of
the coefficients by country and by industry respectively. As one can infer from the box
plots in Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10, for multiple countries we obtain capital and labour
coefficients that fall outside the unit interval. Moreover, for many country-industries,
31In a box plot (see Tukey, 1977), the vertical line within the box indicates the median, while the edges
of the box represent the 25th and 75th percentiles. The whiskers of a box indicate the upper and lower
adjacent values. These are calculated as follows. Let x[25] and x[75] be the 25th and 75th percentiles of for
an ordered variable x. Define U as x[75] + 1.5(x[75] − x[25]), the upper adjacent value is then xi such that
xi ≤ U and xi+1 > U. Define L as x[25] − 1.5(x[75] − x[25]), the lower adjacent value is then xi such that
xi ≥ L and xi+1 < L. Values falling outside of this range are indicated by dots.
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Figure 2.8: Boxplot of capital and labour elasticities for
the old EU15+ countries.
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WLP-TFP estimations by country-industry pair; countries indicated on vertical axis,
(values of) capital and labour elasticities on horizontal axis.
the capital coefficient is not significant at conventional levels, even when it falls within
the unit interval (this is also the case in CompNet (CompNet, 2014)). Gal (2013) deals
with this issue by not calculating TFP for firms in industries where either the capital or
labour coefficient falls outside the unit interval.
We proceed by estimating production functions by industry, but aggregating over
countries. When estimating equation (2.1), we restrict βl and βk to be the same across
countries but allow β0 to be country-specific (capturing for example country-specific
technology levels or management skills). We realise that this is a strong assumption32,
but we prefer to do so because this results in sensible estimates for capital and labour
coefficients as shown in Figure 2.11. This allows us to obtain TFP for the largest
possible set of firms. Furthermore, specifically for multinational (foreign) firms (12% of
observations in the dataset) a European production function might be as relevant as the
‘local’ production function. Our analysis in the next Section is therefore based on TFP-
values obtained using the estimation results visualised in Figure 2.11. In Figure 2.12
we present a box plot of log WLP-TFP by country. The Figure is based on the sample of
manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees. The period considered is 2003-2010.
Countries are ranked on the basis of the 75th percentile of the TFP-distribution. The
32Differences in labour market institutions do exist for example.
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Figure 2.9: Boxplot of capital and labour elasticities for
the CEEC10+ countries.
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(values of) capital and labour elasticities on horizontal axis.
Figure 2.10: Boxplot of capital and labour elasticities for
21 broad NACE categories.
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(values of) capital and labour elasticities on horizontal axis.
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Figure 2.11: Capital and labour elasticities for Europe-
wide production functions by 21 broad NACE categories.
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mies; industries on vertical axis, (values of) capital and labour elasticities on horizontal
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ranking is in line with what one would expect. The old EU-15 countries are generally
more productive than the new members from Eastern Europe. Among the old EU-15
Spain and especially Portugal are among the countries with less productive firms.
2.7 Total Factor Productivity and Foreign Ownership
In this Section we analyse TFP differences between multinationals, foreign, and
domestic firms. In order to take a first look at the productivity levels of the foreign
and domestic firms across Europe, we plot the distributions of their TFP-levels in
Figure 2.13.33 We find that the distribution for foreign firms is clearly to the right of
that for domestic firms. Figures 2.14 and 2.15 display the productivity distributions for
domestic and foreign firms in manufacturing and services respectively. In both cases,
the productivity distribution for foreign firms is to the right of that for domestic firms.
For firms in services industries, the distance between both distributions seems larger
(cf. infra).
33The period considered is 2003-2007, i.e. we exclude both the earlier years where coverage is more
unbalanced across countries and the later years to eliminate potential crisis effects. Only firms with on
average at least 20 employees are considered. This leaves us with 1,345,454 observations that are used in
the Figure. 166,969, i.e. 12,4%, of observations refer to foreign firms.
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Figure 2.12: Boxplot log WLP Total Factor Productivity by country.
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Figure 2.13: WLP-TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms
in Europe.
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Figure 2.14: WLP-TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms
in Europe in the manufacturing industries.manufacturing services
Figure 2.15: WLP-TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms
in Europe in the services industries.
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When we split Europe in three macro-regions (East, North and South34), we can
draw a similar conclusion from the first three panels of Figure 2.16: foreign firms appear
to be more productive than domestic firms in all three regions. The last two panels in
Figure 2.16 respectively illustrate the productivity distributions for the domestic firms
in the three macro-regions and for the foreign firms in these three regions. For domestic
firms we find a clear ranking with firms in the North outperforming firms in the South
and firms in the South outperforming firms in the East. With respect to foreign firms,
however, the distribution for South is closer to the distribution for North. Foreign firms
in the East do seem to be considerably less productive on average.
In order to get further insight into the magnitude of foreign firms’ premium in terms
of TFP (and several other performance indicators), we perform an empirical exercise
along the lines of Bernard and Jensen (1999). The analysis is fairly straightforward and
consists of retrieving the foreign premium from estimating a regression of the following
form:
lnXijrt = α+ βForeignijrt + δLijrt−1 + γt + γj + γr + eijrt (2.2)
In equation (2.2), we regress the level of the performance indicator (X) on a dummy
for foreign ownership (Foreign), the lagged size of the firm (L, measured as the natural
log of the number of employees), and a set of time t, industry j, and region r dummies.35
In Table 2.10 we consider the full sample of foreign and domestic firms for which
we are able to obtain WLP-TFP, but trim the data for extreme values of WLP-TFP by
removing values below (above) the first (99th) percentile in each country-industry-size-
year cell (to preserve the sample distribution in these dimensions).36 Table 2.10 contains
the estimated values for β in equation (2.2). The first column presents premiums for
WLP-TFP for different subsamples as indicated by the row headings, the third column
presents premiums for value added per worker as a comparison check. Columns (2)
and (4) contain the number of observations used in the estimation. Premiums are
34East is BG, CZ, EE, HR, HU, (LT,) LV, PL, RO, SI, SK; North is AT, BE, DE, (DK,) FI, FR, (GB,) NL, SE;
and South is ES, (GR, IE,) IT, PT. For countries between brackets TFP is not available for the period
considered. North contains 425,539 observations; South 516,432; and East 373,783.
35Industries are defined as the ‘broad’ NACE aggregates. We use NUTS2 region dummies (cf. supra).
36Size classes are defined as micro firms with less than 10 employees; small firms with between 10 and 50
employees; medium-sized firms with between 50 and 250 employees; and large firms with more than
250 employees.
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Figure 2.16: WLP-TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms in three Macro-regions
(North, South and East) and WLP-TFP distributions for domestic and foreign firms sepa-
rately in these regions compared.
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Table 2.10: TFP premium of foreign over domestic firms based on the EU-wide sample and
different subsamples.
ln WLP-TFP # obs ln VA pw # obs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
trimmed 0.480 13,023,107 0.503 13,026,194
non-trimmed 0.555 13,238,694 0.573 13,238,694
manufacturing 0.324 3,020,906 0.345 3,021,943
services 0.557 7,919,363 0.584 7,920,568
before 2003 0.490 3,507,385 0.518 3,507,991
2003–2007 0.483 4,714,522 0.511 4,714,983
after 2007 0.469 4,801,200 0.484 4,803,220
majority foreign-owned firms 0.510 13,064,783 0.538 13,069,327
minority foreign-owned firms 0.335 13,064,783 0.365 13,069,327
micro firms (L≤10) 0.532 8,505,507 0.566 8,488,588
small firms (10<L≤50) 0.441 3,462,642 0.458 3,467,654
medium firms (50< L ≤250) 0.335 871,972 0.367 879,794
large firms (L>250) 0.329 182,986 0.368 190,158
Premiums for WLP-TFP and value added per worker (VA pw). Subsamples are obtained by considering
manufacturing and services industries separately, by splitting up the sample period in three shorter
periods, by distinguishing between majority and minority foreign-owned firms and by considering four
size classes of firms. The foreign premium is statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases in columns
(1) and (3). In the trimmed sample, values of WLP-TFP below (above) the 1st (99th) percentile in each
country-industry-size-year cell are removed.
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always significant at the 1% level. Controlling for size, time, industry, and region, we
find that foreign firms’ level of WLP-TFP is on average 48% higher in Europe. This
number is confirmed for value added per worker in column (3) where we find a 50%
premium. For the non-trimmed sample these premiums are about 7 percentage points
higher. When we consider manufacturing and services industries separately we find,
in line with Figures 2.14 and 2.15 above, that the premium is considerably larger for
services industries. The premium seems fairly stable over time with potentially a slight
tendency to decrease, but given changes in sample constellation (cf. Tables 2.A.5 and
2.A.6 in the Appendix), one should not read too much in this decrease. As indicated
above the criterion to classify a firm as foreign is a single foreign owner controlling at
least 10% of shares. When we split foreign firms in a group which is majority foreign-
owned (more than 50%) and a group which is minority foreign-owned (more than 10%
of the shares, but less than 50%)37, we find that both groups outperform domestic firms,
but that majority foreign-owned firms also outperform minority foreign-owned firms.
Majority foreign-owned firms are 51% more productive than domestic firms, whereas
minority foreign-owned firms are 33% more productive. Finally, we consider four size
categories inspired by the EU’s definition of micro (employing less than 10 employees),
small (between 10 and 50 employees), medium (between 50 and 250 employees), and
large (more than 250 employees) firms. The productivity premium decreases by size
class. It is well over 50% for micro firms, about 45% for small firms, and about 33% for
medium and large firms.
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 report foreign WLP-TFP premiums by country and by industry
respectively.38 For each country in Table 2.11 we consider four different samples
of firms: i) all firms; ii) firms with more than 20 employees (which improves the
representativeness of our data); iii) firms with more than 20 employees for the period
2003-2007 (resulting in a stable number of firms, and excluding crisis effects); and
iv) firms in manufacturing with more than 20 employees for the period 2003–2007.
We examine the fourth sample of firms because the WLP-TFP estimation algorithm is
probably more tailored towards manufacturing firms.39 In Table 2.12, foreign WLP-TFP
37Of the 313,677 foreign firms (after trimming) 51,523 firms are minority foreign-owned, while 262,154
firms are majority foreign-owned.
38Yasar et al. (2007) and Castellani and Giovannetti (2010) examine TFP and exporter premia for Turkey
and Italy. These studies find that foreign firms are more productive than domestic counterparts.
39Services do account for large parts of value added in all countries.
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Table 2.13: Foreign ownership and WLP-TFP growth 2005-2011. Evidence from a matched
sample.
All All All Manuf. Services All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Foreign 0.030*** 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.034***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
Foreign (50%) 0.030*** 0.039***
[0.003] [0.002]
Foreign*crisis -0.009**
[0.004]
Crisis -0.161***
[0.004]
log empl.t−1 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.024*** 0.022***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Age -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 375,122 375,122 375,122 128,385 230,715 375,122
R2 0.063 0.063 0.063 0.046 0.077 0.063
Estimations contain year, industry, and country dummies. Standard errors in brackets;
***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
premiums are evaluated by industry (for 21 broad industries) for samples i) to iii). In
both Tables, numbers in rows below the coefficients refer to the number of firm-year
observations used in the estimation. In Table 2.11 we detect the largest premiums for
countries in Eastern Europe (on the right-hand side in the Table). For the old EU15
Members States, the largest premiums are found for Portugal, Spain, and Italy. For
all countries WLP-TFP premiums decrease as the sample becomes more restrictive.
The larger premiums are still typically found in Eastern Europe, though for a country
such as Slovenia the premium is close to that of the Western European countries. In
Table 2.12, we find that premiums in manufacturing industries range from 12.7% to
34.7% for the most restrictive sample. Except for mining (industries 10-14) and hotels
and restaurants (industry 55), the premiums in all other industries are considerably
higher than those in manufacturing.
We further analyse differences in productivity dynamics between domestic and
foreign firms over the period 2005–2011, i.e. three years before and three years after the
crisis. To mitigate potential endogeneity of foreign ownership, we employ a matching
technique to create a missing counterfactual for each foreign firm’s performance. This
resolves to some extent the bias of foreign firms owning the most productive firms
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Table 2.14: Productivity of parents with and without foreign affiliates. Evidence from
EUMULNET.
All aff. ≤ 20 aff ≤ 5 aff Single ≤ 5 aff ≤ 20 aff,
manuf.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (8)
foreign aff. 0.281*** 0.264*** 0.238*** 0.221*** 0.124*** 0.165***
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.009] [0.012] [0.008]
Lagged log empl. 0.061*** 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.083*** 0.064*** 0.145***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
# foreign aff. 0.082***
[0.007]
Observations 213,154 210,158 189,865 119,247 189,865 54,123
R2 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.64
Estimations contain year, industry, and country dummies. Standard errors in brackets;
***/**/* denotes significance at 1/5/10 percent.
in the first place and allows for a fairer comparison between domestic and foreign
performance.40 We therefore match each foreign firm with a domestic counterpart in
the year 2005. We use Stata’s psmatch2 procedure and slightly modify it to make sure
that firms are matched within the same ‘broad’ industry (and country). Observations
are only retained if they belong to the common support. We focus on the year 2005 since
this allows us to track a sample of decent size through pre- and post crisis years.41 After
obtaining the set of BVD ID numbers of the matched foreign and domestic firms for the
year 2005, we add in the financial and other information for all available years (2005–
2011). We use this sample to evaluate the effect of foreign ownership by comparing the
growth performance of matched firms (pre- and during the crisis).
Table 2.13 presents the results of the estimation of the following equation.
∆ ln TFPWLPijct = α+ βForeignijct + δ ln Lijct−1 + κAgeijct + γt + γj + γc + eijct (2.3)
We regress WLP-TFP growth of firm i in industry j in country c at time t on a dummy
40Ideally we would match on both the level and the growth of TFP of domestic and foreign firms prior to
2005, but this would severely limit the number of observations available.
41We retain all firms from AUGAMA that are present in the data set at least from 2005 onwards (could
be earlier) and at least until 2009 (could be later) and that report sufficient information to obtain WLP-
TFP. On this subset of AUGAMA we run a probit for the year 2005 to explain foreign ownership. The
explanatory variables are lagged WLP-TFP, the lagged number of employees, and age (see Alfaro and
Chen (2012)). The balancing hypothesis is satisfied for all three variables.
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Table 2.15: Premium of foreign over domestic firms for other performance
indicators.
1995–2011 2003–2007
premium # obs premium # obs
performance indicator (1) (2) (3) (4)
ln WLP-TFP 0.480 13,023,107 0.266 358,463
ln Value Added per worker 0.503 13,026,194 0.300 361,217
ln Number of Employees* 0.691 11,426,678 0.401 352,576
ln Value Added 0.598 13,003,206 0.369 353,798
ln Capital per worker 0.231 12,992,328 0.298 360,920
ln Operating Revenue 0.565 13,003,535 0.425 353,858
ln Wage 0.326 12,961,377 0.192 361,195
ln Intangible Fixed Assets 0.262 6,247,780 0.298 265,298
ln Total Assets 0.757 12,993,792 0.475 354,003
ln Cash Flow 0.639 10,445,839 0.517 312,699
ln Profit/Loss before Tax 0.771 9,466,307 0.593 278,959
ln Profit/Loss after Tax 0.794 9,129,196 0.616 264,893
Implicit Tax Rate** -2.457 12,838,221 -2.666 356,248
* specification does not contain lagged number of employees; ** denoted in percentage points. Samples
are trimmed for extreme values of the respective indicators by removing values below (above) the 1st
(99th) percentile in each country-industry-size-year cell. Columns (1) and (2) show results obtained from
a sample covering all firms in all industries in the full sample period (1995-2011). Columns (3) and (4)
show results for manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees in the period 2003-2007. The foreign
premium is statistically significant at the 1% level in all cases in columns (1) and (3).
indicating foreign ownership, the lagged size of the firm, the age of the firm, and a set of
industry, country, and year dummies. In the first column we find that the growth rate of
total factor productivity of foreign-owned firms is about three percentage points higher
than that of matched domestic firms. This is mainly driven by majority foreign-owned
firms that record growth rates that are about four percentage points higher than that of
domestic firms, whereas minority foreign-owned firms that record growth rates that
are about 1.2 percentage points higher. The difference between foreign and domestic
firms is larger for services industries according to point estimates, but the difference
is not statistically significant. The last column shows that the difference in growth
rates between foreign and domestic firm narrows during the crisis period but the
combination of the foreign dummy and its interaction with the crisis variable (which
equals one from 2008 onwards) suggests that foreign firms still outperform domestic
counterparts by a little more than two percentage points in terms of TFP growth.
In Table 2.14 we compare the WLP-TFP level of parents with only domestic affiliates
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with that of parents with at least one foreign affiliate, i.e. an affiliate located in another
European country than that of the parent. From EUMULNET we retain all parents and
information on whether or not they own a foreign affiliate (ForAff ). We then run the
following regression for parents p in industry j in country c at time t:
ln TFPWLPpjct = α+ βForAffpjct + δ ln Lpjct−1 + γt + γj + γc + epjct (2.4)
In the first column of Table 2.14 we consider all parents when estimating (2.4).
We find parents that have at least one foreign affiliate to be 28% more productive
than parents with only domestic affiliates. In columns two to four we restrict the
sample by considering only firms with less than 21, 6, or exactly 1 affiliate. The TFP
premium decreases, but when we focus on parents with only a single affiliate (foreign
or domestic), we still find a productivity premium of 22% for parents with a single
foreign affiliate. This evidence is in line with Antràs and Helpman (2004) who show
that only the most productive domestic firms will set up a foreign affiliate. When we
introduce the number of foreign affiliates as additional variable in the specification in
column five (the sample is restricted to parents with at most five affiliates), we find
that an additional foreign affiliate is associated with an eight percentage points larger
TFP premium over parents with only domestic affiliates. Column six finally shows
that the productivity premium decreases to 16.5% when we only consider parents in
manufacturing industries.
Table 2.15, finally, considers other performance indicators than productivity. For
ease of comparison the first two lines repeat the results of Table 2.10 for WLP-TFP and
value added per worker. All performance indicators have been trimmed in a similar
way as indicated for TFP above. The results reported in column (1) cover a sample
of all firms and industries in period 1995–2011; the results in column (3) are obtained
from an analysis using only manufacturing firms that employ at least 20 employees
in period 2003–2007. We first focus on the results for the full sample of firms. Aside
from being about 50% more productive on average, foreign firms create 60% more
value added, have 56% more operating revenues, and generate a 64% larger cash flow.
They do so by employing about 70% more employees than domestic firms, using 23%
more capital per employee, 26% more intangibles (based on the subsample of firms
reporting strictly positive intangibles). Foreign firms’ total assets are on average 75%
57
2. DOMESTIC FIRMS AND MNE’S IN EUROPE
larger. All this results in profits that are slightly less than 80% larger (based on the
subsample of firms reporting strictly positive profits). Their implicit tax rate, calculated
as profits before tax minus profits after tax divided by profits before tax, is on average
2.5 percentage points smaller than domestic firms’ average implicit tax rate. When we
restrict the sample to manufacturing firms with at least 20 employees in 2003-2007, we
confirm the premiums of foreign over domestic firms for all performance indicators.
As can be seen from column (3), the premiums are generally smaller. From Table 2.10
we know that this is more likely to be driven by the exclusion of services firms than
by the narrower period considered. Only for capital per worker and intangible fixed
assets the premium slightly increases. The difference in implicit tax rates is also slightly
larger for this subsample.
2.7.1 Total Factor Productivity of Parents and Affiliates
This section looks further at the TFP differences and correlations between the
productivity of affiliates and their parents. For this purpose we use majority owned
affiliates only for which the Wooldridge-Levinsohn-Petrin TFP is available. This results
in close to 400,000 observations. We first plot the densities of these two groups (parents
and affiliates), where parents of multiple affiliates are counted just once.
Figure 2.17 presents plots for all affiliates, as well as making a distinction between
domestic and foreign ones. Panel (a) shows the results for all parents and affiliates,
whilst in panels (b) and (c) we split the sample by domestic and foreign affiliates. While
the distributions of the entire dataset look very similar, a K-S tests rejects their equality.
A similar picture emerges when we only consider the domestic links, representing
about 80% of our data. In case of foreign affiliates, the distributions are visibly different,
with parents owning affiliates abroad being more productive than these affiliates. This
is no surprising, given that multinationals are generally much more efficient than firms
operating in one country only ( see Helpman et al. (2004)).
Next we look at how much of the variation in TFP of affiliates can be explained by
the productivity of their parents. We run several simple regression with parent’s TFP as
explanatory variable and sequentially include year, industry and country fixed effects,
as shown in (2.5):
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Figure 2.17: TFP densities of parents and their affiliates
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Note: The graph shows WLP TFP distributions of parents and affiliates. The first panel contains the
entire sample, while the last two panels splits the data by whether parents/affiliates are domestic or
foreign.
ln TFPWLPajct = α+ β ln TFP
WLP
pjct + γt + γj + γc + eajct (2.5)
Table 2.16 presents the results for the entire sample, domestic and foreign affiliates.
The last four columns shows the coefficients and R-squared for foreign affiliates when
including country and industry fixed effects of parents only and of parents and affiliates
respectively.
The results suggest that for the entire sample as well as for domestic affiliates,
controlling for year, affiliate country and industry fixed effects, there is a positive and
significant correlation between the TFP of parents and their affiliates. This correlation
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drops slightly if we only consider foreign affiliates, confirming the fact that multination-
als and their affiliates are less alike than their domestic only counterparts. Moreover,
affiliates’ countries and industries are important in determining productivity, since we
observed marked improvements in the R-squared as more controls are included.
The last two regressions should tell us more about the impact of parent’s industry
and country on this relationship. As expected, the parent’s controls have a much
lower explanatory power, TFP being influenced primarily by the affiliate’s controls.
Nonetheless, we observe a slight improvement in the R-squared when including both
sets of fixed effects, suggesting that the country and industry of the parent will also
have in impact on how productive the affiliate is.
Finally, we also check whether being a single affiliate in a parent’s portfolio impacts
the correlation between their productivities. We include a dummy taking value one
if the parent owns other affiliates as well. We expect that firms belonging to larger
networks to be more productive due to a more efficient allocation of tasks within these
groups or learning synergies between affiliates belonging to the same parent (see Egger
et al. (2014)). Table 2.17 presents the new results. We indeed see that having a parent
with more than one affiliate is positively and significantly correlated with affiliate
productivity, confirming our hypothesis.
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2.8 Conclusions
This chapter documents in detail the build of two datasets on the basis of raw data
taken from the Amadeus database issued by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing.
The first dataset, AUGAMA, is a large panel of firms in 26 European countries. More
than 18 million observations with all information needed to obtain a measure of TFP are
available for more than 3.6 million firms. The data stretch the period 1995-2012 and for
the average firm 6.1 years of data is available. The coverage for the years before 2002 is
generally lower (not for all countries though) and not for all firms information for 2012
is already available. We show that AUGAMA adequately approximates the structure
of the European economy across countries, regions, and industries as portrayed by
data from Eurostat (Structural Business Statistics) and Cambridge Econometrics. The
second dataset, EUMULNET, is a dataset of European multinational networks with
‘full’ information, i.e. TFP, for both parents and their European affiliates. We have more
than 600,000 parent-affiliate-year observations, 16% of these are links between a parent
and affiliate in different countries. The period is 1997-2012, but as with AUGAMA
the coverage is lower for earlier years and information for 2012 is not available for all
parent-affiliate combinations. The advantage of AUGAMA and EUMULNET is that
both datasets cover cross-country comparable firm-level data for a large number of
European countries in a single dataset. This allows for cross-country research at the firm
level while maintaining representativeness that is e.g. comparable to the ‘distributed
micro-data analysis’ by CompNet ((CompNet, 2014)).
We use AUGAMA to estimate foreign firms’ productivity premium over domestic
firms. We follow Bernard and Jensen (1999) but estimate productivity premiums for
foreign firms rather than for exporters using simple regression analysis. We find that
across Europe on average foreign firms are 48% more productive than domestic firms.
This is mainly driven by services sectors where foreign firms are on average about 56%
more productive, whereas the difference amounts to 32% in manufacturing industries.
Majority foreign-owned firms (>50% of the shares are foreign-owned) outperform
minority foreign-owned firms, who in turn still outperform domestic firms. We also
find the premium to be smaller in larger firm-size categories. Productivity premiums
are typically larger in Eastern European countries than in Western European countries.
For a number of other firm characteristics (e.g. value added, profitability, intangible
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assets) we find similar premiums for foreign firms. In a framework similar to Alfaro
and Chen (2012) we find that foreign firms grow about 3%-points faster over the period
2005–2011. During the crisis period the growth gap between foreign and domestic
firms becomes smaller but remains positive. Finally, in line with Antràs and Helpman
(2004) we find parents with foreign affiliates to be 27% more productive than parents
with only domestic affiliates. The number decreases to 14.4% when we only consider
parents in manufacturing industries. We also find that there is a positive correlation
between affiliates’ productivities and those of their parents, as productive parents will
share know-how with the affiliate. Moreover, companies with parents owning multiple
affiliates are also more productive, potentially due to the fact that they learn from their
‘siblings’ and that larger networks benefit from economies of scale or scope.
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Appendix 2.A Additional graphs and tables
Table 2.A.1: List of the NACE 2-digit industries included in the data.
Broad
category
NACE
2-digit
Description
C Mining and quarrying
C 10 Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat
C 11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
C 12 Mining of uranium and thorium ores
C 13 Mining of metal ores
C 14 Other mining and quarrying
D Manufacturing
DA 15 Manufacture of food products and beverages
DA 16 Manufacture of tobacco products
DB 17 Manufacture of textiles
DB 18 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
DC 19 Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage,
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear
DD 20 Manufacture of wood and products of wood and cork, except
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting
materials
DE 21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products
DE 22 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
DF 23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear
fuel
DG 24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
DH 25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
DI 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
DJ 27 Manufacture of basic metals
DJ 28 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, exc.
machinery/equipment
DK 29 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c.
DL 30 Manufacture of office machinery and computers
DL 31 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c.
DL 32 Manufacture of radio/television/communication
equipment/apparatus
DL 33 Manufacture of medical/precision/optical instruments,
watches/clocks
DM 34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers
DM 35 Manufacture of other transport equipment
DN 36 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.
DN 37 Recycling
Table continued on the next page
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Table 2.A.2: List of the NACE 2-digit industries included in the data (Continued).
Broad
category
NACE
2-digit
Description
E Electricity, gas and water supply
E 40 Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply
E 41 Collection, purification and distribution of water
F Construction
F 45 Construction
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal and household goods
G 50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles;
retail sale of automotive fuel
G 51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor
vehicles and motorcycles
G 52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of
personal and household goods.
H Hotels and restaurants
H 55 Hotels and restaurants
I Transport, storage and communication
I 60 Land transport; transport via pipelines
I 61 Water transport
I 62 Air transport
I 63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel
agencies
I 64 Post and telecommunications
K Real estate, renting and business activities
K 70 Real estate activities
K 71 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of
personal and household goods
K 72 Computer and related activities
K 73 Research and development
K 74 Other business activities
Table 2.A.3: Definition of Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) of the
European Union. Minimum and maximum population thresholds indicated.
NUTS level Description Min. Max.
NUTS 1 Major socio-economic regions 3 million 7 million
NUTS 2 Basic regions for application of regional policies 800,000 3 million
NUTS 3 Small regions for specific diagnoses 150,000 800,000
See also “Regions in the European Union; Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics, NUTS
2006/EU-27”. NUTS favours administrative divisions. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/
ITY_OFFPUB/KS-RA-07-020/EN/KS-RA-07-020-EN.PDF.
Table 2.A.4: NUTS regions: Example for Belgium
Level Code Description
NUTS 0 BE Belgique / België
NUTS 1 BE1 Region de Bruxelles-Capitale / Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest
NUTS 2 BE10 Region de Bruxelles-Capitale / Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest
NUTS 3 BE100 Arrondissement Bruxelles-Capitale / Arrondissement
Brussel-Hoofdstad
NUTS 1 BE2 Vlaams gewest
NUTS 2 BE21 Provincie Antwerpen
NUTS 3 BE211 Arrondissement Antwerpen
NUTS 3 BE212 Arrondissement Mechelen
NUTS 3 BE213 Arrondissement Turnhout
...
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Distance, Time since Foreign Entry, and
Productivity Spillovers from Foreign
Direct Investment?
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, countries actively and fiercely compete to attract foreign direct invest-
ment (see Harding and Smarzynska Javorcik (2011)). Policymakers are eager to do
so for several reasons. First of all, they expect to benefit in terms of faster economic
growth in their country through additional foreign capital and higher employment.
Second, foreign firms are expected to bring more advanced technology (see Markusen
(1995)) which policymakers believe to ’spill over’ to domestic firms, with increased
domestic productivity as a result. Spillovers from foreign to domestic firms have been
investigated at least since Caves (1974). Initially, it proved difficult to detect clear
evidence of aggregate positive FDI spillovers (see Görg and Greenaway (2004); Cre-
spo and Fontoura (2007)). Following Javorcik (2004), the literature now distinguishes
?This chapter is based on a paper forthcoming in Papers in Regional Science. Co-authored with Bruno
Merlevede.
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between spillovers within the same industry (horizontal spillover effects) as well as
those resulting from vertical links along the supply chain (backward and forward
spillover effects). The recent literature seems to have established fairly robust evidence
of positive backward spillover effects from foreign firms to their domestic suppliers.
By means of a meta-analysis Havránek and Irsˆová (2011) confirm that the average
backward spillover effect is both statistically and economically significant.
Following new theoretical insights that stress the importance of firm level hetero-
geneity (see Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004)), the literature has moved away
from the idea that spillovers are unconditional and uniform. The focus has instead
turned to the identification of characteristics that facilitate positive spillover effects,
concerning domestic firms’ characteristics such as absorptive capacity (e.g. Merlevede
and Schoors (2007)) or foreign firms’ characteristics such as ownership structure (e.g.
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) and Kamal (2014)).
We contribute to this literature by analysing the pattern of technology diffusion as a
function of distance between domestic and foreign firms and foreign firms’ maturity
in the domestic economy. Although both dimensions have been analysed before in
firm-level spillover studies, they have not yet been combined. The combination of both
is, however, important and can yield new insights. This is illustrated by Comin et al.
(2012) who study cross-country technology adaption and find that technology diffuses
slower to locations far away, but the effect of distance vanishes over time. Firm-level
spillovers, especially backward spillovers are likely to be sensitive to the combination of
distance and multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) maturity. MNEs have a keen interest in
technological upgrading by their suppliers and therefore an incentive to provide them
with explicit assistance (see Javorcik (2004)). As successful assistance and upgrading
requires human interaction, communication, and monitoring, nearby suppliers will be
able to learn and upgrade faster and potentially more (cf. Giroud (2012) and Keller and
Yeaple (2013)).
As AUGAMA was not yet available, in this chapter we use a pilot dataset of Roma-
nian firms with variation across NUTS 3 regions to identify patterns of productivity
spillovers.1 We find negative horizontal spillover effects for medium maturities of for-
1The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system for
dividing up the economic territory of the EU. A NUTS level 3 region is a “small region for specific
diagnoses”. The minimum and maximum population thresholds for a NUTS 3 region are defined as
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eign firms, but larger positive spillover effects for foreign firms that have been present
for at least four full years in the domestic economy. On aggregate, the effect of distance
on horizontal spillovers is limited. Point estimates do suggest that distance mitigates
initial negative effects, while it increases the positive spillovers from foreign firms with
longer presence. Point estimates cannot, however, be rejected to be equal over different
distances at conventional levels. This suggests that the competition and labour market
channels driving horizontal spillovers are largely independent of distance. Backward
spillovers, on the other hand, are affected by distance. Domestic firms located in the
same region as a foreign client experience a bonus effect quickly following foreign entry.
‘Relocating’ a firm from its own region to Bucharest-Ilfov, the capital region and top
FDI location, is associated with an 11 per cent larger backward spillover. For medium
maturities of foreign firms, we find a significant positive backward spillover which
is unrelated to distance. However, these spillovers disappear after several years of
foreign presence. Taking into account regional heterogeneity, the pattern of backward
spillovers is confirmed for above median productivity regions, while for below me-
dian productivity regions, we no longer observe a significant within-region backward
bonus upon entry of foreign clients. Consistent with the view that it might take time
for spillovers to be absorbed over larger distances, domestic firms in below median
productivity regions do experience positive backward spillovers from further away,
but more mature foreign firms.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss
the related literature and derive expectations regarding the interaction of distance
and maturity. Section 3 introduces our regional time-since-foreign-entry approach to
spillovers, while in section 4 we give a short overview of our data. Section 5 presents
the results and we conclude in section 6.
3.2 Literature
The literature on spillover effects distinguishes between two types of spillovers.
Horizontal spillovers run from a foreign firm to a host country firm competitor, whereas
vertical spillovers originate in customer-supplier relationships between foreign and
150,000 and 800,000. With “distance” we refer to proximity and regional patterns rather than pure
distance.
73
3. DISTANCE, TIME SINCE FOREIGN ENTRY AND FDI SPILLOVERS
domestic firms, and can be of a backward or forward type. Teece (1977) suggests two
main channels for horizontal spillovers: technology imitation and mobility of workers
trained by foreign firms (see also Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Marin and Bell (2006)). Foreign
entry may also fuel competition in the domestic market. Fiercer competition urges host
country firms to either use existing technologies and resources more efficiently or adopt
new technologies and organizational practices, which provides another important
channel for horizontal effects of foreign presence (see Aitken and Harrison (1999), and
Glass and Saggi (2002)). The latter channel does not represent a transfer of knowledge,
but is simply a gain or loss from increased competition (see Havránek and Irsˆová
(2013)). The standard empirical framework (cf. infra) captures the net effect of these
different channels by the productivity semi-elasticity of the spillover variable. We
follow the existing literature in labelling the within-industry impact of foreign presence
on domestic firms’ productivity horizontal ‘spillover effects’ (see Crespo and Fontoura
(2007) and Havránek and Irsˆová (2013)), bearing in mind that the effect is not limited
to externalities, such as technology imitation and the mobility of workers, but also
captures competition effects.
None of the above effects is necessarily positive. Labor market dynamics may entail
negative spillovers such as a brain drain of local talent to foreign firms to the detriment
of local firm productivity (see Blalock and Gertler (2008)) or an overall increase in
wages irrespective of productivity improvements caused by foreign firms paying
higher wages (see Aitken et al. (1996)). Where foreign technology is easily copied, the
foreign investor may choose to avoid leakage costs on state-of-the-art technology by
transferring technology that is only marginally superior to technology found in the
host country (see Glass and Saggi (1998)). This limits the scope for horizontal spillovers
via demonstration effects. Higher productivity of foreign affiliates may also lead to
lower prices or less demand for the products of domestic competitors. If domestic firms
fail to raise productivity in response to the increased competition, they will be pushed
up their average cost curves (see Aitken and Harrison (1999) on this market-stealing
effect). These partial effects are hard to disentangle empirically and a general measure
for horizontal spillover potential is typically used to identify the net effect of all these
channels.
Backward spillovers run from the foreign firm to its upstream local suppliers. Thus,
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even if foreign firms attempt to minimise technology leakage to direct competitors
(i.e. a horizontal effect), they may still want to assist their local suppliers in providing
inputs of sufficient quality in order to realise the full benefits of their investment.
In other words, they want the inputs from the host country to be of lower cost yet
similar in quality to inputs in the home country. The foreign firm may even transfer
technology to more than one domestic supplier and encourage upstream technology
diffusion to circumvent a hold-up problem. Rodríguez-Clare (1996) shows that the
backward linkage effect is more likely to be favourable when the good produced by
the foreign firm uses intermediate goods intensively and when the home and host
countries are similar in terms of the variety of intermediate goods produced. Under
reversed conditions, the backward linkage effect could damage the host country’s
economy. The literature defines backward spillovers both as externalities to suppliers
that are unaccounted for and not appropriated by the MNE as well as direct support
offered to suppliers (see Moran et al. (2005)). The latter includes technology transfer and
assistance that is intentional, possibly even formalized in an agreement. Therefore, what
we label backward ‘spillovers’ in the remainder of the chapter should be understood
as the combined impact of both types of effects of foreign presence in downstream
industries.
Forward spillovers run from a foreign firm to its local client. In most of the literature
forward spillover effects are small or insignificant (see Havránek and Irsˆová (2011)).
This is likely due to the fact that the literature is largely focused on developing and
transition countries where foreign involvement is typically in manufacturing and
not in services. Further, Damijan et al. (2013) indicate that foreign affiliates in Eastern
Europe are mainly engaged in end-user consumer goods which limits the scope forward
spillover effects. However, for Italy, for example, Mariotti et al. (2014) do find important
forward spillover effects. Therefore, they should not be ruled out a priori.
The current literature has evolved from the search for an average (positive) effect
towards the identification of factors that promote or obstruct spillover effects. We
combine two of these factors: time-since-foreign entry (the maturity of foreign firms in
the host country market) and spatial proximity.
The maturity of foreign firms has received limited attention. Nevertheless worker
mobility is inherently linked to maturity as workers first need to be trained at the
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foreign firm before taking their skills to domestic firms. Labour poaching by new
foreign entrants, on the other hand may entail negative spillover effects. Likewise,
vertical spillovers driven by sourcing inputs produced from or supplying inputs to
MNEs might not necessarily be instantaneous nor permanent. For the Irish electronics
sector Görg and Ruane (2001) find that foreign firms start off with a relatively low extent
of local linkages, but as they get accustomed, they proceed to develop more local input
linkages. Based on their Volvo case study Ivarsson and Alvstam (2005) conclude that
technology transfer to suppliers is more efficient for older MNE plants. Within MNEs
technology is also not necessarily easily or rapidly transferred (see Urata and Kawai
(2000)). Zhang et al. (2013) find spillover effects to be larger in industries where foreign
firms are more mature on average. Merlevede et al. (2014) model the time-since-entry
pattern of foreign firms and show that adequately accounting for it reveals new insights
in the case of country-wide spillovers. Positive horizontal spillover effects require the
presence of mature foreign firms, while positive backward spillover effects arise rapidly
following foreign entry, but are transient.2
As far as the proximity aspect is concerned, many studies have tried to identify a
regional element in spillover effects, but results are mixed (see Crespo and Fontoura
(2007)). For Venezuela Aitken and Harrison (1999) found no evidence of local, nor
country-wide horizontal spillovers. Mariotti et al. (2014) find that spillovers are strong
in knowledge intensive sectors, but proximity is not relevant. Both Keller (2002) and
Halpern and Muraközy (2007), on the other hand, do find that spillover effects decline
or disappear with distance. Using data for Portugal, Crespo et al. (2009) confirm
the importance of proximity between MNEs and domestic firms for FDI spillovers.
Finally, Altomonte and Colantone (2008) and Wen (2014) report mixed results, with
only some regions recording positive spillovers, suggesting that, aside from distance,
other regional characteristics, such as differences in foreign firms’ entry and maturity
patterns, might be relevant drivers of spillover effects.
It is important to keep in mind that effects may vary among developed and develop-
ing countries, as MNEs locate in the former in order to gain technological competences
acquired in the host country (see Ivarsson (2002)), while location in the latter is con-
sistent with supplying the local market with superior products (see Cantwell and
2In related work, Liu (2008) does distinguish between the level and growth effects of foreign presence,
but it is not linked through to maturity.
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Piscitello (2007)). For Romania, we do not expect strong distance patterns in horizontal
spillovers for the following reasons. First, MNEs will show no particular tendency
to agglomerate near domestic firms as local companies do not posses a comparative
advantage in their industry (see e.g. Mariotti et al. (2010)).3 Second, even if located near
domestic firms, horizontal spillover effects will be limited because MNEs will prevent
technology leakage to local competitors. Likewise, the impact of imitation or reverse
engineering will be limited due to low absorptive capacity of domestic Romanian firms
(see e.g. Girma (2005)). Therefore we do not expect much of an advantage of being
close to an MNE. Because of lower absorptive capacity, spillovers are more likely to
manifest themselves through increased competition on the domestic market, potentially
leading to negative spillover effects (see Aitken and Harrison (1999)). Since MNEs
typically operate nationwide, the impact of distance will be limited. Finally, potential
regional horizontal spillover effects might arise from workers moving between MNEs
and domestic firms. Labour turnover could be detrimental to domestic firms when
their best employees are cherry picked by MNEs (see Sinani and Meyer (2004)), or
positive if skills acquired at MNEs move to domestic firms as workers move. As these
effects mainly concern mobile, high-skilled workers, the potential impact of distance is
again likely to be limited (see Davis and Dingel (2012)).
Backward spillover effects originate from a linkage between a domestic supplier
and a foreign client. In this case, we do expect proximity to be more important. Since
it is in the interest of the MNE to cooperate with its supplier, backward linkages -in
contrast to horizontal relations- imply incentives to share technical knowledge (see
Glaeser et al. (1992)). This type of relation will be more sensitive to distance. Giroud
(2012) finds that plants located closer to headquarters show higher investment rates
because it is easier to monitor nearby plants and acquire information on them. Likewise
nearby suppliers should be easier to assist and domestic firms located in the vicinity of
MNEs will have access to more face-to-face interactions and will be able to learn faster
(see Comin et al. (2012); Keller and Yeaple (2013)). Cristea (2011) confirms the impor-
tance of face-to-face communication by showing that increased exports are associated
with increased demand for business travel. Keller and Yeaple (2013) also show that
3A centrally planned economy was introduced in Romania after World War II, seeking to create a large
self-sufficient industrial base, rather than integrating in the global economy by focusing on comparative
advantage industries.
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inputs highly dependent on non-codifiable knowledge call for more communication
favouring nearby locations. Bernard et al. (2014) point to the importance of distance for
the formation of linkages. Finally, for a cross-country setting Comin et al. (2012) show
that the impact of distance on technology diffusion dies out over time. Depending on
how specialized inputs are, forward spillover effects could have a similar transmission
mechanism as backward effects, favouring close-by buyers and clusters of cooperat-
ing MNEs and domestic firms (see Ivarsson (2002)). Alternatively, if MNEs provide
cheaper or better quality inputs to the entire downstream sector, a geographic aspect
might be absent. Because in transition economies multinationals have targeted mainly
manufactured end-user consumer goods (see Damijan et al. (2013)), we also expect less
forward linkages to be established in the first place. For Romania, we therefore expect
forward spillover effects to be of lesser importance.
Summarising, from the above we expect that horizontal spillover effects are likely
to be sensitive to the maturity of foreign firms, but less to spatial proximity. The key
reason for the latter is that horizontal spillovers will manifest themselves mainly via
competition and labour channels. These channels will only be affected by distance in
a limited way. However, as discussed above, there are good reasons to expect a link
between the maturity of foreign firms and horizontal spillover effects. With respect to
backward spillover effects, especially the combination of maturity and spatial proximity
yields the expectation of faster (in terms of foreign maturity) effects at shorter distances
because of MNEs’ incentive to assist their suppliers. Since technical upgrading at local
suppliers is unlikely to be a smooth process, learning will be faster at closer distances
because of easier (face-to-face) contact, visits of engineers, managerial assistance, ....
Further, if the probability of buyer-supplier relations tends to decrease with distance,
we should also expect smaller average spillover effects over larger distances. It is also
unclear whether spillover effects are long-lived. Once its domestic supplier has reached
a sufficient level of TFP, more mature foreign firms may scale down technical assistance.
Finally, in line with other recent work on Eastern Europe such as Damijan et al. (2013),
we do not expect much evidence of forward spillover effects.
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3.3 Empirical framework and measurement
3.3.1 Standard measurement
The empirical framework to analyse spillover effects can be seen as an ‘augmented’
production function, where spillover variables are added to other explanatory variables
such as labour, capital, and material inputs. The typical measure employed to identify
horizontal or within-industry spillover effects is given by Equation (3.1), where the
foreign presence is captured by the share of the foreign firms’ output in that industry.
For a (domestic) firm i in industry j at time t it is of the following form:
HRjt =
∑
i∈j
FitYit
∑
i∈j
Yit
(3.1)
where Y is output and F is the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors.
In line with the definition commonly applied by the OECD or the IMF, at least 10%
of shares should be owned by a single foreign investor for a firm to be considered as
foreign. HRjt in (3.1) measures the share of output that is produced by foreign firms
in industry j. Since this spillover variable is built up to industry level from firm-level
data, HRjt has the same value for all firms i in industry j at time t. The choice of
this measure is not without drawbacks, since we assume a homogeneous reaction of
domestic firms within the same industry to the increase in foreign presence in that
industry. However, the absorptive capacity of the firm as well as its location with
respect to its industry’s technological frontier will determine how well it will react to
increased foreign presence/competition (see Aghion et al. (2005)). Given the data at
hand, we can’t easily make these distinctions, and therefore follow the literature in
using the aggregated measure.
The definition of the backward spillover variable, BKjt, starts from the horizontal
measure and combines it with information from input-output tables as in:
BKjt = ∑
k 6=j
γjkt ∗ HRkt (3.2)
where γjkt is the proportion of industry j’s output supplied to sourcing industry
k at time t. The γ’s are calculated from (time-varying) IO-tables for intermediate
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consumption. Inputs sold within the firm’s industry are excluded (k 6= j) because
this is captured by HRjt. Since firms cannot easily, nor quickly switch industries to
buy inputs, this approach avoids the problem of endogeneity by using the share of
industry output sold to downstream domestic markets k with some level of foreign
presence HRkt. Employing the share of firm output sold to foreign firms in different
industries would cause endogeneity problems if the latter prefer to buy inputs from
more productive domestic firms.
In line with BKjt, we can define FWjt as ∑l 6=j δjlt ∗ HRlt where δjlt is the proportion
of industry j’s inputs sourced from industry l at time t. As in the case of horizontal
spillovers, we proxy the production linkage of domestic and foreign firms belonging to
different industries by using an aggregate measure, mainly the average percentage of
output supplied by industry j to industry k or from industry l to industry j. However, a
firm-specific linkage would be a much more precise way of measuring this relationship,
since it is likely that only a small number of firms actually engage in supplier-buyer
relationships with foreign firms. Given the lack of such data, we follow the literature by
using the aggregated measure. Moreover, since using I-O tables would introduce a bias
preventing us from seeing significant results, the presence of average spillovers should
confirm a very strong effect for firms active in the supply chain of multinationals.
Unlike the direct effect that FDI has on productivity of firms via M&A (see Arnold
and Javorcik (2009)), we are interested in the indirect effect of foreign presence on local
firms. However, since we lack the direct supply-chain links between these firms nor can
we measure the impact of MNEs on domestic firms via labour or competition/imitation
channels, we use the variation in the share of FDI in the relevant market as a proxy for
these channels. Therefore, an increase in the foreign share of output would, on average,
increase the number of supplier/buyer links as well as local competition and labour
mobility, potentially leading to productivity improvements for domestic firms. The
lagged growth of spillover variables HRjt, BKjt, and FWjt are thus regressed on the
productivity growth of (domestic) firm i in industry j. The size, sign, and significance of
the resulting coefficients are then taken as evidence of spillover effects. The estimation
is performed in first differences in order to avoid unobserved firm level characteristics
such as managerial performance and other factors from driving the effect. We do
however include firm age and firm size as controls, since older/larger firms tend to
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grow slower than younger/smaller firms. Finally, country/region, industry and year
fixed effects are used in order to take into account unobservable factors which could
impact TFP growth.
As indicated above, FDI spillovers are commonly analysed in a production function
framework. Firm level total factor productivity is obtained in a first step estimation
and in a second step the FDI spillover variables together with some further controls
are treated as additional ‘input’ explaining domestic firms’ productivity. The careful
estimation of the production function is thus an important building block in the anal-
ysis. The basic problem in estimating productivity is that firms react to firm-specific
productivity shocks that are not observed by the researcher.
Griliches and Mairesse (1995) provide a detailed account of this problem and make
the case that inputs should be treated as endogenous variables since they are chosen on
the basis of the firm’s unobservable assessment of its productivity. The semi-parametric
approaches by Olley and Pakes (1996) (OP) and a more recent modification of it by
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP), and the dynamic panel data approach by Blundell
and Bond (1998) (DPD) are alternative methodologies to overcome the endogeneity
bias in estimating production functions. Both types of methodologies have been widely
used in the recent literature on firm level heterogeneity for derivation of total factor
productivity measures. More recently, Ackerberg et al. (2008) (ACF) argue that, while
there are some solid and intuitive identification ideas in the papers by Olley and Pakes
(1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), their semi-parametric techniques suffer from
collinearity problems casting doubt on the methodology. They suggest an alternative
methodology that make use of the ideas in these papers, but do not suffer from these
collinearity problems. We therefore use the ACF estimator to obtain our indicator of
total factor productivity (TFP). A measure of TFP for firm i in industry j at time t is
obtained as the difference between output and capital, labour, and material inputs,
multiplied by their estimated coefficients:
t f pijt = Yijt − β̂l jlijt − β̂kjkijt − β̂mjmijt (3.3)
Following the literature (e.g. Javorcik (2004)), in the second step t f pijt is related to a
firm specific effect, a vector of spillover variables, FDIjt, and firm and industry level
controls, Zi(j)t. Note that (3.4) now pools firms from all industries together in one large
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panel, whereas (3.3) is estimated by industry. This approach is what Havránek and
Irsˆová (2011) define as best practice.
∆t f pijt = αi +Ψ1 f
(
∆FDIjt−1
)
+Ψ2∆Zi(j)t + ξijt (3.4)
Ψ1 in equation 3.4 allows us to identify the sign, size, and significance of the impact
of foreign presence on the productivity of local firms. In the next section we define our
vectors of spillover variables, FDIjt, and control variables, Zi(j)t.
3.3.2 A regional dynamic approach to spillovers
In this section we introduce our regional dynamic approach to the identification of
spillover effects in the above framework. Whereas we do not have information on the
exact location of foreign firms in our dataset (cf. infra), we do know in which NUTS 3
region a firm is located. We use the NUTS 3 classification as our regional dimension.
At this level Romania is divided in 42 territorial units, i.e. 41 counties and the capital
Bucharest. Our data, however, do not allow us to discriminate between Bucharest and
the surrounding county Ilfov. Therefore, we have 41 territorial units in our analysis.
The NUTS 3 level is appropriate because we find quite some heterogeneity between
regions in terms of foreign presence and larger regional aggregates (e.g. the NUTS 2
division) would hide this heterogeneity. The NUTS 3 division also follows an original
administrative structure for which we are able control by means of region fixed effects.
Figure 3.1 plots the share of industry output produced by foreign firms in a region
from the total country-wide output of that industry (the average over manufacturing
industries in a given region is plotted). The figure clearly shows that foreign presence
is not uniformly spread across the country, but is mainly concentrated along border
regions and in the capital, as consistent with predictions from the literature (see e.g.
Mariotti and Piscitello (1995); McCann and Acs (2011); Spies (2010)). Over the sample
period the dispersion of FDI intensity at the regional level (measured by the standard
deviation) has increased from 1.7 in 2000 to 1.9 in 2005. Given the potential contribution
of spillover effects to economic growth, it is important to test whether these regional
differences in FDI intensity have an impact on where spillover effects are generated,
whether spillover effects differ in size across regions and whether and how spillover
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effects spread from one region to another. We now introduce our methodological
approach. We first introduce the distance dimension, and then interact it with the
time-since-foreign-entry dimension.
Figure 3.1: Industry output produced by foreign firms in a NUTS 3 region as a share of
total country-wide output of the industry (the average over manufacturing industries in a
given region is plotted)
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3.3.2.1 Spillovers and distance
An often used measure to capture within-industry spillover effects HRjt in (3.1) is
the share of output that is produced by foreign firms in industry j. Alternatively one
could use the number of foreign firms in the respective industry (see Altomonte and
Pennings (2009)). However, given that we expect bigger firms to have a greater impact
on domestic productivity changes and potentially have a larger geographical reach as
well, we require a measure capturing the intensive margin of foreign presence and thus
use output instead of the number of foreign firms.
For a given firm i in industry j in region r at time t we can break HRjt down into
different ‘geographical’ subcomponents as follows:
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HRjt =
∑
i∈j
FitYit
∑
i∈j
Yit
(3.5)
=
∑ RitFitYit
∑Yit
+
∑NBitFitYit
∑Yit
+
∑ (1− Rit − NBit) FitYit
∑Yit
(3.6)
where Rit indicates whether firm i is located in region r, and NBit indicates whether
firm i is located in a contiguous region of r. Finally, (1− Rit − NBit) will equal 1 if firm
i is located in a further-away non-neighbouring region, i.e. a rest-of-country category.4
We refer to this regional decomposition as ‘distance’.
From (3.6) it becomes clear that introducing HRjt as a single variable in a regression
involves the implicit assumption that the spillover intensity, as measured by the coeffi-
cient obtained on HRjt, is the same within and across regions. In our empirical analysis
we relax this assumption and allow the coefficients to differ between the different
subcomponents in (3.6), obtaining estimates for region, neighbour and rest-of-country
components respectively. A regional definition for BK follows from (3.2) above. Since
we only have input-output tables at the country-level, we assume that technical coeffi-
cients are similar across regions and equal to those derived from country-level input
output tables.5
We differ from earlier literature by explicitly structuring the regional dimension
as a decomposition of the traditional nation-wide definition. By introducing all three
subcomponents of (3.6) in our analysis we also differ from part of the regional FDI
spillover literature that does not allow for cross-regional spillovers. Often only the
first term of the decomposition is included among the regressors, thereby implicitly
assuming that spillovers are confined to region boundaries and do not cross borders.
This runs counter to Halpern and Muraközy (2007) who find that horizontal spillovers
vary with distance, but do not disappear. It also runs counter to macro-spillover studies
4Clearly, (3.6) could be further decomposed in a straightforward manner to account for second- or even
higher-order neighbours. However, since adding second-order neighbour effects does not affect our
estimates with respect to region, neighbour, and rest-of-country, we focus on the three aforementioned
dimensions. These results are available on request.
5The IO-tables are only available at the country-wide level. Therefore we need to assume that technical
coefficients do not differ across regions. As far as technology is not too different across regions, the
impact on the results should be limited. Since technological coefficients refer to the share of a broad input
category used in the production process, we do not expect large differences across regions. Nevertheless
one should bear this caveat in mind.
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as Keller (2002) who finds that spillovers between countries are declining with distance.
We further distinguish ourselves from the existing literature by modelling cross-region
spillover effects. Consider the following reformulation of (3.6), where summation is
over firms i in industry j:
HRjt =
∑ RitFitYit
∑ RitYit
× ∑ RitYit
∑Yit
+
∑NBitFitYit
∑NBitYit
× ∑NBitYit
∑Yit
+
∑ (1− Rit − NBit) FitYit
∑ (1− Rit − NBit)Yit ×
∑ (1− Rit − NBit)Yit
∑Yit
(3.7)
Studies that focus on regional spillovers typically apply the traditional nation-wide
definition to their regional spillover variable. This spillover variable is constructed as
output produced by foreign firms in industry j in region r as a share of total regional
industry j output, i.e. the first part of the first term in (3.7), rather than as a share of
country-wide industry j output.
The definition of an appropriate measure relates to one’s idea about spillover poten-
tial (this is what the variables are intended to capture). Consider two regions A and B.
In region A 10 out of the total of 100 units are produced by foreign firms, while in region
B 10,000 out of the total 100,000 units are produced by foreigners. ∑ RitFitYit/∑ RitYit
is appropriate if one believes that the spillover potential is the same in both regions. In
the former case, spillovers should be thought of as limited to the region level since it is
difficult to carry this definition through to the cross-region level. Suppose regions A
and B are neighbours. Following a logic of relative within territorial unit presence, the
spillover from neighbours could be measured as ∑NBitFitYit/∑NBitYit . This results
in a value of 0.10 for both region A and B. However, it seems counter-intuitive that the
spillover potential from region A to B would equal the spillover potential from B to
A. This is not the case when using the second subcomponent of our decomposition in
(3.6). In our example, this results in a spillover potential from A to B of 10/100, 100
and a spillover potential from B to A of 10, 000/100, 100. These values seem better
aligned with the cross-region spillover potential one would expect. Regions where
a larger share of the foreign activity is located carry a larger spillover potential and
therefore should be reflected in the measure employed in empirical work. Therefore,
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we apply the decomposition in (3.6) and allow for coefficient heterogeneity for the
different subcomponents.
3.3.2.2 Spillovers and time-since-foreign-entry
Abstracting for the moment from the geographical dimension in HRjt discussed
above, (3.1) hides another important dimension that deserves attention. Indeed, upon
closer inspection various spillover transmission channels imply an impact of foreign
maturity as discussed above. Following Merlevede et al. (2014) we therefore introduce
a time-since-foreign-entry pattern in our analysis of spillover effects. Consider the
following alternative breakdown of (3.1):
HRjt =
∑ F˜1itYit
∑Yit
+
∑ F˜2itYit
∑Yit
+ ...+
∑ F˜nitYit
∑Yit
(3.8)
where F˜x is a variable indicating foreign ownership status and entry timing. F˜xit
equals the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors in firm i if at least 10% of
shares were owned by a single foreign investor in year t− x + 1 and firm i was not
foreign owned in year t− x, i.e. the investment took place between t− x + 1 and t− x.
So F˜xit is set to the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors if:(
x−1
∑
v=0
Fi,t−v = x
)
∧
(
∞
∑
w=x
Fi,t−w = 0
)
(3.9)
HRjt is thus broken down into HR1jt, HR
2
jt, and so on, along the lines of foreign entry
timing (note the difference with pure calendar time or taking lags of HRjt). A time-
since-foreign-entry definition for BKxjt follows from (3.2) and (3.8) above (a definition
for forward spillover variables straight forwardly follows):
BKxjt = ∑
k 6=j
γjkt ∗ HRxkt (3.10)
We combine the regional and time-since-foreign-entry aspects into a single compre-
hensive approach, as summarized in Table 3.1. A failure to find cross-region spillovers
on the basis of aggregate variables as in (3.6) could be due to the fact that time-since-
foreign-entry has been neglected, rather than that these spillovers are truly non-existent.
Indeed, as indicated above the time-since-entry pattern for within-region spillovers may
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well be different from the time-since-entry pattern for cross-region or rest-of-country
spillovers, since it may take more time for domestic firms to absorb spillovers from
foreign firms in further-away regions. Further note that some papers limit the scope of
spillovers to the boundaries of a region by construction of the spillover variables (see
Nicolini and Resmini (2010)). We model the potential regional pattern explicitly and
combine it in a novel way with time-since-foreign-entry effects.
Table 3.1: Coefficient heterogeneity in a regional time-since-foreign-entry approach
Region/Time-since-foreign-entry t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4+
same region CR,t CR,t−1 CR,t−2 CR,t−3 CR,t−4+
neighbour region CNB,t CNB,t−1 CNB,t−2 CNB,t−3 CNB1,t−4+
rest of country CRoC,t CRoC,t−1 CRoC,t−2 CRoC,t−3 CRoC,t−4+
3.3.3 Empirical framework
Our empirical approach detailed in (3.4) above closely follows the existing literature
described earlier. We estimate domestic industry production functions using the ACF
estimator separately for each NACE6 2-digit manufacturing industry j in the period
1996-2005. Capital, labour, and material inputs elasticities are thus treated as industry-
specific. Firms that are foreign at some point in time are excluded from the estimation.
The vector of spillover variables (FDIjt−1) covers different horizontal and vertical
spillover variables described above. More specifically, HR, BK, and FW are decom-
posed in function of both the geography and time-since-foreign-entry dimensions
(for clarity we drop industry and time subscripts in (3.11)). We consider three differ-
ent regional dimensions: within-region spillovers, HR_regt−x, first-order neighbour
spillovers, HR_nbt−x, and spillovers from the regions that make up the rest-of-country,
HR_roct−x. Considering the time span of our dataset (1996-2005, cf. infra) we opt to
include HR_xt to HR_xt−3 and create a variable HR_xt−4+ which aggregates all foreign
firms that have been present for at least four full years on the domestic market, hence
the summation from t to t− 4+ in (3.11). Since we do not have information on exact
dates of foreign entry prior to 1996, the time span of the dataset for the estimations is
reduced to 2001-2005 because of missing values.
6NACE stands for Nomenclature générale des Activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes.
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Ψ1 f
(
FDIjt−1
)
=
4+
∑
x=0
(
αt−xh,regHR_reg
t−x + αt−xh,nbHR_nb
t−x + αt−xh,rocHR_roc
t−x
)
+
4+
∑
x=0
(
αt−xb,regBK_reg
t−x + αt−xb,nbBK_nb
t−x + αt−xb,rocBK_roc
t−x
)
+
4+
∑
x=
(
αt−xf ,regFW_reg
t−x + αt−xf ,nbFW_nb
t−x + αt−xf ,rocFW_roc
t−x
)
(3.11)
Through the vector Zi(j)t we control for competition within the industry, measured
by the Herfindahl index, import competition in the industry, the share of interme-
diates supplied in total industry output, and firm size and age. Further we use the
region-industry share of national industry activity and the region’s share of national
manufacturing activity to control for region and region-industry agglomeration effects.
Specification (3.4) is first-differenced and estimated by OLS. We also introduce industry
(αj), region (αr), and time dummies (αt) in the first-differenced specification to account
for unobserved factors that could be driving growth performance at the region or in-
dustry level. This results in (3.12) as final specification to be estimated. Since FDIjt and
some control variables are defined at the industry level, and estimations are performed
at the firm level, standard errors need to be adjusted (Moulton (1990)). Standard errors
are therefore clustered for all observations in the same region, industry and year (see
Javorcik (2004)).
∆t f pijrt = Ψ′1∆ f
(
FDIjt−1
)
+Ψ′2∆Zi(j)t + αt + αj + αr + eijrt (3.12)
3.4 Data
For this chapter we use a pilot firm-level data for a panel of Romanian manufactur-
ing firms during 1996-2005. We do not employ the larger AUGAMA due the fact that we
did not yet have it available and we wanted to focus only on one country for this analy-
sis. Since most foreign investment entered the country after 1996, Romania makes a very
good candidate to study the dynamic impact of recent foreign investment on domestic
firm productivity (see Hilber and Voicu (2010)). Moreover, in a bid to bring all regions
to a similar level of economic development by creating a homogeneous working class,
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the country has undergone a massive forced industrialisation for about two decades
prior to 1990s (see Ronnås (1984)). This was at least partially successful due to the wide
dispersion of natural resources across the country. Although the process did not level
out all regional differences that developed over centuries, it did reduce some disparities
and created a more standardised structure of counties with strong manufacturing bases
and improved urban networks. The fall of communism in 1989 was accompanied by a
reversal of at least some of these policies, with severe restructuring in the industrial
set-up of the country as a consequence. As a result, regional inequalities have risen
due to both market forces and a decrease in state intervention (see Antonescu (2012)).
While we do not have data for the 1990-1995 period, our sample still covers the early
stages of the transition period and therefore a relatively homogeneous regional set-up.
Our firm-level data are taken from Amadeus, a Bureau van Dijk Electronic Pub-
lishing database. Amadeus is a pan-European database of financial information on
public and private companies. Every month Bureau Van Dijk issues a new DVD with
updated information. A single issue of the DVD contains only the latest information
on ownership and firms that go out of business are dropped from the database fairly
rapidly. Furthermore, because Bureau Van Dijk updates individual ownership links
between legal entities rather than the full ownership structure of a given firm, the own-
ership information on a specific DVD-issue often consists of a number of ownership
links with different dates, referring to the last verification of a specific link. To construct
our dataset with entry, exit, and time-specific foreign entry in local Romanian firms,
we therefore employed a series of different issues of the database. However, since
ownership information is gathered at irregular intervals, we do not have ownership in-
formation for all firm-owner-year combinations.7 Given these specificities of Amadeus,
we first created a dataset at the firm-owner-year-level with the available information
from Amadeus. We then filled out missing firm-owner-year-entries under restriction
that the full ownership structure cannot exceed 100%. In case of time gaps between
entries for the same owner-firm combination but with a different share-size we assume
that changes show up immediately in the database. Finally, we then fill out the gaps
7Identifying the same owner in different issues is not always straightforward since an ID is only listed in
case the owner is a firm that is listed in Amadeus itself. For all other owners matching is done on the
basis of the name. Differences in spacings, plurals, addition to the name of a company-type, the use of
characters specific to Romanian versus standard Roman characters in different issues are corrected for.
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with the older information.8 We focus on a sample of firms that report unconsolidated
data.
Data are deflated using industry price level data at NACE rev.1.1 2-digit level. These
are taken from the Industrial Database for Eastern Europe from the Vienna Institute
for International Economic Studies (2008) and from the Romanian National Statistical
Office (RNSO) (2005). Real output Y is measured as operating revenues deflated by
producer price indices of the appropriate NACE industry; real material inputs M,
are deflated by a weighted intermediate input deflator where the industry-specific
weighting scheme is drawn from the IO tables. Labor L is expressed as the number of
employees. Real capital K is measured as tangible fixed assets, deflated by the average
of the deflators for the following five NACE industries: machinery and equipment
(29); office machinery and computing (30); electrical machinery and apparatus (31);
motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers (34); and other transport equipment (35) (see
Javorcik (2004)). Detailed IO tables containing 105 (59 manufacturing) sectors for the
period 1996–2005 were obtained from the RNSO.
We restrict the dataset to firms with on average at least 5 employees over the sample
period. The dataset is further trimmed for outliers by removing the top and bottom
percentiles of the annual growth rates of real operating revenues, real capital, labour,
and real material inputs.9 The share of foreign firms in the total number of sample
firms steadily increased from 17% to 24% (10% to 15% if small firms are not excluded).
Table 3.2 lists summary statistics for both domestic and foreign firms. The stylized
facts commonly found in the literature are confirmed in our dataset. Foreign firms
are larger in terms of employment and capital, produce more output and are more
productive. The productivity bonus of foreign over domestic firms is 26% in case of the
ACF methodology.
Based on 15164 industry-region-year observations Table 3.3 reveals that on average
over industries, regions, and years about 25% of output is produced by foreign firms.
On average 20.7 percentage-points of it is produced in the rest-of-country. Within-
8e.g.
Amadeus immediate
2000 40 40
2001 . 40
2002 50 50
9If the ‘outlier’ is the first or last observation for a specific firm and other data points appear ‘normal’, the
other firm-year data are kept. If not all observations for this firm are dropped from the dataset.
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Table 3.2: TFP summary statistics
All firms Domestic firms Foreign firms
n=133154 n=105854 n=27300
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ln(real output) 13.74 1.90 13.53 1.84 14.52 1.94
ln(employment) 3.08 1.47 2.93 1.40 3.67 1.57
ln(capital) 12.08 2.32 11.82 2.26 13.06 2.29
ln(tfp) ACF 5.74 1.52 5.69 1.52 5.95 1.47
Summary statistics for foreign and domestic firms.
region and neighbouring-region aggregates account for 1 and 3.2 percentage-points on
average. Taking into account the median value, the interquartile range, minima, and
maxima suggests a reasonable variation in the data for within-region and neighbouring-
region aggregates. Some industries are dominated by foreign firms concentrated
in a single region as testified by the maximum value of 80.3%. Backward spillover
variables show a more mitigated pattern as they are a weighted average of downstream
horizontal variables. Correlations between region-neighbour, region-rest-of-country,
and neighbour-rest-of-country are virtually zero at 0.03, -0.05, and -0.07. Table 3.4 shows
that for each regional aggregate foreign firms which have been present for at least four
years account on average for the largest share of output produced by foreign firms in
the industry and region. One should bear these numbers in mind when interpreting
the results below.
Table 3.3: Summary statistics for the distance decomposition
Mean Median IQR P25 Min Max
horizontal
region 1.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 80.3
neighbour 3.2 0.6 3.1 0.0 0.0 83.5
rest-of-country 20.7 17.5 21.5 8.5 0.0 87.2
backward
region 0.6 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 38.7
neighbour 1.7 0.7 1.2 0.3 0.0 26.8
rest-of-country 14.4 14.5 9.8 9.3 0.1 62.9
Table entries refer to the share of total country-wide industry output produced by foreign firms in the
region, neighbouring region, and rest-of-country regional aggregates. Numbers are based on 15164
industry-region-year observations.
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics for the distance and time-since-foreign-entry decomposition
t t-1 t-2 t-3 t-4+
region 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.78
neighbour 0.13 0.37 0.45 0.47 2.59
rest-of-country 0.78 2.40 2.98 3.22 16.52
Table entries refer to the share of total country-wide industry output produced by foreign firms of a
given maturity (indicated in column headings) in the region, neighbouring region, and rest-of-country
regional aggregates. Numbers are averages over 15164 industry-region-year observations.
3.5 Results
This section presents results of different sets of estimations. For the sake of clarity
and in order to keep the tables manageable we do not report the results on the control
variables here. If not mentioned otherwise, we include firm size and age, industry
competition, competition from imports in the industry, the share of intermediates
supplied in total industry output, and time, industry and region dummies as control
variables. We consider horizontal, backward and forward spillovers. The latter turn
out to be insignificant and for reasons of clarity and space we only report forward
spillover results in the first results table and omit them from further tables. We think
of them as additional control variables. We first discuss results that only focus on the
distance decomposition of the spillover variables. Then we combine the distance and
time-since-foreign-entry decompositions of the spillover variables and present our main
results. We refer the reader to Merlevede et al. (2014) for results on the time-since-entry
decomposition by itself.
3.5.1 Distance decomposition
Table 3.5 presents results for the distance decomposition. The table contains both
the estimated coefficients for spillover effects over different distances and an F-test for
the equality of the estimated coefficients over distance. We observe that all horizontal
spillover coefficients are significant. The estimated coefficients increase with distance
which suggests that while positive spillover channels dominate, negative effects such
as increased competition are somewhat stronger for nearby foreign firms. We cannot
reject the different coefficients to be equal, however. Backward spillover effects are
only statistically significant from firms located further away, specifically in the rest-of-
country area. This result could reflect that backward spillover effects originate from
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firms concentrated in a small number of regions and from there spread to other regions
of the country. For the average Romanian region these regions would pertain to the
rest-of-country category. Nonetheless, the test for equality of coefficients again is unable
to reject the null hypothesis that coefficients are equal. The third column shows that
forward spillovers are insignificant, a finding which is not uncommon in the literature
(see e.g. Damijan et al. (2013)).
Table 3.5: Results when applying the distance decomposition to spillover variables
Horizontal Backward Forward
same region 0.834* 1.577 -1.924
[0.461] [1.058] [1.261]
neighbouring region 1.117*** 0.304 1.465
[0.287] [0.916] [0.915]
rest of country 1.438*** 1.355*** 0.082
[0.141] [0.375] [0.322]
Reg=NB=RoC 1.268 0.692 2.325*
Observations 49,074
R-squared 0.05
The table presents both the regression results for the geographical component alone and a test for the
equality of coefficients at regional, neighbour and rest-of-country level with the corresponding F-test.
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. F-test *
rejected at 10%; ** rejected at 5%; *** rejected at 1%.
3.5.2 Distance and time-since-foreign-entry decomposition
Results in Table 3.5 do not account for the time-since-foreign-entry dimension.
Table 3.6 therefore shows our central result that combines the regional dimension with
the time-since-foreign-entry dimension. From specification (1) we infer that horizontal
spillover effects (column a) are negative in the first years after entry, but turn positive
when foreign firms ‘mature’. The intensity of horizontal spillovers again does not
seem to vary in terms of FDI location (nearby or far away), with very similar spillover
coefficients for same region, neighbouring region, and rest-of-country aggregates. This
is confirmed by the results in column 1 of Table 3.7, as we cannot reject the equality
of the horizontal spillover coefficients across the regional dimension. Therefore, for
a similar share of foreign sales at each geographic level, domestic firms experience
similar productivity effects whether foreign firms are located in their own region, in a
neighbouring region or in the rest-of-country.
The time-since-entry dimension suggest that domestic firms experience an initial
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Table 3.6: Horizontal and Backward spillovers
(1) (2) (3)
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
Horizontal Backward Horizontal Backward Horizontal Backward
entry in t
same region -0.574 18.231*** -0.427 19.852*** -0.164 20.151**
[0.953] [6.921] [0.964] [7.073] [1.030] [9.875]
neighbouring region 0.889 -0.346
[0.546] [5.192]
rest of country 0.183 2.712 0.421 2.405
[0.332] [1.740] [0.307] [1.682]
entry in t-1
same region -2.483*** 10.985*** -2.394*** 11.735*** -2.621*** 9.943***
[0.814] [2.929] [0.820] [2.937] [0.861] [3.327]
neighbouring region -1.574*** 5.201
[0.577] [3.750]
rest of country -1.089*** 8.464*** -1.104*** 8.176***
[0.374] [1.094] [0.354] [1.062]
entry in t-2
same region -1.427*** 3.343*** -1.394*** 3.579*** -1.528** 2.570**
[0.539] [1.122] [0.541] [1.134] [0.618] [1.287]
neighbouring region -2.461*** 6.227**
[0.562] [2.820]
rest of country -1.427*** 4.224*** -1.549*** 4.325***
[0.269] [0.745] [0.263] [0.726]
entry in t-3
same region 0.263 3.845*** 0.237 3.970*** -0.027 2.760*
[0.437] [1.415] [0.439] [1.464] [0.490] [1.453]
neighbouring region 0.084 2.784
[0.525] [2.456]
rest of country 0.583*** 4.287*** 0.555*** 4.126***
[0.193] [0.971] [0.186] [0.939]
entry in t-4 or earlier
same region 1.546*** 0.525 1.539*** 0.543 1.212*** -0.192
[0.412] [1.214] [0.416] [1.215] [0.453] [1.350]
neighbouring region 1.814*** -1.368
[0.315] [1.025]
rest of country 2.108*** -0.439 2.053*** -0.594
[0.155] [0.435] [0.152] [0.418]
Observations 49,074 49,074 49,074
R-squared 0.071 0.070 0.045
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
negative impact following foreign firms’ entry, which could be due to considerable
negative competition effects or labour cherry picking. However, once foreign firms
have been present for a sufficiently long period in the domestic economy (entry in t-4 or
earlier), positive spillover effects do arise and they are sufficiently large to compensate
for earlier negative effects. In line with Table 3.5, point estimates again hint at a larger
(or less negative) impact for foreign firms located in the rest-of-country versus the own
region, confirming that distance might offer some protection against negative effects.
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Backward spillover effects in specification (1) column (b), on the other hand, show a
larger sensitivity to the distance between domestic and foreign firms. Both distance
and time-since-foreign-entry are important determinants of the magnitude of the back-
ward spillover effect accruing to domestic firms. Taking time-since-foreign-entry into
account, we find that entry of foreign firms in the same region entails a faster positive
contribution to the domestic firms’ productivity. Positive spillover effects from further
away foreign firms do manifest themselves, but take more time to do so. To better
illustrate the impact of backwards spillovers, in Figure 3.2 we plot the total expected
contribution to a domestic firm’s TFP level of a foreign entrant producing 2 per cent
of downstream output annually, i.e. the backward spillover effect. From panel (a) of
Figure 3.2 we clearly infer that a domestic firm would prefer to see the foreign firm
enter in its own region, as the expected backward spillover effect over the foreign firm’s
life time is at least twice as large there compared to those from the other two regional
dimensions. The F-tests in Table 3.7 confirm a statistically significant bonus of being
close to foreign clients. Moreover, specifications (2) and (3) in Table 3.6 show that the
‘being close’ bonus is not driven by a specific correlation structure between the different
elements of the regional decomposition, since the exclusion of the neighbour variables
or the neighbour and rest − o f − country variables does not affect the results of the
region variable. Panel (b) of Figure 3.2 shows that positive and significant backward
spillover effects are arising from foreign firms with limited maturity (this is in line
with Merlevede et al. (2014)). The time-since-foreign-entry pattern shows a strong
initial impact of supplying intermediate inputs to foreign firms located in the host
region that decays over time and disappears for more mature foreign firms. The pat-
terns for backward spillover effects from foreign firms in neighbouring regions or in
rest-of-country regions are similar and not statistically different from one another (cf.
F-tests in Table 3.7). These spillover effects take more time to manifest themselves and
also disappear once a foreign firm has been present for a longer period in the host
country. This explains the difference with our findings in Table 3.5 where we did not
account for the time-since-foreign-entry pattern. Since only recent foreign entrants
drive regional differences in backward spillover effects, lumping all firms together in
terms of time-since-foreign-entry prevents us from observing this effect.
These findings are consistent with our expectations. Horizontal spillover effects
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Figure 3.2: Backward spillover effect of a foreign firm producing 2 per cent of downstream
output
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The figure shows the actual contribution to a domestic firm’s TFP level of a foreign firm each year
producing 2 per cent of downstream output.
Table 3.7: Test for equality of coefficients
F-test Horizontal Backward
Regt=NBt=RoCt 1.117 2.536*
Regt=NBt 1.838 4.280**
NBt=RoCt 1.241 0.330
Regt=RoCt 0.558 4.813**
Regt−1=NBt−1=RoCt−1 1.314 0.777
Regt−2=NBt−2=RoCt−2 1.656 0.513
Regt−3=NBt−3=RoCt−3 0.606 0.198
Regt−4+=NBt−4+=RoCt−4+ 1.248 0.834
The table presents a test for the equality of coefficients at regional, neighbour and rest-of-country level
with the corresponding F-test value. * rejected at 10%; ** rejected at 5%; *** rejected at 1%.
vary with distance on the basis of point estimates, but differences are not statistically
significant. There is thus some indication that the closer to a foreign firm, the smaller
the spillover effect will be because of a stronger initial negative competition and labour
market effects. However, because MNEs typically compete nation-wide and high-
skilled workers in demand by foreign firms are likely to be highly mobile, the distance
effect is not significant. Backward spillover effects, on the other hand, are faster and
larger for nearby domestic firms. This is because MNEs have an incentive to assist
their local suppliers and learning is faster at closer distances due to easier (face-to-face)
contact and visits of engineers. This does not rule out effects over longer distances, but
we find them to be smaller and to take more time to manifest themselves. Backward
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spillover effects are limited in time-since-foreign-entry, as linkages with foreign clients
no longer stimulate technological upgrading after considerable initial improvements of
productivity.
Since Figure 3.2 does not convey much about the actual in-sample contribution to
productivity for Romanian firms, we offer two additional views of our results. First,
we calculate the period-average contribution to the TFP-level of the average domestic
firm of the different spillover variables, as shown in Figure 3.3. This is achieved by
multiplying the average amount of foreign presence at all three regional levels with
their respective coefficients. Moreover, it gives a better indication of what foreign entry
has brought for Romanian firms over 2001-2005. Figure 3.3 suggests that the average
contribution of the rest-of-country horizontal spillover is larger than those from either
the own or neighbouring regions. This is due to the combination of similar sized
coefficients as well as the fact that on average the amount of foreign activity in the rest-
of-country regional aggregate is much larger than in either the own or neighbouring
regions. From panel (a) of Figure 3.3 it is also clear that the positive contribution after
four years of foreign presence outweighs the negative effects foreign firms generate
in the first three years. This confirms the fact that after an initial adjustment period,
domestic firms do benefit from the presence of foreign firms in their own industry (cf.
Merlevede et al. (2014)). Backward spillover effects are limited to the first years after
foreign entry. For the average domestic firm the rest-of-country backward spillover
effect is the largest because most of the foreign firms are located there, but the within-
region contribution is non-negligible.
Second, since the previous result does not take into account regional heterogeneity
in Romania, we recalculate the expected impact in terms of spillover effects on TFP
from moving a domestic firm between regions, as seen in Figure 3.4. We first ‘relocate’
a firm from Vaslui (denoted as VS), a subpar performing region in the North-East at
the border with Moldova, to Timis¸ (denoted as TM), a regional hub in the South-West
of Romania. This move increases the total spillover effect on the log of the TFP-level
of the firm with 0.036. The effect is for about two thirds driven by an increase in
the horizontal spillover effect which in turn is driven mainly by an increase in the
within-region effect (the negative neighbour and positive rest-of-country components
are smaller and cancel out). A further move from Timis¸ to Bucharest-Ilfov (denoted
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Figure 3.3: Average effect
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The figure shows the actual contribution of the FDI on the productivity of domestic firms, where each
coefficient is augmented by the amount of foreign presence at the respective regional dimension.
as B) increases the total spillover effect by 0.058. In contrast to the previous move, the
increase is now due to the combination of a decrease in the horizontal effect (-0.032)
that is more than compensated by a larger increase in the backward spillover effect
(0.091). The latter is due to the fact that being in the same region as foreign entrants
carries a statistically significant bonus in terms of backward spillover effects, as well
as that Bucharest-Ilfov is the main TFP-hub in Romania, dwarfing the other regions in
terms of foreign presence and foreign entry over the sample period. This also explains
a within-region negative horizontal effect in Bucharest-Ilfov, compared to Timis¸. In the
latter the horizontal effects from the many foreign firms located in Bucharest-Ilfov have
a more benign effect as they are part of the rest-of-country component for firms located
there. The regions recording the smallest total spillover effects over the sample period
are neighbours of Bucharest-Ilfov. This occurs due to the fact that they are less protected
from negative horizontal effects from foreign firms in Bucharest-Ilfov as well as that
they are not close enough in order to benefit from the immediate positive backward
spillover effects generated by the large number of foreign entrants in Bucharest-Ilfov.
Note that all this is derived on the basis of point estimates and should be considered
as indicating the direction of the effects. F-tests revealed that only the ‘immediate’
within-region backward spillover effect (the largest source of spillover effects) is found
to be statistically different from the other geographical components.
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Figure 3.4: The NUTS3 regions in Romania
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In Table 3.8 we further explore regional heterogeneity in the estimation by testing
whether the identified patterns are stable across regions that perform above and below
median region-productivity. We use the approach of Foster et al. (2001) to calculate
initial regional TFP from our firm-level data.10 Regions with above median region-TFP
levels could be interpreted as more dynamic regions with larger absorptive capability,
yielding a rationale to expect different patterns. As Table 3.8 indicates, more productive
regions show slightly higher horizontal spillover coefficients compared to the entire
sample. This might suggest that firms located in these regions are on average better at
adapting to foreign presence in their industry. Coefficients are similar at all regional
dimensions, indicating that location is not relevant for horizontal spillover absorption.
With respect to backward spillover effects, we confirm the ‘being-close bonus’, i.e. the
significantly larger within-region backward spillover effect from recent foreign entrants.
Overall, these patterns are fairly similar to those obtained using the full sample. Differ-
ences emerge when we consider spillover patterns in below median region-productivity
regions. Within-region positive horizontal spillover effects from foreign firms with
10We compute this value by a weighted sum of their individual productivities: Pr = ∑ sir ∗ pi and where
sir is the regional output share of firm i in region r and pi is its productivity.
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sufficient maturity are no longer detected (whereas they still are positive and significant
at the neighbour and rest-of-country levels). Similarly, for backward spillover effects,
the within-region ‘being-close bonus’ for new foreign entrants disappears, as do the
positive within-region backward spillover effects from foreign firms entering two and
three years earlier. It also takes more time for other positive backward spillover effects
to manifest themselves in these regions (3-4 years).
Table 3.8: Horizontal and Backward spillovers in Above and Below median productivity
regions
(1) Above (2) Below
(a) Horizontal (b) Backwards (a) Horizontal (b) Backwards
entry in t
same region -0.504 17.622** 0.869 49.737
[1.130] [7.697] [0.994] [47.079]
neighbouring region -0.937 -3.246 1.799*** 17.826
[0.849] [5.905] [0.520] [11.645]
rest of country 0.571 2.256 -0.584 4.253
[0.404] [2.204] [0.596] [2.708]
entry in t-1
same region -2.266** 11.672*** -4.238 46.073*
[0.899] [3.213] [5.869] [26.034]
neighbouring region -1.659** 3.812 -3.358*** 8.437
[0.705] [4.240] [1.090] [8.256]
rest of country -0.852* 8.711*** -1.247*** 8.071***
[0.498] [1.319] [0.446] [1.883]
entry in t-2
same region -1.316** 3.580*** -10.836** 14.002
[0.582] [1.189] [4.726] [15.817]
neighbouring region -2.505*** 2.036 -3.253*** 19.130***
[0.705] [3.139] [0.889] [5.051]
rest of country -1.475*** 3.762*** -1.157*** 4.963***
[0.342] [0.961] [0.389] [1.039]
entry in t-3
same region 0.408 3.810*** -4.773 21.948
[0.450] [1.383] [3.559] [24.716]
neighbouring region 0.161 1.019 0.089 8.415*
[0.643] [2.815] [0.845] [4.590]
rest of country 0.766*** 3.682*** 0.404 5.775***
[0.253] [1.283] [0.277] [1.240]
entry in t-4 or earlier
same region 1.713*** 0.264 1.651 10.422
[0.413] [1.246] [1.473] [9.899]
neighbouring region 2.135*** -1.01 1.585*** -2.831
[0.398] [1.208] [0.482] [2.175]
rest of country 2.301*** -0.384 1.999*** -0.4
[0.204] [0.571] [0.234] [0.656]
Observations 33,693 15,381
R-squared 0.075 0.072
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 3.9: Test for equality of coefficients - Above/Below
F-test (1) Above (2) Below(a) Horizontal (b) Backward (a) Horizontal (b) Backward
Regt=NBt=RoCt 1.507 2.304 4.854*** 1.094
Regt=NBt 0.102 4.402** 0.867 0.441
NBt=RoCt 2.687 0.814 9.637*** 1.340
Regt=RoCt 0.797 3.745* 1.678 0.933
Regt−1=NBt−1=RoCt−1 1.174 1.160 1.878 1.062
Regt−2=NBt−2=RoCt−2 1.162 0.146 4.330** 4.168**
Regt−2=NBt−2 1.911 0.210 2.487 0.091
NBt−2=RoCt−2 2.059 0.289 5.023** 7.752***
Regt−2=RoCt−2 0.067 0.014 4.118** 0.325
Regt−3=NBt−3=RoCt−3 0.622 0.452 1.107 0.342
Regt−4+=NBt−4+=RoCt−4+ 1.004 0.318 0.380 1.215
The table presents a test for the equality of coefficients at regional, neighbour and rest-of-country level
with the corresponding F-test value. * rejected at 10%; ** rejected at 5%; *** rejected at 1%.
3.5.3 Foreign firms’ location choice
In Table 3.8 we found that regions above and below the median region-productivity
show different spillover patterns. One could argue that foreign firms would tend
to locate in the regions where they expect domestic firms with higher productivity
(growth) to be located. In order to make sure that our results are not driven by such
factors, we analyze foreign firms’ location choice within Romania. From panel (a) in
Figure 3.5 one can observe that the majority of foreign companies locates either near the
Western border with Hungary or in Bucharest-Ilfov, the capital region. This indicates
that location choice is potentially non-random.
Location choice can be explained by several factors. First of all, it has been suggested
that foreign companies investing in developing countries such as Romania face very
specific obstacles like widespread bureaucracies, corruption, insufficiently developed
financial markets and unpredictable legal systems (see Bitzenis (2006)). Therefore,
instead of focusing solely on labour costs, foreign firms would locate in areas with high
services agglomeration or, in other words, large cities which allow them to have access
to lawyers, accountants, translators and the banking industry (Hilber and Voicu (2010)).
Second, location of foreign subsidiaries might also be explained by the proximity to
Western borders. Since a large share of foreign investment has European roots, choosing
a location closer to home might constitute an advantage for their parents. Moreover,
since Western border regions have for a large part of recent history been under the
influence of the Habsburg empire, locating in this area might be more appealing from a
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cultural sense as well (see Becker et al. (2011)).
Nonetheless, there might still be an issue if the most productive (domestic) com-
panies are also located in these regions. Comparing panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3.5
suggests no immediate problem. Nevertheless, we run two simple regressions to inves-
tigate how regional productivity growth is related to the location choice of new foreign
firms. We perform the analysis at both the region and the region-industry level. We
include a Western border dummy because we expect the border to have a significant
impact on location choice due to the closeness to Western markets. Further we add a
dummy that is set to one if the main national road connecting Bucharest with Hungary
passes through the region.11 Finally, we also include the regional rural rate obtained
from the Romanian National Statistical Office (RNSO) (2014) as we expect foreign firms
to be located in urban areas, giving them access to services and higher educated labour
force. The results in Table 3.10 indicate that location is indeed heavily influenced by our
control variables but is not related to the lagged first difference of regional productivity
of domestic firms. We therefore conclude that foreign firm location is not influenced by
the presence of fast growing domestic firms in the region.
Figure 3.5: Share of foreign firms and regional productivity
(a) 2005 share of foreign firms as percentage of
total country number of foreign firms
Bulgaria
Hungary
Serbia
Moldova
Ukraine
<0.5
0.5−1
1−2
2−5
5−10
>10
(b) 2005 regional productivity of domestic firms
computed as a weighted sum of their individual
productivities
Bulgaria
Hungary
Serbia
Moldova
Ukraine
2−3.5
3.5−4.5
4.5−5
5−5.5
>5.5
11Other roads were underdeveloped and of poor quality during our sample period.
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Table 3.10: Location of foreign firms
New foreign firms New foreign firms
(region) (region industry)
Regional productivity growth 0.021 -0.006
[0.576] [0.006]
DN1 road 11.146*** 0.220***
[2.550] [0.048]
HU border 10.564*** 0.313***
[2.424] [0.057]
Rural rate -52.326*** -1.740***
[11.965] [0.194]
Observations 369 6,293
R-squared 0.356 0.061
The table shows the regression results of local firm productivity change on foreign firm location. Standard
errors are reported in brackets. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at
1 percent. The dependent variables are the lag of the first difference in regional/region-industry firm
productivity of domestic firms, a dummy indicating whether the main national road is crossing the
region, a dummy for bordering regions with Hungary and the regional rural rate.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyses horizontal and vertical productivity spillover effects of foreign
direct investment on domestic Romanian manufacturing companies from 1996 to 2005.
We add to the literature by analysing the pattern of technology diffusion as a function of
both distance (proximity) and time-since-foreign-entry as mediating factors of spillover
effects.
Horizontal spillovers are found to be fairly homogeneous over distance. Recent
foreign entrants have a negative impact on local competitors’ TFP which is more than
compensated by positive effects once foreign firms have been present for a longer
period in the domestic economy. This indicates that it takes time for domestic firms to
adjust to foreign presence, with productivity improvements being realised provided
these companies withstand the initial pressures from foreign entrants and are able to
absorb the new foreign technology. This finding does not differ between above and
below median productivity regions.
In terms of backward spillovers, our results indicate that these manifest themselves
relatively fast after foreign entry, but fade away when foreign firms have been present
for a longer period. Being located in the same region as foreign firms carries a rapidly
arriving productivity bonus compared to foreign firms located further away. This
103
3. DISTANCE, TIME SINCE FOREIGN ENTRY AND FDI SPILLOVERS
suggests that over larger distances spillovers are absorbed, but at a slower pace. The
effect is particularly strong for domestic firms located in regions with above median pro-
ductivity. For below median productivity regions, positive backward spillover effects
mainly originate from further away regions and the being close bonus disappears.
These patterns are in line with what one would expect for a developing economy.
Horizontal spillovers mainly manifest themselves via competition and labour channels
which are only affected by distance in a limited way. In the time-since-foreign-entry
dimension these effects are non-linear, with a negative competition and labour poaching
effects at first, followed by positive spillovers once domestic firms have adjusted to
the increased competition and workers trained by foreign firms start to switch back
to domestic firms. Because MNEs have an incentive to assist their local suppliers and
learning is faster at closer distances due to easier (face-to-face) contact and visits of
engineers, we find a bonus of being located close to a foreign client. The latter does
not preclude effects over longer distances, but they are smaller and take more time to
manifest themselves. Irrespective of distance, backward spillover effects are limited in
time-since-foreign-entry. Once a domestic supplier has reached a sufficient level of TFP,
a linkage with a foreign client no longer stimulates technological upgrading. We do not
find evidence of forward spillover effects which is in line with other recent work on
Eastern Europe.
Overall spillover effects from foreign direct investment are likely to be positive, but
both horizontal and backward spillover effects vary considerably with foreign firms’
maturity. Backward spillover effects are also faster and larger for nearby domestic
firms. Horizontal spillover effects vary with distance on the basis of point estimates
(the closer, the smaller the spillover effect because of a negative competition aspect),
but these differences are not statistically significant.
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FDI and Borders: Evidence of
Knowledge Spillovers from
Neighbouring Countries ?
4.1 Introduction
Together with enterprise creation, encouraging inward foreign direct investment
(FDI) is one of the cornerstones of most industrial policy in both developing and
developed countries. Policymakers do so because FDI is considered to be an important
channel via which growth can be boosted. Multinational firms (MNEs) are not only
expected to bring new capital, resources and jobs, but they are also expected to generate
positive productivity spillover effects towards domestic firms. It is generally agreed
that MNEs are more productive than their domestic counterparts and posses superior
technologies and knowledge (see Helpman et al., 2004). Given that it is impossible
for MNEs to fully internalise these advantages, these technologies and know-how
are expected to spill over to domestic firms, resulting in productivity gains for the
latter. This paper brings together three strands of literature to investigate the impact of
?This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Bruno Merlevede.
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national borders in productivity spillover effects from FDI. Our paper is most strongly
related to the micro-econometric literature on productivity spillover effects from foreign
to domestic firms. Further it draws on the macro-oriented literature on technology
transfer across countries and the literature on border effects in trade.
Research into the existence and economic significance of these spillover effects has
provided mixed results, however (see e.g. Görg and Greenaway, 2004; Crespo and
Fontoura, 2007). This was especially the case for the earlier literature that focused
on spillover effects from MNEs on domestic firms that operate in the same industry
(horizontal spillover effects). A more consistent picture emerges when one looks at
vertical spillover effects, i.e. those arising between a foreign firm and its domestic sup-
pliers (and to a lesser extent buyers). First established by Javorcik (2004), these findings
suggest that MNEs have a greater interest in sharing their advanced knowledge, be
it either in terms of operational or management techniques, with domestic firms that
are related to the foreign firm through the supply chain. Following Javorcik (2004), a
large set of papers have replicated this finding for other countries, with consistently
positive and economically significant backward spillover effects and small, but often
statistically significant forward spillovers (see Havránek and Irsˆová, 2011).
Despite the great breath of papers in this field, the literature almost exclusively
consists of single country studies. This is due to the fact that large, representative multi-
country firm-level datasets are scarce. The literature has therefore turned attention more
towards characteristics that potentially facilitate the occurrence of (positive) spillover
effects. Relevant characteristics include the absorptive capability of the domestic
firms (see e.g. Narula and Marin, 2005), the characteristics of foreign affiliates such as
technological capability, embeddedness, and autonomy (e.g. Giroud et al., 2012; Marin
and Bell, 2006; Lenaerts and Merlevede, 2015), as well as the distance between foreign
and domestic firms (Merlevede and Purice, 2015).
In this paper we exactly draw upon the large, representative multi-country firm-
level dataset for European countries constructed in Chapter 2. This allows us to analyse
the potential for cross-border spillover effects. Using country-level data, Keller (2002)
finds that technology transfer declines and in the end disappears with distance. Comin
et al. (2012) confirm this finding and show that distance has a negative impact on
technology diffusion, although they also find that the impact of distance dies out over
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time. These results clearly point to a role for distance. In our multi-country firm-level
setting we analyse the impact of distance in a discrete way and investigate whether
national borders constitute a barrier for spillover effects from MNEs to local firms. This
further relates to the literature that investigates border effects in trade. McCallum (1995)
finds that regions within the US trade about 20 times more than US and Canadian
regions over a similar distance. By means of a meta-analysis, Havranek and Irsova
(2015) confirm that within-country regions trade about 20% more than regions with
similar characteristics, but located in different countries. Clearly, border effects in trade
are very relevant to vertical spillover effects since they are explicitly related to the
supply chain.
Our data allows us to analyse the potential for cross-border spillover effects for a
large number of domestic firms in Eastern European countries that have joined the EU in
2004 and 2007. For an economic union such as the EU, where borders should constitute
less of a barrier for the movement of capital and goods, it is not unlikely that domestic
Eastern European firms near the border with Western Europe are interacting with firms
in neighbouring countries. Especially client-supplier relations could be established
across borders. We further investigate whether some heterogeneity in borders exists
by using bilateral Schengen membership as a further test of the strictness of borders.
This question also parallels part of the trade literature that has been concerned with
the impact of (heterogeneity in) borders on the trade between and within countries. In
line with this border effect literature, we analyse whether (cross-border) FDI spillover
effects can be detected in Eastern Europe and whether there are significant differences
between within country and cross-border spillover effects for similar distances between
foreign and domestic firms.
We believe this to be an important question for several reasons. First of all, testing
for such spillover effects can be interpreted as a test of the integration in the internal
EU market. Are borders still a too strong barrier for domestic firms located near the
border to be able to benefit from the MNE activity in the neighbouring region across the
border? Second, the existence of spillover effects from MNEs located over the border
could suggest potential benefits of cooperation between neighbouring countries when
trying to attract FDI in their regions.
We perform the analysis using firm-level data on Central and Eastern Europe during
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the 2000-2010 period. We use information on the region where firms are located, and
combine this with the distance between regions to analyse whether domestic firms
within a certain distance from the border experience productivity gains as a result of
MNE activity nearby, but across the border. Our findings suggest that national borders
constitute an almost insurmountable barrier for horizontal and forward spillover effects.
In the case of backward spillover, national borders significantly dampen cross-border
spillover effects, but the size of the impact of the border seems related to the ‘depth’
of the border as evidenced by the difference between Schengen and non-Schengen
borders.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we give a brief
overview of our methodology. Section 3 introduces our data and explains how we
constructed the dataset. Section 4 presents the results and we conclude in section 5.
4.2 Spillovers and border effects
In order to identify the presence of cross-border spillover effects, we first introduce
the traditional country-wide approach to the analysis of spillover effects. We then
proceed by introducing cross-border spillover effects in the standard framework for the
analysis of productivity spillover effects from FDI.
4.2.1 Country wide spillovers in the standard framework
The existing literature on country-wide spillover effects from foreign direct invest-
ment makes and important distinction between within industry, or horizontal spillover
effects, and between industry, or vertical spillover effects. The main channels for hori-
zontal spillovers are technology imitation (the demonstration effect, (see Teece, 1977)
and mobility of workers trained by foreign firms (see Görg and Strobl, 2005). Foreign
entry may also lead to increased competition in the domestic market. This could form
an incentive for host-country firms to use existing technologies and resources more
efficiently or adopt new technologies, which provides another important channel of
horizontal spillover effects (see e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999). These effects are not
however necessarily positive. Backward spillovers run from a foreign firm to its up-
stream local suppliers. In this case foreign firms are more likely to assist their local
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suppliers in providing inputs of sufficient quality to realise the full benefits of their
investment. A forward spillover goes from a foreign firm to its downstream local
buyer of inputs. These inputs may be of better quality and enhance the productivity
of local firms that use them. However, these inputs may also be more expensive and
less adapted to local firm requirements, potentially denting local firm productivity.
The existing literature on country-wide spillover effects from foreign direct invest-
ment makes and important distinction between within industry, or horizontal spillover
effects, and between industry, or vertical spillover effects. The main channels for hori-
zontal spillovers are technology imitation (the demonstration effect, (see Teece, 1977)
and mobility of workers trained by foreign firms (see Görg and Strobl, 2005). Foreign
entry may also lead to increased competition in the domestic market. This could form
an incentive for host-country firms to use existing technologies and resources more
efficiently or adopt new technologies, which provides another important channel of
horizontal spillover effects (see e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 1999). These effects are how-
ever necessarily positive. Backward spillovers run from a foreign firm to its upstream
local suppliers. In this case foreign firms are more likely to assist their local suppliers
in providing inputs of sufficient quality to realise the full benefits of their investment.
A forward spillover goes from a foreign firm to its downstream local buyer of inputs.
These inputs may be of better quality and enhance the productivity of local firms that
use these inputs, but these inputs may also be more expensive and less adapted to local
firm requirements, so they dent local firm productivity.
The standard methodology for identifying these spillovers effects can be viewed as
an ‘augmented’ production function approach. In this approach variables capturing
foreign presence are added to more standard explanatory variables such as labour,
capital, and material inputs in explaining total factor productivity. The standard
measure for the (country-wide) horizontal spillover variable is given in Equation (4.1).
For a (domestic) firm i in industry j at time t it is of the following form:
HRCWjt =
∑
i∈j
FitYit
∑
i∈j
Yit
(4.1)
where Y is output and F is the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors.
(4.1) is the standard used throughout the literature. However, there are other ways
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to measure the FDI intensity within a country. Altomonte and Pennings (2009) for
example use a simple count of foreign firms. However, we prefer to use the share of
output produced by foreign firms, as this takes into account the relative size of foreign
activity. We denote as foreign any firm with a non-domestic direct ownership of more
than 50%. HRCWjt in (4.1) thus measures the share of output that is produced by foreign
firms in industry j in the country at time t. The spillover variable is then built up to
industry level from firm-level data, such that HRCWjt has the same value for all firms i
in industry j at time t.
The backward spillover variable, BKCWjt , is computed in (4.2) following an approach
that is by now standard in the literature:
BKCWjt = ∑
k 6=j
γjk ∗ HRCWkt (4.2)
here γjk is the proportion of industry j’s output supplied to industry k. Typically
the γ’s are calculated using country-level input-output (I-O) tables for intermediate
consumption. However, since we are looking at multiple countries and will also account
for cross border spillovers, we make use of EU-27 I-O tables.1 These tables are not
available on an annual basis. We use the 2007-table provided by Eurostat. The backward
spillover variable is thus an industry-level measure that captures the potential for a
domestic firm in industry j to supply a foreign firm in downstream industry k.
Similarly to the backward spillover variable, we define the forward spillover variable
as:
FWCWjt = ∑
l 6=j
δjl ∗ HRCWlt (4.3)
where δjl is the proportion of industry j’s inputs sourced from industry l. The
forward spillover variable then captures the potential for a domestic firm in industry j
to buy its inputs from a foreign firm in upstream industry l.
Once computed, the spillover variables HRCWjt , BK
CW
jt , and FW
CW
jt are then added
as explanatory variables in an equation estimating the productivity of (domestic) firm i
1An alternative to using one I-O table is applying country-specific tables for spillovers within a country
and country pairwise tables for spillovers across borders, as allowed by the WIOD database. However,
WIOD is computed at a more aggregate level, which could significantly underestimate the impact of
backward spillovers (see Lenaerts and Merlevede, 2012).
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in industry j (c f . in f ra). As common in the literature, the size, sign and significance of
the resulting coefficients are taken as evidence of spillover effects. The country wide
spillovers are then:
Ψ1 f FDICWjt−1 = αhr, f cHR
CW
jt−1 + αbk, f cBK
CW
jt−1 + α f w, f cFW
CW
jt−1 (4.4)
4.2.2 Accounting for borders
Starting with the seminal paper by McCallum (1995), the trade literature has been
concerned with the impact of borders. McCallum (1995) was the first to compare how
the movement of goods between two regions within a country (the US) compare to
that between regions in different countries (the US and Canada). He found that the
US-Canada border constitutes very a strong barrier to trade. Ever since a multitude
of papers have tried to measure this border effect, with results suggesting that within-
country regions trade around 20% more than regions from different countries with
similar characteristics (see Havranek and Irsova, 2015). Results do however differ
depending on the methodology used to determine internal distance within countries
(see Head and Mayer, 2002). Moreover, estimates differ depending on the industries as
well as the countries considered, with stronger border effects in more regional markets
of perishable goods (see Chen, 2004) as well as in developing world compared to
the OECD countries (see Havranek and Irsova, 2015). Taking inspiration from this
rich border effect literature, we analyse whether cross-border FDI spillover effects are
present in the EU or whether borders are too strong a barrier for firms to be able to
benefit from MNE activity in the neighbouring countries and regions.
In addition to the country-wide spillover effects in (4.4), we therefore introduce cross-
border spillover effects (horizontal and vertical) stemming from FDI in neighbouring
countries. We start by determining the location of firms in our dataset up to the relative
detailed NUTS 3-digit regional level.2 For firms located in a region close to the border
we define an ’area of interest’ (AI) and consider those with a national border present
within this area. Figure 4.1 illustrates this procedure for a domestic firm located in the
2Since we do not posses all the exact addresses where firms are located, this is the best measure we have
to determine how far from each other foreign and domestic firms are located. For a reasonable amount of
firms, the data only allow to assign our firms to the centre of their region because of missing zip-codes.
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Bratislava NUTS 3-digit region in Slovakia. The light grey area is the area of interest for
a firm in the Bratislava region. It encompasses all NUTS 3-digit regions whose centre is
within 75 kilometres of the centre of the Bratislava region.3 This light grey area forms
the basis for defining variables to analyse cross-border spillover effects. We prefer to
consider home country regions that have a neighbouring cross-border regions within
75 kilometres region centre distance over pure neighbour regions because NUTS 3-digit
regions differ in size across countries. Figure 4.1 shows that for a firm in Bratislava
this area of interest includes both national NUTS 3-digit regions as well as regions
in two neighbour countries, Austria and Hungary. A Bratislavan firm thus would
potentially face both spillovers from within Slovakia itself as well as spillovers from
its two neighbours. Note that while the Czech Republic is a neighbour of Slovakia
as well, the distance between Bratislava and the nearest NUTS 3-digit Czech region
centre is above 75 km, therefore falling outside our ‘area of interest’. Bearing in mind
that there is some consensus on the backward spillover channel as the main source of
substantial positive spillover effect, the choice for an area of interest of limited distance
can be motivated by recent research that points towards the role of proximity in the
formation of linkages. Using a Japanese transaction dataset, Bernard et al. (2014) show
the importance of distance for the formation of linkages. Key to the backward spillover
channel is that MNEs have an interest in technological upgrading by their suppliers
and therefore an incentive to provide them with explicit assistance (see Javorcik, 2004).
As successful assistance and upgrading requires human interaction, communication,
and monitoring (see Giroud, 2012; Keller and Yeaple, 2013), nearby suppliers are the
most likely place to detect positive spillover effects. Keller and Yeaple (2013) further
show that more knowledge-intensive inputs call for more communication, thereby
favouring nearby locations. Therefore, a distance-limited area of interest including
national borders is the best setting to detect border effects in productivity spillover
effects from MNEs to local firms.
Our empirical strategy amounts to defining spillover variables for firms in ‘border’
regions that allow to identify whether spillover effects from foreign firms within the
area of interest -both within the home country and across the border- are different from
the traditional country-wide spillovers defined above. We build on (4.1) and define
3We consider other distances as robustness check.
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Figure 4.1: The spillovers region for a firm in Bratislava
Austria
Hungary
Czech Republic
Slovakia
Croatia
Slovenia
BratislavaVienna
Budapest
Circle of interest Country−wide FDI
 Domestic Foreign at home
Foreign over border
The figure shows how we calculate the FDI spillover potential for a domestic firm located in Bratislava,
Slovakia.
spillover variables within the area of interest (AI) as follows:
HRAIjt =
∑
i∈j,i∈AI
FitYit
∑
i∈j,i∈AI
Yit
=
∑
i∈j,i∈AI−H
FitYit + ∑
i∈j,i∈AI−CB
FitYit
∑
i∈j,i∈AI
Yit
= HRAI−Hjt + HR
AI−B
jt (4.5)
where Y is output and F is the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors as
before. The difference with (4.1) is that HRAI is limited to firms located in the area
of interest and includes regions in the neighbouring country. Further HRAI can be
straightforwardly split in foreign activity in the home country (HRAI−H) and foreign
activity across the border (HRB). This allows us to separate the impact of both types
of foreign activity in the estimation. Differences in the estimated impact then make
inference about the impact of the border possible. In the calculation of foreign presence
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in (4.5) we exclude home country firms with foreign activity across the border. We
do so due to the fact that although technically foreign in the neighbouring country,
there might be endogeneity concerns. Domestic firms over the border might be there
due to higher productivity at home to begin with, thus crossing the border due to this
advantage in the first place.
Backward spillover variables can then be calculated as before, again making us of
the I-O tables as in (4.2) (forward spillover variables are obtained in a similar way):
BKAI−Hjt = ∑
k 6=j
γjk ∗ HRAI−Hkt (4.6)
BKAI−CBjt = ∑
k 6=j
γjk ∗ HRAI−CBkt (4.7)
The additional spillover variables for firms in regions close to the border can then
be grouped as:
Ψ2 f FDIAIjt−1 = αhr, f bHR
AI−H
jt−1 + αhr, f hHR
AI−CB
jt−1
+ αbk, f bBKAI−Hjt−1 + αbk, f hBK
AI−CB
jt−1
+ α f w, f bFWAI−Hjt−1 + α f w, f hFW
AI−CB
jt−1 (4.8)
4.2.3 Empirical framework
As indicated above, FDI spillovers are typically introduced as additional inputs
explaining total factor productivity (TFP) in a production function framework. In this
paper, we rely on the standard framework and follow what Havránek and Irsˆová (2011)
describe as ‘best practice’. In particular, we consider a two-step procedure where we
use firm-level data to estimate a production function in order to obtain a TFP-measure
in the first step, and then relate TFP-growth to foreign presence and additional control
variables in a second step.
In the estimation of total factor productivity (TFP) one is confronted with an en-
dogeneity problem due to the fact that firms and observe their productivity (shocks)
and adjust their input choices accordingly. To account for this problem, several semi-
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parametric techniques have been suggested, among which those of Olley and Pakes
(1996) (OP) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (LP). A recent modification of the LP
methodology was suggested by Wooldridge (2009) (WLP), which combines the benefits
of OP and LP, whilst applying a joint GMM estimation which both enhances efficiency
and accounts for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. We therefore use the WLP
estimator to obtain our indicator of total factor productivity (TFP). A measure of TFP
for firm i in industry j at time t is obtained as the difference between output and capital,
labour, and material inputs, multiplied by their estimated coefficients (lower cases refer
to logs):
t f pijt = yijt − β̂l jlijt − β̂kjkijt − β̂mjmijt (4.9)
In a second step we regress the change in productivity of domestic firms on the
spillovers variables defined above and a set of control variables. We then estimate the
following specification using the sample of all domestic firms:
∆t f pijrt = Ψ′1∆ f
(
FDICWjt−1
)
+Ψ′2∆ f
(
FDIAIjt−1
)
+Ψ′3Zijt + αt + αj + αr + eijrt (4.10)
where Ψ1 (see (4.4)) refers to the impact of traditional country-wide foreign presence
on the productivity of local firms and Ψ2 (see (4.8)) identifies the additional impact of
foreign firms from within the area of interest both at home and across the border. Zijt
stands for firm specific control variables such as age, size. We further introduce time
(αt), industry (αj) and region (αr) dummies in the first-differenced specification (4.10)
to account for unobserved factors that could be driving the change in performance at
the region or industry level. This is relevant because we consider a sample of Eastern
European countries where specific features of their transition from plan to market may
still have some impact in certain regions or industries. We estimate specification (4.10)
by OLS. Finally, since FDIjt and some control variables are defined at the industry level
and estimations are performed at the firm level, standard errors are clustered for all
observations in the same region, industry and year (see Javorcik, 2004; Moulton, 1990).
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4.2.4 Alternative estimation techniques
Since we allow distance to determine whether a domestic firm will be impacted by
its foreign counterparts, this paper has a clear spacial element. Therefore, an alternative
estimations for our analysis might be the spacial econometric technique. In essence, we
already use a specification in the spirit of the spatial lag of X model as suggested by
LeSage (2014), where:
y = Xβ1 +WXβ2 + e (4.11)
with y being the change in domestic TFP productivity, X representing the share of
FDI in the region or across the border and W is an a adjacency matrix with values of
zero and one, depending on whether a foreign firm is located within our distance of
interest or not.4
However, we do not use the more famous Spatial Durbin Model (SDM), which is a
global spillover specification and includes a lag vector WY, where Y is the dependent
variable from the neighbouring regions. In our case this would imply that local firms
across the border have an impact on the productivity of domestic firms as well. We
believe that this is implausible, as it is the multinationals that are more mobile and more
productive in the first place. Moreover, recent papers have expressed concern about
the use of spacial econometrics without proper theoretical justification and suggested
some remedies for researchers. For example, Partridge et al. (2012) recommend using a
Moran-I test which would indicate whether we are dealing with spacial dependence
and thus whether including a spacial lag WY is warranted in the first place.
Following this advise, we perform a Moran-I test checking for spacial autocorrela-
tion between the growth of domestic firms at home and over the border. Given that we
are dealing with panel firm level data for several industries, we first compute the re-
gional unweighted productivity growth of domestic firms in manufacturing industries.
The choice of aggregating firm productivities is due to the fact that very few industries
are present in all regions. We then test for spacial autocorrelation by year. The table
with yearly Moran-I statistics and respective p-values is given below.
As Table 4.1 suggests, except for 2009, we can not reject the null hypothesis that
4We have also tried a specification where the weights are determined purely by physical adjacency, with
results similar the ones in the main specification. Results are available on request.
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Table 4.1: Moran I test for spacial autocorrelation
Variable Year I E(I) sd(I) z p-value*
A
ve
ra
ge
pr
od
uc
ti
vi
ty
gr
ow
th 2001 0.046 -0.001 0.069 0.687 0.246
2002 -0.067 -0.001 0.068 -0.972 0.165
2003 0.043 -0.001 0.057 0.778 0.218
2004 -0.042 -0.001 0.051 -0.798 0.213
2005 -0.056 -0.001 0.069 -0.805 0.210
2006 0.004 -0.001 0.068 0.077 0.469
2007 0.029 -0.001 0.064 0.470 0.319
2008 -0.023 -0.001 0.069 -0.316 0.376
2009 0.106 -0.001 0.069 1.559 0.060
2010 0.060 -0.001 0.069 0.879 0.190
The table shows the results of a 1-tailed Moran test for spacial autocorrelation. The variable tested is the
average productivity growth of domestic manufacturing firms in bordering regions.
there is zero spatial autocorrelation present in the productivity growth of domestic
firms at home compared to those across the border. We therefore conclude that spacial
correlation is not an issue and that not accounting for the spatial lag WY is appropriate
for our analysis.
4.3 Data
Our basic data source is the AUGAMA, a database consisting of financial and
ownership information on public and private companies across Europe as described
in Chapter 2. From this large database, we constructed a sample covering the period
2000-2010 that allows us to study FDI spillover effects on domestic manufacturing firms
in seven Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC).5 For a detailed account of
how the data was constructed and cleaned, we refer to Chapter 2.6 We choose to focus
on these seven countries due to ample evidence that CEEC firms have benefited from
the entry of foreign companies from Western Europe (see e.g. Damijan et al., 2013).
During this period, our data records more than 200,000 domestic firms. We limit the
sample to firms with at least 10 employees and an unconsolidated account. We consider
a further eleven countries that border our focal seven CEEC countries.7
5Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
6We use multiple issues (published on DVDs) of the database because a single issue is only a snapshot of
the ownership information and firms that exit are dropped from the next issue released. In order to get a
full overview of ownership and financials through time, multiple issues are required.
7Austria, Belarus, Germany, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Moldova, Macedonia, Serbia, Russia, and Ukraine.
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Figure 4.2: Border regions in selected EU countries
(a) Countries only
BG
CZ
HU
PL
ROSI
SK
(b) 75 KM
(c) 100 KM
The figure shows a map containing those countries used in the analysis in panel (a), as well as the ’border’
regions considered in the analysis on the basis of th 75km (panel (b)) and 100km distance definitions
(panel (c)).
Panel (a) in Figure 4.2 shows the countries used in the analysis. Figure 4.2 further
provides an overview of bordering regions in our data, based on our preferred 75 km
definition in panel (b) and based on a 100 km definition in panel (c). Comparing panels
(b) and (c) illustrates our motivation for the choice of the 75 km definition as our base
scenario. The 75 km definition is better in identifying border regions, whereas the
100 km definition includes nearly all domestic regions in the smaller countries in the
analysis as border regions. We use the 100 km definition as a robustness check of our
results. From panel (b) one can infer that the ratio between border and non-border
regions varies across countries. As expected larger countries such as Romania and
Poland have a smaller ratio; medium-sized countries, Hungary and Czech Republic,
have a balanced mix between the two; and smaller countries such as Slovenia and
Slovakia and have primarily border regions.
Clearly, ownership information is required to distinguish between foreign firms
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Table 4.2: Number of foreign firms by country
10% ownership 50% ownership
Country Number Percentage Number Percentage
Austria 10,749 7.47 8,179 7.35
Bulgaria 1,046 0.73 706 0.63
Belarus 653 0.45 653 0.59
Czech Republic 4,418 3.07 3,936 3.54
Germany 60,706 42.18 43,170 38.82
Greece 1,077 0.75 847 0.76
Croatia 1,120 0.78 1,038 0.93
Hungary 3,870 2.69 2,449 2.2
Italy 6,882 4.78 5,460 4.91
Moldova 20 0.01 20 0.02
Macedonia 692 0.48 692 0.62
Poland 9,554 6.64 8,139 7.32
Romania 17,930 12.46 11,675 10.5
Serbia 21,321 14.81 21,321 19.17
Russia 1,971 1.37 1,442 1.3
Slovenia 756 0.53 569 0.51
Slovakia 983 0.68 780 0.7
Ukraine 172 0.12 135 0.12
Total 143,920 100 111,211 100
The table presents the total number of foreign firms by country, by ownership percentage for the entire
period.
in the home country and domestic firms over the border. To properly identify the
owner, we focus on FDI with foreign ownership of more than 50%. Whilst other papers
typically use a lower boundary of 10% (c f . the OECD definition), we employ the
higher share in order to be able to properly account for the nationality of the direct
owner. A simple count of firms in Table 4.2 suggests that while we do lose some firms
by applying the higher cut-off, most of the foreign firms are majority foreign owned
and the distribution across countries of foreign firms is very similar between the two
definitions.
Table 4.3 presents an overview of domestic, foreign and neighbouring firms by
country. Further, the last two columns provide an idea of which countries have larger
exposure to foreign investment in neighbouring regions across the border. Bulgaria
scores high in this ranking due to the proximity of several regions to the Romanian cap-
ital, Bucharest, that has attracted a significant amount of foreign investment. Slovakia,
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with its capital less than 75 km away from Vienna (Austria) also has a large exposure.
Romania on the other hand, has very few foreign firms on its border with both Bulgaria
and Hungary, potentially due to the location of their capital cities far away from the
Romanian border.
Table 4.3: Number of firms by country
Country At home Over border
Domestic Foreign (all) Neighbours Foreign
Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Bulgaria 11,125 5.54 706 2.50 172 3.27 4,628 29.09
Czech Republic 38,286 19.08 3,936 13.93 1,451 27.61 1,956 12.29
Hungary 28,860 14.38 2,449 8.67 508 9.67 1,791 11.26
Poland 51,177 25.50 8,139 28.81 2,149 40.89 732 4.60
Romania 55,108 27.46 11,675 41.32 445 8.47 210 1.32
Slovenia 5,416 2.70 569 2.01 248 4.72 1,459 9.17
Slovakia 10,728 5.35 780 2.76 282 5.37 5,135 32.27
Total 200,700 100 28,254 100 5,255 100 15,911 100
The table presents a count of firms by country for the entire period. The foreign at home category
contains both the third country foreign firms as well as foreign firms from neighbouring countries.
Table 4.4 shows average values of the different horizontal spillover variables for
each country. Most countries show larger foreign shares of economic activity within
their borders than outside these. This is again related to the size of the country and the
location of major cities within these countries and around their borders. An exception
from this are Slovenia and Slovakia, two rather small countries neighboured by Austria
(and Italy). As their neighbours are two Western European states with significant
foreign activity, they show very similar shares for these two categories. Although
Poland shares a border with Germany, this is the former East-Germany where there is
less activity.
Figure 4.3 shows the TFP distribution of two groups of domestic firms: those located
close to the border and those located in the country centre. We do this for Romania and
Czech Republic, two countries with a balanced number of firms over the two groups.
While in Romania ’border’ firms are slightly more productive than those located further
away, in Czech Republic this picture is reversed. This might be driven by the location of
their capital cities, and therefore that of the more productive firms: close to a border in
the former and far away in the latter. We control for such potential effects by including
region fixed effects in our estimations.
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Table 4.4: Spillover intensities by country and type in 2007
Country HRCW HRAI−H HRAI−CB
Bulgaria 0.089 0.009 0.054
Czech Republic 0.082 0.023 0.038
Hungary 0.045 0.027 0.019
Poland 0.145 0.061 0.023
Romania 0.169 0.103 0.004
Slovenia 0.010 0.000 0.035
Slovakia 0.036 0.011 0.033
The table presents spillover intensities of border regions for the year 2007. First column shows the
countrywide share of foreign activity, the second column shows the foreign activity as share of the ‘circle
of interest’ and finally the last column contains the foreign share of activity from across the border.
Figure 4.3: Distribution of domestic firms’ TFP
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4.4 Results
This section presents our results. We first analyse the impact of a national border
on productivity spillover effects from MNEs to domestic firms. In a second set of
results we focus on border heterogeneity and distinguish between two types of borders,
namely Schengen vs. non-Schengen borders. This analysis is motivated by the fact that
while Schengen borders allow people and goods to travel freely across borders, non-
Schengen borders are characterised by stronger border control, which may constitute a
significant impediment for the formation of cross-border relationships. We then present
a robustness analysis considering the choice of distance and ownership threshold.
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4.4.1 The impact of borders on productivity spillover effects from
FDI
Table 4.5 presents our first set of results. In column (1) we start with an analysis of
traditional country-wide spillovers. The obtained coefficients represent the country-
wide impact on domestic firms’ productivity growth of all MNEs present in the home
country, irrespective of their location. We detect positive horizontal spillovers in our
sample of domestic firms in CEEC countries. On the basis of a large meta-analysis,
Havránek and Irsˆová (2013) find that the average horizontal spillover effect is zero,
but that certain characteristics foster positive spillover effects. They cite a.o. a limited
technology gap, higher levels of human capital, and non-fully foreign-owned projects
as factors fostering positive spillover effects. These factors are likely to be present
in our sample. CEEC countries are known for their high level of human capital and
given the time period considered (2000-2010) a considerable catching up process in
terms of technology has already been taking place prior to the start of our sample,
and certainly near the end of our sample. Furthermore, Merlevede et al. (2014) find
that MNEs of sufficient maturity (in terms of presence in the home country) generate
positive horizontal spillover effects rather than the negative impact they have shortly
after entry. Again, for our sample foreign presence in these CEEC countries is likely
to be dominated by MNEs that have been present for a sufficiently long period to
generate positive spillover effects overall. Our strong positive result for backward
spillover effects does not come as a surprise. It is the most important channel found in
the literature for positive spillover effects (see Havránek and Irsˆová, 2011), deriving
from the incentives of foreign firms to assist their local suppliers. Given that our
sample is based on CEEC, where higher quality inputs may be too expensive or too
advanced for local firms, the negative forward spillovers are not surprising and confirm
previous studies (see e.g. Schoors and van der Tol, 2002). Furthermore MNEs in CEEC-
countries tend to be mainly engaged in end-user consumer goods with limited interest
in supplying local firms (Damijan et al., 2013).
In column (2) we add HorizontalAI−H, BackwardAI−H, and ForwardAI−H, i.e. the
spillover variables capturing the di f f erential impact from MNEs within 75 km from
domestic firms, but located in the home country. This can be seen as an interaction
effect that investigates whether being close to MNEs has an additional effect on top
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of the country-wide spillovers. From column (2) one can infer that results suggest no
additional benefits of being close to MNEs. This is in line with Merlevede and Purice
(2015), who show that regional patterns do exist but that they are heterogeneous in
nature and require a more complex empirical strategy to be detected. This is beyond
the scope of this paper as we are primarily interested in analysing border effects
in the average spillover effect to domestic firms. This is done in columns (3) and
(4) where the cross-border spillover variables HorizontalAI−CB, BackwardAI−CB, and
ForwardAI−CB are introduced in the specification. We find only significant backward
cross-border spillover effects, horizontal and forward cross-border spillover effects
being not significantly different from zero. Comparing columns (3) and (4) suggests
a negligible impact of the AI − H spillover variables on this result. This implies that
domestic firms near the border can benefit in terms of productivity by becoming a
supplier to an MNE located nearby, but across the border. What does this imply
in terms of border effects? As HorizontalAI−CB, BackwardAI−CB, and ForwardAI−CB
capture the effect of MNEs in nearby regions across the border, their impact should be
compared to the home country spillover effects to make inferences about the impact
of national borders on the transmission of productivity spillovers. This is what we
do in Table 4.6 where we perform F-tests for the equality of coefficients for home
and cross-border effects. For all three spillover types we are able to reject the null
hypothesis of equal coefficients. For the horizontal and forward spillover effects that
are smaller, national borders seem to block any potential spillover for our sample
of CEEC-countries. For the bigger backward productivity spillover effects, we find
that national borders significantly decrease spillover effects, but these effects are not
fully wiped out. Combined with the fact that the country-wide spillover potential is
generally larger than the cross-border spillover potential (as measured by the value
of the respective spillover variables, c f . supra), we establish an economic significant
border effect.
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Table 4.5: Home country and cross border FDI spillover effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Home country spillover effects
Country-wide
HorizontalCW 0.270*** 0.274*** 0.270*** 0.274***
[0.045] [0.043] [0.045] [0.043]
BackwardCW 1.686*** 1.695*** 1.695*** 1.701***
[0.204] [0.210] [0.205] [0.210]
ForwardCW -0.868*** -0.865*** -0.881*** -0.877***
[0.154] [0.148] [0.154] [0.148]
Area of interest vs. country-wide
HorizontalAI−H -0.022 -0.022
[0.071] [0.071]
BackwardAI−H -0.066 -0.047
[0.197] [0.196]
ForwardAI−H 0.011 -0.004
[0.185] [0.182]
Cross-border spillover effects
Area of interest
HorizontalAI−CB 0.055 0.055
[0.069] [0.069]
BackwardAI−CB 1.019*** 1.021***
[0.263] [0.265]
ForwardAI−CB 0.202 0.197
[0.206] [0.208]
Observations 314,150 314,150 314,150 314,150
R-squared 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Table 4.6: Test for equality of coefficients - country-wide vs. border
F-test F-value P-value
Country-wide vs. cross-border
HRhome=HRcross−border 7.54 0.0060
BKhome=BKcross−border 5.31 0.0213
FWhome=FWcross−border 17.54 0.0000
The table presents a test for the equality of coefficients for countrywide and over the border spillovers
with the corresponding F-test value and P-value.
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4.4.2 Border heterogeneity and productivity spillover effects from
FDI - The impact of Schengen
From the previous subsection we retain that national borders were not ’strong’
enough to reduce backward cross-border spillover effects to zero. However, the effect
in the previous subsection reflects the average over all borders the CEEC countries
have. The above analysis therefore neglects a potentially significant policy change
in the form of some of these countries joining the Schengen Area in 2007. This is
important as the cost for crossing the border between Schengen countries is almost
zero, while crossing borders with non-Schengen countries - be it for people or goods-
can be much more difficult due to border controls. Given our result of significant
cross-border backward spillover effects and the fact that such relationships entail the
transport of goods across the border, we might expect differences between Schengen
and non-Schengen borders. In this subsection we therefore differentiate the impact of
cross-border foreign presence between borders of two Schengen countries and borders
involving at least one non-Schengen country. Naturally, we expect spillover effects to be
stronger among Schengen states, since border controls at non-Schengen borders involve
delays in merchandise shipments as well as the passage of people when entering
or exiting these countries. We perform this test by introducing a Schengen dummy,
SH, in the definition of HRAI−CB in order to split the variable in a Schengen and a
non-Schengen subcomponent. (4.12) describes the decomposition for the horizontal
spillover variable. Backward and forward decompositions follow straightforwardly.
HRAI−CBjt =
∑
i∈j,i∈AI−CB
FitYit
∑
i∈j,i∈AI
Yit
=
∑
i∈j,i∈AI−CB
SHitFitYit + ∑
i∈j,i∈AI−CB
(1− SHit)FitYit
∑
i∈j,i∈AI
Yit
= HRAI−CB−SHjt + HR
AI−CB−NSH
jt (4.12)
Table 4.7 presents results that are analogous to columns (3) and (4) in Table 4.5 but
now consider the further Schengen decomposition.
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Table 4.7: Home country and cross border FDI spillover effects - Schengen vs. Non-
Schengen borders
(1) (2)
Home country spillover effects
Country-wide
HorizontalCW 0.274*** 0.277***
[0.045] [0.043]
BackwardCW 1.713*** 1.716***
[0.207] [0.212]
ForwardCW -0.833*** -0.835***
[0.152] [0.146]
Area of interest vs. country-wide
HorizontalAI−H -0.020
[0.071]
BackwardAI−H -0.026
[0.194]
ForwardAI−H 0.025
[0.180]
Cross-border spillover effects
Area of interest - Schengen border
HorizontalAI−CB−SH 0.097 0.097
[0.072] [0.072]
BackwardAI−CB−SH 1.292*** 1.288***
[0.299] [0.302]
ForwardAI−CB−SH 0.284 0.286
[0.266] [0.268]
Area of interest - Non-Schengen border
HorizontalAI−CB−NSH 0.031 0.031
[0.080] [0.080]
BackwardAI−CB−NSH 0.873*** 0.871***
[0.281] [0.284]
ForwardAI−CB−NSH 0.131 0.133
[0.255] [0.256]
Observations 314,150 314,150
R-squared 0.116 0.116
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.8: Test for equality of coefficients -
Country-wide vs. Schengen vs. non-Schengen borders
F-test F-value P-value
Country-wide vs. Schengen border
HRhome=HRSchengen 4.75 0.0294
BKhome=BKSchengen 1.70 0.1929
FWhome=FWSchengen 13.56 0.0002
Country-wide vs. non-Schengen border
HRhome=HRnon−Schengen 7.56 0.0060
BKhome=BKnon−Schengen 7.09 0.0078
FWhome=FWnon−Schengen 10.63 0.0011
Schengen vs. non-Schengen border
HRSchengen=HRnon−Schengen 0.76 0.3830
BKSchengen=BKnon−Schengen 2.58 0.1082
FWSchengen=FWnon−Schengen 0.22 0.6356
The table presents a test for the equality of coefficients for Schengen vs. non-Schengen borders with the
corresponding F-test value and P-value.
With respect to the home country spillover effects, our previous results are con-
firmed. In terms of the Schengen-non-Schengen decomposition of cross-border spillover
effects we find for cross-border horizontal and forward spillover effects no difference
between Schengen and non-Schengen borders and our earlier results of non-significance
is confirmed. For cross-border backward spillover effects we find a significant effect for
both Schengen and non-Schengen borders. We do observe, however, a clear ranking
in terms of the size of the point estimate. The within country backward spillover
coefficient is larger than its cross-border Schengen counterpart, which in turn is larger
than the non-Schengen coefficient. The F-tests in Table 4.8, however, indicate that we
cannot reject the within country backward spillover coefficient to be equal to its cross-
border Schengen counterpart, whereas it is significantly different from its cross-border
non-Schengen counterpart at the 1% level. Comparing the Schengen and non-Schengen
coefficients, we can almost reject equality at the 10% level.
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4.4.3 Robustness
In this section we test the robustness of our results by varying two choices we made
when calculating our spillover variables. The first relates to the definition of what
constitutes a foreign firm, the second to the 75km as distance for defining the area
of interest. For the definition of ’foreignness’ we chose the 50% foreign ownership
criterion for the reasons mentioned above. However, most spillover studies apply a 10%
criterion for considering a firm as foreign. To define our area of interest, we opted for
75km distance between region centres because this results in a nicer ‘corridor’ around
the borders. The 100km definition on the other hand does include all border regions,
but leaves almost no pure home-country regions in the smaller countries of our sample,
as can be seen from Figure 4.2 above.
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 repeat the last specifications from Tables 4.5and 4.7 respec-
tively. Table 4.9 confirms our earlier findings with respect to the average cross-border
backward spillover effect. Using the 100km definition, the point estimate goes down
somewhat. Furthermore, the negative forward spillover effect in the home country
seems to decrease with more foreign presence in upstream industries in the home
country located in the area of interest. Table 4.10 suggests that the former result is
mainly due to the fact that this alternative distance choice reduces the cross-border
backward spillover effect to zero. Furthermore, using the the 100km-50% specification,
we see some evidence of cross-border horizontal spillovers in Schengen countries. The
F-tests for these specifications are reported in the Appendix.
All in all these results seem to strengthen our earlier conclusion that national borders
constitute an almost insurmountable barrier for horizontal and forward spillover effects.
In the case of backward spillover effects, national borders significantly dampen cross-
border spillover. However, the size of the border impact seems related to the ‘depth’
of the border, as evidenced by the difference between Schengen and non-Schengen
countries. Clearly, this offers scope for the analysis of other border characteristics as
can be found in the trade literature such as cultural similarities, euro adoption, etc. This
is left for further research however.
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Table 4.9: Home country and cross border FDI spillover effects - Robustness w.r.t. distance
and ownership definitions
(1) (2) (3)
75km− 10% 100km− 50% 100km− 10%
Home country spillover effects
Country-wide
HorizontalCW 0.286*** 0.264*** 0.293***
[0.043] [0.045] [0.045]
BackwardCW 1.745*** 1.629*** 1.721***
[0.209] [0.217] [0.227]
ForwardCW -0.882*** -1.083*** -1.068***
[0.147] [0.165] [0.161]
Area of interest vs. country-wide
HorizontalAI−H -0.026 0.015 -0.036
[0.068] [0.050] [0.048]
BackwardAI−H -0.261 0.142 -0.107
[0.186] [0.172] [0.176]
ForwardAI−H 0.022 0.419*** 0.424***
[0.170] [0.144] [0.122]
Cross-border spillover effects
Area of interest
HorizontalAI−CB 0.015 0.289 0.171
[0.064] [0.180] [0.170]
BackwardAI−CB 0.811*** 0.681** 0.575**
[0.239] [0.284] [0.263]
ForwardAI−CB -0.087 0.222 -0.107
[0.226] [0.238] [0.237]
Observations 305,251 314,150 305,251
R-squared 0.115 0.117 0.115
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.10: Home country and cross border FDI spillover effects - Schengen vs. Non-
Schengen borders - Robustness w.r.t. distance and ownership definitions
(1) (2) (3)
75km− 10% 100km− 50% 100km− 10%
Home country spillover effects
Country-wide
HorizontalCW 0.289*** 0.267*** 0.296***
[0.043] [0.045] [0.045]
BackwardCW 1.759*** 1.641*** 1.731***
[0.210] [0.219] [0.229]
ForwardCW -0.845*** -1.033*** -1.021***
[0.146] [0.162] [0.158]
Area of interest vs. country-wide
HorizontalAI−H -0.024 0.017 -0.033
[0.068] [0.050] [0.048]
BackwardAI−H -0.245 0.161 -0.081
[0.184] [0.171] [0.175]
ForwardAI−H 0.049 0.423*** 0.428***
[0.170] [0.142] [0.120]
Cross-border spillover effects
Area of interest - Schengen border
HorizontalAI−CB−SH 0.042 0.184** 0.112
[0.078] [0.091] [0.094]
BackwardAI−CB−SH 1.077*** 0.944*** 0.971***
[0.277] [0.311] [0.286]
ForwardAI−CB−SH -0.127 0.382 -0.153
[0.278] [0.250] [0.262]
Area of interest - Non-Schengen border
HorizontalAI−CB−NSH 0.002 0.308 0.179
[0.070] [0.201] [0.190]
BackwardAI−CB−NSH 0.676*** 0.531* 0.398
[0.254] [0.304] [0.280]
ForwardAI−CB−NSH -0.074 0.095 -0.121
[0.251] [0.292] [0.269]
Observations 305,251 314,150 305,251
R-squared 0.115 0.117 0.115
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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4.5 Conclusion
The literature on productivity spillovers of FDI has primarily focused on within-
country effects of MNE presence. In this paper we analyse the potential for cross-border
spillover effects. We use a large multi-country firm-level dataset to measure indirect
FDI spillovers in a number of Central and Eastern European countries during the
2000-2010 period. We employ information on the region where firms are located, and
combine this with the distance between regions to analyse whether domestic firms
within a certain distance from the border experience productivity gains as a result of
nearby MNE activity from across the border. We compare this with the spillover effects
generated within the local firm’s home country and home region. Our findings suggest
that national borders constitute an almost insurmountable barrier for horizontal and
forward spillover effects. In the case of backward spillover effects, national borders
significantly dampen cross-border spillovers, but the size of the border impact seems
related to the ‘depth’ of the border, as evidenced by differences between Schengen and
non-Schengen countries.
Our finding has a broader implication for policy makers. On the one hand, it
suggests a greater integration of the European internal market, where national borders
play an ever smaller role in maintaining economic barriers between countries and
allow for cross-country technology diffusion. On the other hand, since backward
spillover effects potentially extend beyond the country of location, competition between
policy makers for attracting FDI seems less grounded. While indeed the country-wide
effect of FDI is significant and important, some spillover effects will inevitably reach
neighbouring countries as well. Our results suggest that there could be benefits from
cooperation among neighbouring countries in attracting FDI.
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Appendix 4.A Additional tables
Table 4.A.1: Test for equality of coefficients for 75km - 10% specification
F-test F-value P-value
All borders
HRhome=HRcross−border 12.61 0.0004
BKhome=BKcross−border 11.81 0.0006
FWhome=FWcross−border 9.87 0.0017
Schengen borders
HRhome=HRSchengen 7.75 0.0054
BKhome=BKSchengen 5.00 0.0254
FWhome=FWSchengen 6.06 0.0138
non-Schengen borders
HRhome=HRnon−Schengen 12.58 0.0004
BKhome=BKnon−Schengen 13.78 0.0002
FWhome=FWnon−Schengen 7.59 0.0059
Schengen - non-Schengen borders
HRSchengen=HRnon−Schengen 0.31 0.5782
BKSchengen=BKnon−Schengen 3.12 0.0774
FWSchengen=FWnon−Schengen 0.04 0.8343
The table presents a test for the equality of coefficients for Schengen vs. non-Schengen borders with the
corresponding F-test value and P-value.
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Table 4.A.2: Test for equality of coefficients for 100km - 50% specification
F-test F-value P-value
All borders
HRhome=HRcross−border 0.02 0.8913
BKhome=BKcross−border 8.50 0.0036
FWhome=FWcross−border 19.22 0.0000
Schengen borders
HRhome=HRSchengen 0.65 0.4184
BKhome=BKSchengen 3.95 0.0468
FWhome=FWSchengen 22.24 0.0000
non-Schengen borders
HRhome=HRnon−Schengen 0.04 0.8459
BKhome=BKnon−Schengen 10.23 0.0014
FWhome=FWnon−Schengen 10.70 0.0011
Schengen - non-Schengen borders
HRSchengen=HRnon−Schengen 0.73 0.3928
BKSchengen=BKnon−Schengen 2.09 0.1486
FWSchengen=FWnon−Schengen 0.87 0.3517
The table presents a test for the equality of coefficients for Schengen vs. non-Schengen borders with the
corresponding F-test value and P-value.
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Table 4.A.3: Test for equality of coefficients for 100km - 10% specification
F-test F-value P-value
All borders
HRhome=HRcross−border 0.47 0.4931
BKhome=BKcross−border 13.12 0.0003
FWhome=FWcross−border 11.84 0.0006
Schengen borders
HRhome=HRSchengen 3.01 0.0828
BKhome=BKSchengen 5.28 0.0216
FWhome=FWSchengen 9.04 0.0027
non-Schengen borders
HRhome=HRnon−Schengen 0.35 0.5534
BKhome=BKnon−Schengen 15.72 0.0001
FWhome=FWnon−Schengen 8.32 0.0039
Schengen - non-Schengen borders
HRSchengen=HRnon−Schengen 0.26 0.6107
BKSchengen=BKnon−Schengen 4.81 0.0283
FWSchengen=FWnon−Schengen 0.02 0.9000
The table presents a test for the equality of coefficients for Schengen vs. non-Schengen borders with the
corresponding F-test value and P-value.
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5
Do Parent-Affiliate Characteristics Affect
Firm Performance: A View Through the
Cycle?
5.1 Introduction
After several rounds of trade liberalisation, the past couple of decades have wit-
nessed a significant increase in the fragmentation of production chains and the inter-
nationalisation of firm ownership. These developments however have given rise to
concerns regarding the volatility of employment in companies that are either foreign-
owned or operate in multiple locations. Moreover, for countries that are heavily relying
on FDI, such as Ireland and Slovakia, this issue has become even more prominent
during the latest financial crisis, when significant decreases in output, trade and em-
ployment have been recorded.
Extensive research has already looked at the performance of domestic companies
compared to that of foreign firms, with mixed results. On the one hand we know that
multinationals (MNEs) are usually more productive and pay higher wages (Bernard
?This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Bruno Merlevede.
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et al. (1995)). Moreover, older and larger firms, as many subsidiary owning firms are,
will be more resistant to crises (see e.g. Dunne and Hughes (1994)). On the other
hand, companies operating in several countries are accustomed to moving and could
be more flexible in relocating to another country. The existing literature confirms this,
as most studies either do not find a significantly better performance on the part of
multinational affiliates compared to local firms, or record a higher level of exit among
them. For example Görg and Strobl (2002) find that MNEs are more ‘footloose’ than
domestic plants, ceteris paribus. For Belgian firms, Blanchard et al. (2012) conclude that
MNEs are indeed ‘footloose’ and will exit much faster than similar national firms, with
potential negative effects for the industry. Navaretti et al. (2003) find that MNEs adjust
labour demand faster than national companies, however they are better at maintaining
employment in the longer run. Bernard and Jensen (2007) find that even at home
US multinationals are more ‘footloose’ compared to their domestic only counterparts,
suggesting that the employment preferences are different not so much between do-
mestic and foreign companies but between MNEs and non-MNEs. Comparing firm
performance during a crisis in Chile, Alvarez and Görg (2007) do not find that MNEs
react better than local firms. A similar study on Irish data by Godart et al. (2011) suggest
that foreign firms exit the economy just as often as domestic firms during a period of
economic downturn.
Nonetheless, a limited number studies which have a closer look at parent character-
istics reveal that, under certain conditions, multinationals could represent a stabilizing
force for the local economy. For example, MNEs will be less sensitive to changes in
wages and thus less ‘footloose’ if they have a more extensive network of local linkages
(Görg et al. (2009)). In case of local financial crisis, multinationals could be more stable
than national counterparts due to their ability to relocate sales to other countries ( see
Dikova et al. (2013)). The distance from headquarters seems to matter as well, with
papers finding that geographically dispersed companies will divest from further away
locations compared to those in the same state/country as their headquarters (see e.g.
Landier et al., 2009; Abraham et al., 2014). They suggest that multinationals will prefer
maintaining plants that are closer by for two main reasons. First communication and
information flows from larger distances are more difficult to maintain while monitoring
is more costly. Second, these firms have closer ties with the community at home, speak
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the language and have a better knowledge of the local culture and will therefore try to
avoid potential backlash from downsizing close-by ( see e.g.Norback et al. (2013)).
Lastly, an emerging literature is looking at the impact of financial market develop-
ment on multinationals and their investment activities. On the one hand, financing
frictions are recognized as important factors for MNE’s decision making and thus
potentially as predictors of affiliate (re-)location. A recent paper by Poelhekke (2015)
suggests that the rise of multinational banks has facilitated the expansion of foreign
direct investment, especially coming from the same country as the respective bank. On
the other hand, the internal capital market of multinationals is important in facilitating
the activity of affiliates, especially during crisis. Hebous and Weichenrieder (2010) find
that wholly owned affiliates are able to circumvent sharp currency depreciations by
accessing capital from their parent companies. Using Chinese data, Manova et al. (2015)
find that multinational subsidiaries are less liquidity constrained, having access to
either the internal capital of its parent or broader financial markets. Finally, Alfaro and
Chen (2012) compares the performance of domestic and foreign owned firms during the
last financial crisis and conclude that foreign affiliates have performed better, especially
if they had strong vertical production and financial ties with their parent.
Given how important the performance of affiliates could be in maintaining economic
growth and employment, we investigate what factors impact their performance. Our
contribution is twofold. First, unlike most of the papers so far, we try to asses affiliate
performance based on the characteristics of parent. Moreover, since we have access to
networks of multinationals in and from multiple EU counties, we can explore not only
the traditional firm level characteristics of the parent, but also the financial institutions
variation in the country of origin of parents and their affiliates. Second, we add to
the literature by looking at these firm-specific factors through the cycle, by choosing
a period that encompasses both the years prior to the latest financial crisis as well as
those in which the crisis was recorded. Since firms might behave differently during
good times compared to bad times, one of the aims of this paper is to pin down those
characteristics that improve the resilience of affiliates to economic shocks through they
cycle.
For the purpose of our analysis we use the AUGAMA firm-level database as well
as the EUMULNET database, comprising ownership information of firms as well as
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financial and balance sheet information. Due to unique country identifiers assigned
to each firm, we are able to reconstruct the network of affiliates a parent owns as well
as important data regarding their activities. Besides looking at standard performance
measures, we also take into account whether the parent is active in one national market
or is a multinational, whether it owns one or multiple affiliates, is listed on the stock
exchange or not and how well industrially diversified it is. On the institutional side, we
account for the financial development of the country of parent/affiliate by including
the country levels of credit to private sector as percentage of GDP.
Our results show that larger, more productive and listed parents are more likely to
close down an affiliate, while belonging to a multinational parent improves affiliate
survival. Moreover, industrial diversification of the parent improves affiliates survival,
especially during the crisis years. Finally, we find parents that come from countries
with looser credit environments positively affect affiliate survival, but this effect is
mainly due to the pre-crisis years. In the aftermath of the crisis, even parents that on
average had access to more loans, as proxied by county private credit ratios, are not
able to improve the probability of survival of their affiliates.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our data
and explains how we constructed the dataset. Sections 3 and 4 present the results and
robustness checks and we conclude in section 5.
5.2 Data
For this analysis we are using the AUGAMA firm-level database as well as the
EUMULNET database. From the former database we obtain balance sheet information
and profit and loss accounts for European parents and their affiliates, while from the
latter we obtain the ownership information, or the EU network of affiliates belonging to
one parent company. Since ownership information is gathered at irregular intervals, we
do not have ownership information for all firm-owner-year combinations. Given this,
we first create a dataset at the parent-affiliate-year-level with the available information
and then fill out the missing firm-owner-year-entries under the assumption that the
older information is valid until a change is recorded. After building this parent-affiliate
panel, we then update it with the financial information from the country where the
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parent/subsidiary is located, as reported in AUGAMA.
The data are deflated using capital and output deflators as appropriate. Moreover,
the data is cleaned by truncating at the 1st and 99th percentile in each country in terms
of wage, employment, total assets and sales.1 While most of the financial information,
including several ratios, are directly available in the original database, we do construct
some variables ourselves. Notably we compute the average wage per firm by taking the
ratio of the cost of employees to the number of employees. To further get rid of outliers
and reporting mistakes, we drop all firms where the ratio between the smallest and
largest wage per firm during the sample period is larger than 3, which often implies
that the costs of employees do not grow at a similar rate as the number of employees.
This constraint is especially violated in firms operating in non-manufacturing sectors.
To this end our dataset consists of 20 European countries, which in turn consists
of about 30,000 parent-subsidiary links where the ownership is above 50%. We only
consider the majority owned subsidiaries since we assume that these parents would
have a say in what happens with their affiliate. To account for the cycle, we focus on the
period 2004-2010. Table 5.1 gives an overview of the data, by showing the frequency of
firms across the various European countries. Due to the lack or limited availability of
data for some countries, we are unable to consider all of the EU, however we do have
a good mix of both Northern as well as Southern and Central and Eastern European
countries (CEEC). We consider manufacturing and sales affiliates only, with robustness
analysis performed separately on the manufacturing firms.
We use affiliate exit as determinant of its performance and assume that as long as
the affiliate exists, it is profitable for the parent to maintain its operations. An exit is
defined when the firm does not have any financial information available in the database.
Moreover, we exclude from our analysis all firms that have been sold off or cease to be
majority owned during the sample period. This leave us with an average exit rate of
close to 7%. Figure 5.1 gives an overview of the average exit rate per country.
As the exit decision of an affiliate will be determined by both its own characteristics
as well as those of its parent, we will next review some of the variables that we use in
order to predict exit.
1For a detailed description of the data, please consult Chapter 2.
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Table 5.1: Frequency of firms by country in 2007
# parents # affiliates owned # abroad # affiliates in country # foreign owned
Austria 67 102 69 74 41
Belgium 420 634 162 531 59
Bulgaria 41 49 0 52 3
Czech Republic 34 42 3 70 31
Germany 274 633 176 567 110
Estonia 24 26 0 37 11
Spain 1854 2554 117 2678 241
Finland 44 46 5 42 1
France 2210 3383 268 3351 236
Croatia 72 91 0 91 0
Hungary 58 60 5 85 30
Italy 737 1027 172 975 120
Latvia 1 1 1 0 0
The Netherlands 48 86 68 35 17
Poland 41 46 3 121 78
Portugal 348 442 12 486 56
Romania 50 57 3 103 49
Sweden 927 1116 37 1104 25
Slovenia 4 7 7 0 0
Slovakia 2 2 1 2 1
The table shows a count of parents and affiliates for each country by domestic/multinational status
in 2007. The first three rows contain information on the number of parents in one country, how many
affiliates these parents own and how many of these owned affiliates are abroad. The last two rows sum
the total number of affiliates in a country and how many of them have a foreign parent.
Figure 5.1: Affiliate exits as percentage of total number of firms
(.07,.15]
(.05,.07]
(.02,.05]
[0,.02]
No data
The figure shows the average exit rate of affiliates in own country as percentage of total firms in that
country in years 2005-2010.
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5.2.1 Affiliate characteristics
To control for the performance of the affiliate, we use a set of firm level variables as
well as an industry level variable, as suggested by previous literature. Given that firm
size and firm age are associated with higher firm longevity (see Dunne et al. (1988)), we
employ these variables in our estimations. Our proxy for firm size is the log of number
of employees while age is the number of years in operation (different from number of
years owned by the parent). Moreover, as productivity is a good determinant of firm
survival (see e.g. Melitz (2003)), we include a measure of affiliate labour productivity
as well. We control for capital intensity of the firm, as it might have a positive impact
on survival by acting as collateral in the face of a shock. We therefore add the log of
capital-labour ratio as well as the log of the average wage paid by the firm, to proxy for
employment costs.
As a measure of the competitiveness of the industry the firm is operating in, we
borrow an industry entry cost measure from Bernard and Jensen (2007), which should
give us an idea of whether an industry is expanding or contracting. This measure takes
the yearly minimum of the entry and exit rates, such that:
ECit = 1−min[entryrateit, exitrateit]
where the rates are calculated for each industry i and year t irrespective of country.
5.2.2 Parent characteristics
Similarly to affiliate performance, we use size, age, wage, capital intensity and
productivity of the parent to predict affiliate exit, since these characteristics could also
be important factors in predicting whether affiliates survive or will shut down. As
suggested by Bernard and Jensen (2007), larger and more productive parents might
find it easier to relocate production, thus closing down an affiliate.
Table 5.2 shows summary statistics of some of the main parent and affiliate firm-
level characteristics used in the estimations, as split by exiter/survivor status. We
observe that at first look, the two groups are very similar both in terms of their own
characteristics as well as those of their parents. Nonetheless, an F-test rejects their
equality for most of the variables included. Survivors are generally larger, more
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productive and more capital intensive. Their parents are also very different with larger,
more productive and less capital intensive parents closing their affiliates faster.
Table 5.2: Summary statistics by exiting/surviving firm
Exiter Survivor F-test
A
ffi
lia
te
Size 2.75 2.88 0.00
Age 17.97 19.78 0.00
Wage 10.31 10.32 0.26
Productivity 12.04 12.14 0.00
Capital Intensity 9.11 9.23 0.00
Pa
re
nt
Size 3.46 3.14 0.00
Age 25.57 26.07 0.03
Wage 10.60 10.66 0.00
Productivity 12.16 12.09 0.00
Capital Intensity 9.78 9.88 0.00
Multi-firm 0.45 0.47 0.00
Multinational 0.11 0.15 0.00
Listed parent 0.01 0.01 0.33
Observations 9154 60264
The table presents summary statistics of main variables by exiter status (i.e. the firms will exit sometime
during the sample period). The F-test suggests that aside from affiliate wage and whether one’s parent is
listed, there are significant differences between affiliates that survive and those that do not.
Aside from these factors, we also consider additional variables that could impact
affiliate exit.
Multinational Being a multinational, or owning affiliates in a different country than
the one the parent is itself located, could impact affiliate survival due to the ‘footloose’
nature of the parent, as suggested by Görg and Strobl (2002) and Bernard and Sjöholm
(2003). We therefore include a dummy for multinational status of the parent.
Multi-firm We also check whether owning several affiliates is detrimental to affiliate
survival. We define these parents as “multi-firm”. Given that most parents in our data
own just one affiliate, we prefer a binary variable of whether the parent owns more than
one affiliate instead of a continuous one with the actual number of affiliates owned.
The literature is rather mixed when it comes to this factor, as some find that belonging
to a group improves survival (see e.g. Disney et al. (2003)), while others on the contrary
find that, controlling for plant characteristics, firms with multiple plants will shut down
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easier (see e.g. Bernard and Jensen (2007)). We expect parents with a larger number of
affiliates to be more flexible with managing them, and thus to shut them down easier.
Table 5.3 provides an overview of the structure of the networks in the data. We can see
that the majority of parents (66%) own a single domestic affiliate, while less than one
percent of firms own more than 10 affiliates. Moreover, approximately 17% of affiliates
are foreign and about 16% of parents are multinational.
Table 5.3: Distribution of the number of affiliates per parent for the year 2007
Parents Affiliates
Domestic Multinational Domestic Foreign
A
ffi
lia
te
s
1 5321 0.733 594 0.082 5321 0.572 594 0.536
2 875 0.121 109 0.015 1750 0.188 218 0.197
3 243 0.033 33 0.005 729 0.078 99 0.089
4 101 0.014 13 0.002 404 0.043 52 0.047
5 42 0.006 4 0.001 210 0.023 20 0.018
6 27 0.004 7 0.001 162 0.017 42 0.038
7 22 0.003 2 0.000 154 0.017 14 0.013
8 6 0.001 1 0.000 48 0.005 8 0.007
9 5 0.001 2 0.000 45 0.005 20 0.018
10 or more 19 0.003 2 0.000 472 0.051 42 0.038
Total 7256 7256 9295 1109
The table shows a count of parents by the number of affiliates they own and by domestic/multinational
status.
Listed We include a dummy for whether the parent is a listed firm or not. This is
motivated by the fact that firms whose shares are publicly owned are usually much
larger and older than non-listed firms, characteristics which could be associated with
higher exit rates for their affiliates. Moreover, these firms might be more sensitive to
the stock market, closing their affiliates faster than non-listed firms, especially in period
of economic downturn.
Table 5.4 breaks down the same characteristics by parent type, where parents divided
in three major categories based on whether they own one or multiple affiliates, whether
they operate in a single country or are a multinationals and whether they are listed
or not. We observe that not only are “multi-firm”, multinational and listed parents
larger and older than their counterparts, but so are their affiliates. Moreover, while
these different categories pay largely similar wages, there are visible TFP differences
between them, with ‘multi-firm”, multinational and listed parents and their affiliates
being more productive, as consistent with the literature.
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Table 5.4: Parent and affiliate characteristics by parent type
Single affiliate Multi-firm Domestic Multinational Non-Listed Listed
A
ffi
lia
te
Size 2.63 3.13 2.74 3.61 2.85 4.09
Age 18.91 20.19 19.42 20.04 19.48 23.01
Wage 10.25 10.39 10.29 10.45 10.32 10.08
Productivity 12.02 12.25 12.08 12.39 12.13 11.93
Capital intensity 9.19 9.23 9.19 9.33 9.21 9.30
Pa
re
nt
Size 2.93 3.48 2.91 4.90 3.17 5.37
Age 24.07 28.18 24.52 34.98 25.86 40.58
Wage 10.49 10.83 10.61 10.92 10.65 10.43
Productivity 12.03 12.18 12.01 12.62 12.10 11.70
Capital intensity 9.85 9.88 9.82 10.13 9.86 10.07
Observations 36871 32547 59682 9736 68843 575
The table shows summary statistics of main variables by single/multi-firm, domestic/multinational and
listed/non-listed parent status.
Distance Consistent with the findings that multinationals are prone to closing down
affiliates that are located further from headquarters, we add the distance between
parent and affiliate as explanatory variable. We expect that, due to larger monitoring
costs, distance will have a positive impact on affiliate exit (see e.g. Giroud (2012)).
Diversification level We test whether industrial diversification of parents has a posi-
tive impact on affiliate survival. This is the mirror image of multinationality and often
is a complementary strategy of parents, as some will choose to diversify via going
abroad while others will do so in terms of the number of industries they operate in
(see Davies et al. (2001)). The literature suggests that diversification will increase the
probability of exit (see Gibson and Harris (1996)). Nonetheless, more diversified parents
could potentially protect their affiliates better if the industries their are active in do not
experience shocks that are highly correlated. Firm diversification is measured using the
entropy index as follows:
Diversification = ΣPiln(1/Pi)
where Pi is the share of the industry i in the total sales of the parent and ln(1/Pi)
is the weight for each industry in parent’s portfolio. Higher values signify better
diversification of the parent. To correct for the highly non-normal distribution of this
variables due to many parents owning a single affiliate, we use the log of diversification
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Table 5.5: Correlation coefficients of affiliate, parent and group characteristics
Affiliate Parent
Size Age Wage TFP K/L Size Age Wage TFP K/L
A
ffi
lia
te
Size 1.00
Age 0.24 1.00
Wage 0.03 0.13 1.00
Productivity -0.04 0.04 0.54 1.00
Capital Intensity (K/L) 0.17 0.08 0.10 0.18 1.00
Pa
re
nt
Size 0.33 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.09 1.00
Age 0.18 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.38 1.00
Wage 0.18 0.09 0.44 0.23 0.06 -0.14 -0.01 1.00
Productivity 0.13 0.04 0.23 0.25 0.08 0.21 0.14 0.33 1.00
Capital Intensity (K/L) 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.25 1.00
The table shows correlation coefficients of main variables.
as an independent variable.
Production linkages Given that production linkages have been found as important
predictors of affiliate performance (see e.g. Alfaro and Chen (2012)), we include a
dummy for whether affiliates and parents are active at the same Nace 4 digit level or
not. We define an affiliate as vertical if it does not operate in the same industry as the
parent. We expect vertical affiliates to have a lower exit rate due to their potentially
important role in the production chain of the parent.
Financial linkages Consistent with the findings of Manova et al. (2015) that financial
linkages can offer protection to affiliates via internal capital flows from parents, we
check whether differences in the development of financial markets of parents and
affiliates has an impact on affiliate exit. Since the true extent of parent’s financial help is
not available in the data, we assume that parents from countries with easier access to
finance will pass that over to their affiliates if need be.
For data on country level financial development we use the private credit by deposit
banks and other financial institutions as percentage of GDP provided by the World Bank
(see Beck et al. (2000)). This measure has been previously used in the trade literature by
Manova (2013) as well as Vandenbussche et al. (2013).2 Since we are potentially dealing
with two credit environments from the country of parent and that of the affiliate, for
2We replace the private credit values for Slovakia with those of the same variable taken from the World
Bank’s Financial structure database, since the original data contains missing values for this country. The
two databases are very similar otherwise.
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our estimations we include both the parent’s country score as well as that of the affiliate.
Figure 5.2 gives an overview of EU variation in terms of the average share of GDP of
domestic credit, while Table 5.6 reports summary statistics for this variable.
Figure 5.2: Domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP
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No data
The figure shows the average domestic credit to the public sector as % of GDP for the years 2005-2010.
We observe that the countries with largest shares of consumer credit to GDP are pri-
marily located in Western Europe, while CEEC levels of credit are relatively low. The
discrepancy between the highest and lowest scoring countries is quite high, with Ro-
mania having a level as low as 20% in 2005 while in Spain this indicator is close to
150% for the same period. Naturally, this variable does not perfectly describe the credit
constraints of companies, as part of this credit is owned by consumer an is therefore
non-corporate.3
As robustness we employ industry level data on how dependent manufacturing indus-
tries are on external finance. This measure was first introduced by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) in an attempt to control for endogeneity when explaining sectoral growth, and it
is defined as the share of capital expenditure not financed by cash flow. While some
sectors are inherently more dependent on finance, they will be the ones affected most
by financial constraints. We borrow this measure form Bena and Ondko (2012), who
calculate the external finance dependence based on European firm level data taken
3Notably in the Netherlands this ratio is high due to a large household debt.
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Table 5.6: Domestic credit to private sector by country
Country Mean St. Deviation
Austria 115.73 4.00
Belgium 86.46 8.80
Bulgaria 60.15 14.53
Czech Republic 44.17 7.00
Germany 105.87 3.03
Estonia 89.56 12.49
Spain 183.40 26.14
Finland 81.56 7.70
France 102.04 7.98
Croatia 61.82 6.03
Hungary 61.97 7.81
Italy 100.19 11.90
Latvia 89.78 12.51
The Netherlands 176.01 16.43
Poland 41.94 9.59
Portugal 161.70 18.24
Romania 36.16 11.25
Sweden 117.15 10.79
Slovenia 77.40 14.71
Slovakia 40.43 6.63
The table contains country summary statistics of financial development as taken from the the World
Bank on-line database.
from Amadeus. Table 5.7 provides an overview of this ranking of industries, where
higher values indicate larger financial dependence.
All in all, our dataset consists of nearly 75,000 observations. For each firm we estimate
the probability of exit as a pooled Probit (following Bernard and Jensen (2007)) :
Pr(Da ft = 1|Zt) = Φ(βa f Za ft + βpaZpat + βindZindt + cctr + cind + ct)
where Za f is a vector of affiliate characteristics and Zpa a vector of parent characteristics.
Furthermore, we cluster standard errors at the level of affiliate’s country and include
country, industry and year fixed effects.
5.3 Results
This section presents the results of our main estimations. We consider the impact
that parent firm level characteristics have on the probability of affiliate exit as well as
whether having parents located in countries with more developed financial markets
improves survival rate of affiliates.
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Table 5.7: Industry external finance dependence
Nace code Industry Ext. finance dep.
15 Food products and beverages -0.117
16 Tobacco products -0.124
17 Textiles 0.204
18 Wearing apparel -0.382
19 Leather -1.548
20 Wood and cork 0.061
21 Pulp and paper products -0.02
22 Publishing and printing -0.217
23 Coke and refined petroleum 0.658
24 Chemical products 1.821
25 Rubber and plastic -0.082
26 Other non-metallic mineral prod. -0.101
27 Basic metals 0.073
28 Fabricated metal products -0.32
29 Machinery and equipment -0.117
30 Office machinery and computers 0.886
31 Electrical machinery and communication equipment 0.417
32 Radio, tv, and communication equipment 0.84
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 0.665
34 Motor vehicles 0.17
35 Other transport equipment -0.117
36 Manufacturing n.e.c. -0.141
The table contains industry values of external finance dependence calculated for European firms as taken
from Bena and Ondko (2012).
5.3.1 Affiliate exit and firm structure
Table 5.8 shows the main estimation results, in the form of marginal effects. Con-
trolling for country, industry and year fixed effects we observe that practically all
of the included characteristics matter in predicting affiliate exit. While larger, older,
more productive and more capital intensive affiliates seem to improve affiliate survival,
distance from parent increases probability of shut-down, as expected. Vertical affiliates
are also more likely to survive, suggesting that they might play a crucial role in the
production network of the parent.
As far as the characteristics of the parents are concerned, we see that larger, more
productive and listed parents are more likely to shut down their affiliates, while the
more capital intensive parents have the opposite effect. This is somewhat in line with
Bernard and Jensen (2007), as they find multinationals and multi-plant firms, who are
usually larger, more productive and present on the stock exchange, to have a negative
effect on plant survival.
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Table 5.8: Affiliate exit and parent characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.00773*** -0.00710*** -0.00926*** -0.01076*** -0.00788***
(0.00086) (0.00087) (0.00158) (0.00170) (0.00170)
Age -0.00014** -0.00015** -0.00011 -0.00015** -0.00005
(0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00010)
Wage 0.00299 0.00493* 0.00280 0.00053 0.00417
(0.00271) (0.00279) (0.00275) (0.00301) (0.00372)
Productivity -0.00600*** -0.00570*** -0.00642*** -0.00407** -0.00865***
(0.00126) (0.00126) (0.00168) (0.00182) (0.00217)
Capital intensity -0.00123* -0.00134** -0.00094 -0.00161** -0.00051
(0.00063) (0.00063) (0.00067) (0.00070) (0.00084)
Vertical -0.01750*** -0.01705*** -0.00903*** -0.01375*** -0.00289
(0.00257) (0.00257) (0.00221) (0.00240) (0.00516)
Distance 0.00152*** 0.00241*** 0.00145*** 0.00143*** 0.00152**
(0.00043) (0.00050) (0.00042) (0.00054) (0.00075)
Parent characteristics
Size 0.00776*** 0.00899*** 0.00609***
(0.00141) (0.00131) (0.00220)
Age -0.00022*** -0.00023*** -0.00021**
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00009)
Wage -0.00400* -0.00043 -0.00750**
(0.00238) (0.00272) (0.00307)
Productivity 0.00580*** 0.00509*** 0.00649***
(0.00134) (0.00175) (0.00125)
Capital intensity -0.00259*** -0.00295*** -0.00207***
(0.00030) (0.00057) (0.00057)
Listed parent 0.03775*** 0.02339 0.07170***
(0.01412) (0.01653) (0.02677)
Multi-firm -0.00348 -0.00210 -0.00433 0.00007
(0.00247) (0.00221) (0.00327) (0.00268)
Multi-national -0.01618*** -0.02194*** -0.02406*** -0.01840***
(0.00382) (0.00345) (0.00486) (0.00495)
Diversification -0.00562** -0.00049 -0.01067**
(0.00272) (0.00517) (0.00522)
Industry characteristics
Entry costs -0.67668*** -0.67776*** -0.63649*** -0.21194 -1.22361***
(0.21183) (0.21181) (0.21669) (0.21911) (0.34630)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 69,418 69,418 69,418 37,915 31,413
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Looking at the status of the parent separately, we find little evidence that being either
a multinational or owning more than one affiliate is detrimental to affiliate survival,
even if we don’t control for parent characteristics. To the contrary, multinational parents
as well as the diversified ones, exhibit a positive effect of affiliate survival rate. This
might be due to smaller multinational parents in our data, compared to the large
multinationals in Bernard and Jensen (2007)’s sample, indicating that parents active
in more than one industry or present in several countries can better diversify their
exposure to shocks. Moreover, we do not find evidence that having more than one
affiliate is beneficial or detrimental to affiliate survival.
In columns (4) and (5) we split our sample into pre- and crisis periods. It is worth
noting that while most of the coefficients do not change significantly, the level of
diversification of the parent does seem to improve affiliate survival especially during
2008-2010 period.
5.3.2 Affiliate exit and relative financial development
Next we look at the financial landscape that parents and affiliates are active in,
in order to find out whether parents from countries with a more developed financial
sector manage to protect their affiliates better than parents coming from countries with
worse financial development. We do so for two samples, mainly all countries and
excluding Spanish and Dutch affiliates and parents. We decide to exclude Spain due to
it’s extremely large levels of credit to private sector, the only country to exceed 200%
level during the sample period. We also choose to drop the Netherlands since a large
share of the credit to private sector in this country is actually due to private mortgage
debt and thus does not proxy well firm access to credit. Moreover, since many of our
affiliates are domestic, we include country financial indicators for affiliates and parents
separately. Table 5.9 present the main findings for all countries, while the results for the
sample without Spain and the Netherlands is shown in Table 5.10.
154
5.3. Results
Table 5.9: Affiliate exit and financial constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2004-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.00927*** -0.00921*** -0.01079*** -0.01074*** -0.00791*** -0.00789***
(0.00235) (0.00234) (0.00245) (0.00245) (0.00195) (0.00196)
Age -0.00011*** -0.00011** -0.00015*** -0.00015*** -0.00005 -0.00005
(0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00007) (0.00008)
Wage 0.00280 0.00258 0.00047 0.00050 0.00410 0.00421
(0.00500) (0.00491) (0.00893) (0.00895) (0.00374) (0.00376)
Productivity -0.00643*** -0.00624*** -0.00410 -0.00402 -0.00863*** -0.00863***
(0.00191) (0.00186) (0.00344) (0.00343) (0.00138) (0.00137)
Capital intensity -0.00093 -0.00098 -0.00160*** -0.00160*** -0.00049 -0.00050
(0.00117) (0.00116) (0.00060) (0.00060) (0.00207) (0.00206)
Vertical -0.00904*** -0.00898*** -0.01383*** -0.01373*** -0.00306*** -0.00287***
(0.00273) (0.00266) (0.00346) (0.00341) (0.00109) (0.00109)
Distance 0.00145*** 0.00144*** 0.00141** 0.00143** 0.00149*** 0.00150***
(0.00054) (0.00053) (0.00069) (0.00069) (0.00042) (0.00041)
Parent characteristics
Size 0.00776*** 0.00777*** 0.00899*** 0.00899*** 0.00607*** 0.00609***
(0.00064) (0.00063) (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00101) (0.00101)
Age -0.00022** -0.00022** -0.00023*** -0.00023*** -0.00021 -0.00021
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00014) (0.00014)
Wage -0.00399*** -0.00407*** -0.00023 -0.00043 -0.00714*** -0.00755***
(0.00127) (0.00145) (0.00150) (0.00177) (0.00144) (0.00184)
Productivity 0.00580*** 0.00584*** 0.00510*** 0.00507*** 0.00640*** 0.00653***
(0.00117) (0.00117) (0.00141) (0.00137) (0.00192) (0.00193)
Capital intensity -0.00259*** -0.00260*** -0.00293*** -0.00295*** -0.00204*** -0.00207***
(0.00045) (0.00046) (0.00063) (0.00064) (0.00053) (0.00053)
Listed parent 0.03772*** 0.03810*** 0.02308 0.02371 0.07124** 0.07135**
(0.01445) (0.01433) (0.01821) (0.01815) (0.03122) (0.03137)
Multi-firm -0.00209 -0.00220 -0.00433 -0.00439 0.00010 0.00015
(0.00274) (0.00274) (0.00345) (0.00348) (0.00229) (0.00226)
Multi-national -0.02195*** -0.02192*** -0.02412*** -0.02406*** -0.01866*** -0.01831***
(0.00350) (0.00343) (0.00309) (0.00323) (0.00477) (0.00525)
Diversification -0.00563 -0.00534 -0.00055 -0.00029 -0.01070** -0.01101**
(0.00702) (0.00705) (0.01006) (0.01001) (0.00439) (0.00445)
Financial development
Credit ratio affiliate 0.03755** 0.02614 0.10912
(0.01796) (0.01623) (0.11909)
Credit ratio parent -0.00041 -0.00781 -0.00819
(0.00891) (0.01190) (0.00895)
Industry characteristics
Entry costs -0.63642* -0.63605* -0.20986 -0.22042 -1.22237** -1.22836**
(0.33531) (0.33742) (0.29668) (0.29140) (0.60545) (0.61224)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 69,418 69,418 37,915 37,915 31,413 31,413
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.10: Affiliate exit and financial constraints - excluding Spain and the Netherlands
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2004-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.0102*** -0.0101*** -0.0127*** -0.0125*** -0.00763*** -0.00756***
(0.00299) (0.00296) (0.00268) (0.00273) (0.00284) (0.00284)
Age -8.66e-05** -8.22e-05** -0.000149*** -0.000143*** 3.43e-06 4.84e-06
(4.14e-05) (3.97e-05) (4.78e-05) (5.06e-05) (7.07e-05) (6.99e-05)
Wage 0.000958 0.00117 -0.00283 -0.00235 0.00418 0.00426
(0.00593) (0.00598) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.00442) (0.00447)
Productivity -0.00422** -0.00428** -0.000509 -0.000504 -0.00839*** -0.00838***
(0.00169) (0.00169) (0.00264) (0.00267) (0.00205) (0.00204)
Capital intensity -0.00243*** -0.00247*** -0.00204*** -0.00207*** -0.00303** -0.00304**
(0.000536) (0.000534) (0.000764) (0.000775) (0.00122) (0.00120)
Vertical -0.0121*** -0.0117*** -0.0175*** -0.0172*** -0.00388** -0.00366**
(0.00178) (0.00181) (0.00322) (0.00325) (0.00157) (0.00146)
Distance 0.00123* 0.00120* 0.00133 0.00128 0.00113** 0.00110**
(0.000643) (0.000665) (0.000897) (0.000929) (0.000544) (0.000559)
Parent characteristics
Size 0.00800*** 0.00795*** 0.00974*** 0.00965*** 0.00576*** 0.00580***
(0.000830) (0.000847) (0.00183) (0.00188) (0.00147) (0.00145)
Age -0.000130** -0.000144** -0.000159*** -0.000170*** -9.11e-05 -9.74e-05
(6.41e-05) (6.32e-05) (5.35e-05) (5.52e-05) (8.33e-05) (8.31e-05)
Wage -0.00458** -0.00644*** -0.00172 -0.00396 -0.00783*** -0.00861***
(0.00208) (0.00243) (0.00215) (0.00282) (0.00207) (0.00236)
Productivity 0.00666*** 0.00673*** 0.00492*** 0.00503** 0.00861*** 0.00867***
(0.00154) (0.00156) (0.00191) (0.00196) (0.00166) (0.00167)
Capital intensity -0.00285*** -0.00280*** -0.00314*** -0.00311*** -0.00243*** -0.00241***
(0.000657) (0.000639) (0.000812) (0.000810) (0.000732) (0.000720)
Listed parent 0.0498*** 0.0492*** 0.0431** 0.0418** 0.0717** 0.0712**
(0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0175) (0.0172) (0.0338) (0.0338)
Multi-firm 0.000323 0.000447 -0.000776 -0.000500 0.000999 0.00102
(0.00299) (0.00307) (0.00344) (0.00363) (0.00308) (0.00307)
Multi-national -0.0213*** -0.0228*** -0.0242*** -0.0252*** -0.0179*** -0.0188***
(0.00369) (0.00368) (0.00302) (0.00382) (0.00687) (0.00670)
Diversification -0.00930 -0.00916 -0.00687 -0.00701 -0.0114** -0.0114**
(0.00659) (0.00671) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.00480) (0.00473)
Financial development
Credit ratio affiliate -0.101 -0.108 0.0245
(0.0698) (0.0768) (0.0760)
Credit ratio parent -0.0409** -0.0567** -0.0161
(0.0181) (0.0222) (0.0219)
Industry characteristics
Entry costs -0.981*** -0.980*** -0.527*** -0.529*** -1.836*** -1.844***
(0.220) (0.216) (0.192) (0.189) (0.299) (0.298)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 49,202 49,202 27,555 27,555 21,600 21,600
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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We observe that for the entire sample the coefficient for the parent’s financial
development is not significant, while greater levels of domestic credit at home increase
the probability of exit, primarily in the pre-crisis years. The results without the two
aforementioned countries however seem more plausible, as there larger levels of credit
do indicate a lower probability of exit, as predicted by the literature. In particular,
parent’s level of credit is significant, albeit not during the crisis years. This seems to
suggest that investment is pro-cyclical and even parents from countries with better
access to finance were not able to improve their affiliates’ chances of survival during
the crisis.
5.4 Robustness checks
In this section we perform a couple of robustness checks. We first consider the
impact of the relative size of an affiliate compared to that of the parent. We do so to
compare the importance of being large in the absolute versus in the relative terms for
survival. Moreover, we also check whether our results are sensitive to the estimation
methodology used. Mainly, we re-run our basic estimations using a Linear Probability
Model (LPM). Furthermore, we rerun the main specification on foreign affiliates only.
We do so due to the belief that foreign firms are generally less constrained than their
domestic counterparts (see Buch et al. (2010)). Nonetheless, we would like to see if
parents coming from countries with better access to finance improve the chances of
survival of their foreign affiliates. Finally, we check if financial constraints differences
play a stronger role in those sectors which are classified as dependent on external
finance. As the ranking of industries with dependence on external finance is available
for manufacturing firms only, we exclude sales affiliates and repeat the analysis on
manufacturing affiliates only.
5.4.1 Exit and relative size of affiliate
To determine whether the relative or the absolute size play a role in affiliate survival,
we construct an extra variable which represents the relative size of the affiliate to that
of the parent. We employ the log of the ratio of employment in both entities, but results
hold for a similar analysis when fixed capital assets of parent and affiliate are used.
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Table 5.11: Affiliate exit and parent characteristics - the role of relative size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.00361*** -0.00234** -0.00184** -0.00213* -0.00212
(0.00101) (0.00102) (0.00087) (0.00115) (0.00151)
Age -0.00013* -0.00014** -0.00011 -0.00015** -0.00006
(0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00010)
Wage 0.00019 0.00242 0.00310 0.00094 0.00439
(0.00268) (0.00275) (0.00273) (0.00301) (0.00370)
Productivity -0.00616*** -0.00577*** -0.00643*** -0.00406** -0.00867***
(0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00169) (0.00184) (0.00218)
Capital intensity -0.00117* -0.00131** -0.00095 -0.00164** -0.00051
(0.00062) (0.00062) (0.00066) (0.00070) (0.00083)
Vertical -0.01264*** -0.01154*** -0.00933*** -0.01409*** -0.00313
(0.00256) (0.00255) (0.00225) (0.00238) (0.00523)
Distance 0.00044 0.00150*** 0.00152*** 0.00152*** 0.00157**
(0.00043) (0.00048) (0.00042) (0.00054) (0.00075)
Parent characteristics
Relative size affiliate -0.00607*** -0.00670*** -0.00712*** -0.00823*** -0.00557**
(0.00073) (0.00074) (0.00138) (0.00130) (0.00217)
Age -0.00020*** -0.00021*** -0.00020**
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00009)
Wage -0.00445* -0.00107 -0.00778**
(0.00234) (0.00265) (0.00305)
Productivity 0.00593*** 0.00526*** 0.00658***
(0.00133) (0.00175) (0.00125)
Capital intensity -0.00258*** -0.00289*** -0.00209***
(0.00029) (0.00055) (0.00057)
Listed parent 0.03919*** 0.02541 0.07224***
(0.01411) (0.01670) (0.02701)
Multi-firm -0.00502** -0.00197 -0.00414 0.00014
(0.00240) (0.00223) (0.00327) (0.00269)
Multi-national -0.02049*** -0.02130*** -0.02336*** -0.01785***
(0.00371) (0.00339) (0.00483) (0.00496)
Diversification -0.00517* 0.00011 -0.01034**
(0.00273) (0.00524) (0.00517)
Industry characteristics
Entry costs -0.66386*** -0.66341*** -0.64166*** -0.21847 -1.22911***
(0.21056) (0.21048) (0.21697) (0.21998) (0.34548)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 69,418 69,418 69,418 37,915 31,413
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.12: Affiliate exit and financial constraints - excluding Spain and the Netherlands -
the role of relative size
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2004-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.00261 -0.00253 -0.00336 -0.00319 -0.00227 -0.00217
(0.00311) (0.00310) (0.00391) (0.00398) (0.00185) (0.00187)
Age -8.64e-05** -8.20e-05** -0.000147*** -0.000141*** 1.61e-06 3.04e-06
(4.08e-05) (3.90e-05) (4.70e-05) (4.99e-05) (7.07e-05) (6.98e-05)
Wage 0.00129 0.00151 -0.00244 -0.00197 0.00446 0.00455
(0.00592) (0.00598) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.00446) (0.00451)
Productivity -0.00418** -0.00425** -0.000441 -0.000438 -0.00839*** -0.00837***
(0.00168) (0.00168) (0.00264) (0.00267) (0.00204) (0.00203)
Capital intensity -0.00243*** -0.00248*** -0.00206*** -0.00209*** -0.00302** -0.00303**
(0.000529) (0.000529) (0.000780) (0.000790) (0.00120) (0.00118)
Vertical -0.0125*** -0.0121*** -0.0179*** -0.0177*** -0.00426*** -0.00403***
(0.00176) (0.00181) (0.00327) (0.00330) (0.00148) (0.00139)
Distance 0.00132** 0.00129* 0.00144 0.00140 0.00120** 0.00117**
(0.000653) (0.000676) (0.000900) (0.000931) (0.000553) (0.000568)
Parent characteristics
Relative size affiliate -0.00724*** -0.00720*** -0.00888*** -0.00880*** -0.00511*** -0.00515***
(0.000849) (0.000869) (0.00188) (0.00192) (0.00142) (0.00140)
Age -0.000114* -0.000128** -0.000140*** -0.000151*** -7.76e-05 -8.41e-05
(6.15e-05) (6.12e-05) (5.25e-05) (5.43e-05) (8.04e-05) (8.06e-05)
Wage -0.00508** -0.00697*** -0.00245 -0.00464* -0.00817*** -0.00898***
(0.00200) (0.00231) (0.00207) (0.00266) (0.00202) (0.00229)
Productivity 0.00681*** 0.00688*** 0.00511*** 0.00521*** 0.00871*** 0.00877***
(0.00152) (0.00154) (0.00189) (0.00194) (0.00168) (0.00168)
Capital intensity -0.00281*** -0.00276*** -0.00303*** -0.00301*** -0.00243*** -0.00241***
(0.000651) (0.000634) (0.000820) (0.000818) (0.000724) (0.000712)
Listed parent 0.0514*** 0.0508*** 0.0455** 0.0442** 0.0724** 0.0719**
(0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0339) (0.0339)
Multi-firm 0.000390 0.000516 -0.000625 -0.000351 0.000996 0.00102
(0.00300) (0.00308) (0.00345) (0.00364) (0.00305) (0.00304)
Multi-national -0.0206*** -0.0221*** -0.0236*** -0.0245*** -0.0173** -0.0183***
(0.00372) (0.00373) (0.00308) (0.00388) (0.00685) (0.00670)
Diversification -0.00873 -0.00859 -0.00617 -0.00634 -0.0110** -0.0109**
(0.00662) (0.00675) (0.0108) (0.0113) (0.00485) (0.00478)
Financial development
Credit ratio affiliate -0.104 -0.109 0.0238
(0.0684) (0.0751) (0.0756)
Credit ratio parent -0.0415** -0.0556** -0.0168
(0.0177) (0.0220) (0.0218)
Industry characteristics
Entry costs -0.986*** -0.984*** -0.531*** -0.532*** -1.843*** -1.852***
(0.221) (0.217) (0.190) (0.188) (0.298) (0.297)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 49,202 49,202 27,555 27,555 21,600 21,600
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Given that this ratio is highly correlated with employment levels of the parent, we
replace this variable by the ratio. Table 5.11 presents the results and suggests that
while the relatively larger affiliates have a higher chance of survival, the absolute
size is still important, with bigger affiliates having lower exit rates. However, the
absolute size advantage becomes insignificant during the crisis, potentially due to
the severity of the economic downturn experienced by firms. When considering the
financial development in countries of parents and affiliates in Table 5.12, while the
relative size remains important, the absolute size is not significant any longer. This
leads us to conclude that size in itself does not impact survival. However, compared to
the size of the parent, larger affiliates are more likely to survive than smaller ones.
5.4.2 Predicting exit with LPM
Next we also consider whether using a Linear Probability Model impacts our results.
We present the main estimation with parent firm-level characteristics as well as one on
country financial development. The results in Table 5.13 confirm the findings from our
Probit model. Mainly, we again see that larger and more capital intensive affiliates have
a lower probability of exit. Moreover, as predicted by the literature, more productive
firms will be able to survive longer, as they are using their inputs more efficiently.
Vertical affiliates have a lower exit probability as well, probably due to their importance
in the production chain of the parent. Moreover, we confirm that distance is positively
associated with exit, as MNEs will close further away locations that more difficult to
monitor than their closer by counterparts.
In terms of parent characteristics, we again find that larger, more productive and
listed parents are more likely to shut down their affiliates, while the multinational status,
age and capital intensity of the parent is actually improving survival. As mentioned
earlier, this is probably due to the nature of our multinational firms. While very large
listed companies are able to buy and sell affiliates at a fast pace depending on the
business model they chose to follow and keeping their own productivity as priority,
smaller parents are less able to do so, potentially suffering as a result.
In Table 5.14 we repeat the analysis by adding the financial development of parents
and affiliates.
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Table 5.13: Affiliate exit and parent characteristics - LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.00777*** -0.00711*** -0.00917*** -0.01035*** -0.00803***
(0.00085) (0.00086) (0.00149) (0.00161) (0.00165)
Age -0.00012* -0.00012** -0.00009 -0.00013* -0.00004
(0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00009)
Wage 0.00306 0.00510 0.00258 0.00084 0.00346
(0.00305) (0.00311) (0.00311) (0.00337) (0.00404)
Productivity -0.00619*** -0.00585*** -0.00633*** -0.00387** -0.00837***
(0.00130) (0.00130) (0.00176) (0.00186) (0.00215)
Capital intensity -0.00127* -0.00138** -0.00100 -0.00170* -0.00056
(0.00066) (0.00066) (0.00075) (0.00083) (0.00090)
Vertical -0.01719*** -0.01683*** -0.00919*** -0.01427*** -0.00288
(0.00255) (0.00256) (0.00224) (0.00278) (0.00531)
Distance 0.00154*** 0.00246*** 0.00151*** 0.00147** 0.00164*
(0.00044) (0.00052) (0.00045) (0.00062) (0.00081)
Parent characteristics
Size 0.00752*** 0.00850*** 0.00602***
(0.00136) (0.00135) (0.00215)
Age -0.00020*** -0.00020*** -0.00020**
(0.00004) (0.00005) (0.00008)
Wage -0.00329 -0.00003 -0.00675**
(0.00243) (0.00256) (0.00317)
Productivity 0.00503*** 0.00425** 0.00582***
(0.00124) (0.00176) (0.00124)
Capital intensity -0.00222*** -0.00235*** -0.00188***
(0.00028) (0.00047) (0.00058)
Listed parent 0.03127*** 0.02230 0.05047***
(0.01112) (0.01527) (0.01702)
Multi-firm -0.00366 -0.00216 -0.00376 -0.00053
(0.00250) (0.00220) (0.00329) (0.00284)
Multi-national -0.01648*** -0.02367*** -0.02701*** -0.01942***
(0.00416) (0.00416) (0.00628) (0.00555)
Diversification -0.00505* -0.00054 -0.00910**
(0.00248) (0.00510) (0.00412)
Industry characteristics
Entry costs -0.66270*** -0.66083*** -0.64888*** -0.26081 -1.17969***
(0.20994) (0.20991) (0.22201) (0.21994) (0.36079)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 69,418 69,418 69,418 37,915 31,413
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.14: Affiliate exit and financial constraints - excluding Spain and the Netherlands -
LPM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2004-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.0102** -0.00998** -0.0124*** -0.0121*** -0.00778** -0.00769**
(0.00346) (0.00345) (0.00294) (0.00300) (0.00348) (0.00348)
Age -6.72e-05** -6.32e-05* -0.000122** -0.000118** 1.08e-05 1.36e-05
(3.03e-05) (3.00e-05) (4.48e-05) (4.77e-05) (7.01e-05) (6.93e-05)
Wage 0.000339 0.000708 -0.00247 -0.00203 0.00297 0.00311
(0.00680) (0.00684) (0.0123) (0.0125) (0.00496) (0.00498)
Productivity -0.00386* -0.00391* -0.000350 -0.000319 -0.00752*** -0.00750***
(0.00191) (0.00190) (0.00284) (0.00288) (0.00204) (0.00202)
Capital intensity -0.00256*** -0.00261*** -0.00210*** -0.00212*** -0.00327* -0.00330*
(0.000681) (0.000677) (0.000688) (0.000694) (0.00160) (0.00159)
Vertical -0.0125*** -0.0121*** -0.0183*** -0.0181*** -0.00406** -0.00382**
(0.00236) (0.00238) (0.00406) (0.00405) (0.00164) (0.00156)
Distance 0.00128* 0.00124 0.00139 0.00137 0.00124* 0.00120*
(0.000691) (0.000713) (0.000925) (0.000951) (0.000586) (0.000602)
Parent characteristics
Size 0.00783*** 0.00776*** 0.00932*** 0.00923*** 0.00571** 0.00573**
(0.000780) (0.000783) (0.00126) (0.00129) (0.00200) (0.00198)
Age -0.000123* -0.000137** -0.000143** -0.000156** -8.75e-05 -9.53e-05
(6.12e-05) (6.00e-05) (5.64e-05) (5.68e-05) (7.57e-05) (7.57e-05)
Wage -0.00391** -0.00586** -0.00144 -0.00330 -0.00698*** -0.00799***
(0.00178) (0.00215) (0.00183) (0.00262) (0.00205) (0.00231)
Productivity 0.00598*** 0.00609*** 0.00440** 0.00449** 0.00787*** 0.00794***
(0.00141) (0.00145) (0.00187) (0.00184) (0.00211) (0.00210)
Capital intensity -0.00243*** -0.00240*** -0.00261*** -0.00258*** -0.00211** -0.00210**
(0.000593) (0.000567) (0.000708) (0.000704) (0.000774) (0.000765)
Listed parent 0.0404*** 0.0404*** 0.0365** 0.0364** 0.0505* 0.0503*
(0.0111) (0.0108) (0.0171) (0.0168) (0.0255) (0.0254)
Multi-firm -1.12e-05 5.50e-05 -0.000567 -0.000496 0.000501 0.000498
(0.00290) (0.00300) (0.00324) (0.00339) (0.00320) (0.00322)
Multi-national -0.0233*** -0.0247*** -0.0270*** -0.0279*** -0.0199** -0.0208**
(0.00507) (0.00488) (0.00423) (0.00491) (0.00852) (0.00835)
Diversification -0.00828 -0.00815 -0.00595 -0.00583 -0.0103** -0.0101**
(0.00522) (0.00542) (0.00890) (0.00954) (0.00426) (0.00430)
Financial development
Credit ratio affiliate -0.0898 -0.0564 0.0196
(0.0609) (0.0616) (0.0800)
Credit ratio parent -0.0439** -0.0506* -0.0207
(0.0162) (0.0243) (0.0222)
Industry characteristics
Entry costs -0.972*** -0.972*** -0.559*** -0.554*** -1.662*** -1.675***
(0.195) (0.192) (0.188) (0.186) (0.284) (0.278)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 49,202 49,202 27,555 27,555 21,600 21,600
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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5.4. Robustness checks
Table 5.14 confirms our previous findings that parents from countries with easier
access to credit decrease affiliate exit probability. However, as before, this relationship
breaks down in the crisis years, suggesting that investment is pro-cyclical and that
parents with access to more capital are not able to shield their affiliates from closing
down.
5.4.3 Exit of foreign firms
Recent literature has suggested that both exporters and firms engaging in FDI
experience less financial constraints than firms operating in a single market (see e.g.
Wagner (2014)). This is however due to less constrained firms self-selecting into either
exporting or engagement in multinational activity. In this subsection we test whether
indeed foreign affiliates are less dependent on the credit environment of their countries
as well as the importance of credit constraints in the country of the parent for probability
of exit. Table 5.15 shows results for all firms but also for the sample excluding Spain
and the Netherlands. The results suggest that there is little impact of country level
credit on affiliate exit. This is consistent with the literature as far as foreign affiliates do
not face similar credit constraints as their domestic counterparts. Moreover, the credit
conditions in the parent’s country also plays no significant role in foreign affiliate exit.
5.4.4 Exit of foreign manufacturing firms
Whilst in the previous example we estimated survival of both manufacturing as
well as sales affiliates, here we zoom in on the manufacturing firms only. Compared
to the entire sample, manufacturing affiliates might have tighter constraints due to
their heavier reliance on capital for production. Therefore, in this subsection we further
explore the impact of financial linkages on foreign affiliate survival in manufacturing
sectors alone. We do so by interacting the credit variables with the dependence of
industries on external finance, as first employed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). We
expect that firms in industries relying on external finance are able to benefit more from
looser credit environment in their own countries as well as the countries of their parents.
Table 5.16 shows the results for the entire sample, while in Table 5.17 we again exclude
Spain and The Netherlands.
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Table 5.15: Foreign affiliate exit and financial constraints - with and without Spain and the
Netherlands
all excluding ES and NL
2004-2010 2004-2007 2008-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.00919*** -0.01224*** -0.00674** -0.00902*** -0.01348*** -0.00665
(0.00229) (0.00235) (0.00344) (0.00326) (0.00226) (0.00458)
Age -0.00004 -0.00006 -0.00003 0.00005 -0.00002 0.00008
(0.00017) (0.00010) (0.00034) (0.00029) (0.00012) (0.00045)
Wage -0.00432 0.00213 -0.00618 0.00355 0.01186 -0.00165
(0.00664) (0.00857) (0.00857) (0.01010) (0.01120) (0.01256)
Productivity -0.01001*** -0.00447 -0.01652*** -0.01096*** -0.00904** -0.01341**
(0.00182) (0.00317) (0.00420) (0.00230) (0.00396) (0.00611)
Capital Intensity -0.00248** -0.00299 -0.00285 -0.00393** -0.00229 -0.00507*
(0.00117) (0.00220) (0.00181) (0.00200) (0.00311) (0.00301)
Vertical 0.00277 -0.00632 0.01000 -0.00152 -0.01232 0.00303
(0.00529) (0.00498) (0.01037) (0.00757) (0.00930) (0.01160)
Distance -0.00357 -0.00555 -0.00173 -0.00311 -0.00356 -0.00397
(0.00532) (0.00619) (0.00685) (0.00530) (0.00629) (0.00607)
Parent characteristics
Size 0.00449*** 0.00793*** 0.00178 0.00288*** 0.00514* 0.00130
(0.00081) (0.00208) (0.00194) (0.00103) (0.00268) (0.00221)
Age -0.00022*** -0.00004 -0.00049*** -0.00026*** -0.00005 -0.00056***
(0.00006) (0.00007) (0.00011) (0.00007) (0.00007) (0.00015)
Wage 0.00811 0.01335** 0.00073 0.00975** 0.01785** 0.00279
(0.00619) (0.00531) (0.01140) (0.00423) (0.00757) (0.00579)
Productivity 0.00343 0.00148 0.00493 0.00158 0.00456 -0.00196
(0.00236) (0.00297) (0.00642) (0.00123) (0.00312) (0.00432)
Capital Intensity -0.00228 -0.00031 -0.00401* -0.00186 0.00030 -0.00349
(0.00168) (0.00283) (0.00221) (0.00201) (0.00263) (0.00289)
Listed parent 0.01937** 0.01352 0.01482 0.02152* 0.02864 0.00877
(0.00947) (0.01259) (0.03195) (0.01140) (0.01782) (0.03606)
Multi-firm -0.01122*** -0.01112* -0.00973* -0.01127* -0.01616** -0.00639
(0.00424) (0.00607) (0.00587) (0.00647) (0.00673) (0.01239)
Diversification -0.00708 -0.00846 -0.00465 0.00117 -0.00415 0.00912
(0.00804) (0.01540) (0.00945) (0.01066) (0.01827) (0.01168)
Financial development
Credit ratio affiliate -0.42899 0.39586 -1.30596*** -0.06811 -0.07112 -0.15305
(0.50264) (0.48658) (0.48535) (0.06409) (0.09815) (0.18813)
Credit ratio parent 0.01292 -0.00637 0.04742 0.01555 0.00248 0.03553
(0.02166) (0.02338) (0.17855) (0.01794) (0.02795) (0.02751)
Industry characteristics
Entry cost 0.00532 -0.00279 0.01049 -0.06225 0.38731 -0.81732
(0.00357) (0.01373) (0.00890) (0.66535) (0.85584) (0.87070)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,622 3,593 3,800 4,563 1,990 2,365
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.16: Foreign manufacturing affiliate exit and financial constraints
2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2004-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.00782*** -0.00773*** -0.01097** -0.01214*** -0.00616 -0.00578
(0.00208) (0.00206) (0.00447) (0.00431) (0.00447) (0.00480)
Age -0.00011 -0.00011 -0.00031 -0.00033 -0.00006 -0.00004
(0.00019) (0.00018) (0.00026) (0.00027) (0.00032) (0.00033)
Wage -0.00804 -0.00776 -0.01671 -0.01696 -0.00101 -0.00019
(0.01170) (0.01168) (0.01659) (0.01648) (0.01306) (0.01248)
Productivity -0.00249 -0.00246 -0.00035 -0.00185 -0.00306 -0.00235
(0.00394) (0.00393) (0.00785) (0.00798) (0.00775) (0.00789)
Capital intensity -0.00362 -0.00373 -0.00452 -0.00346 -0.00464 -0.00564*
(0.00223) (0.00234) (0.00444) (0.00458) (0.00306) (0.00324)
Vertical -0.01392 -0.01416 -0.02346*** -0.02317*** -0.00695 -0.00831
(0.00951) (0.00953) (0.00776) (0.00767) (0.01837) (0.01805)
Distance -0.00857* -0.00856* -0.00828 -0.00969 -0.00953 -0.00884
(0.00496) (0.00500) (0.00674) (0.00615) (0.00678) (0.00694)
Affiliate characteristics
Size 0.00522** 0.00516** 0.00825*** 0.00855*** 0.00221 0.00200
(0.00228) (0.00230) (0.00236) (0.00218) (0.00572) (0.00566)
Age -0.00037** -0.00037** -0.00039*** -0.00040*** -0.00038* -0.00038*
(0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00020) (0.00019)
Wage 0.02610*** 0.02600*** 0.02515*** 0.02525*** 0.02622** 0.02650**
(0.00392) (0.00395) (0.00763) (0.00778) (0.01209) (0.01156)
Productivity -0.00305* -0.00317* -0.00240 -0.00318 -0.00359 -0.00369
(0.00172) (0.00169) (0.00415) (0.00392) (0.00445) (0.00458)
Capital intensity -0.00388 -0.00380 -0.00063 -0.00092 -0.00596 -0.00553
(0.00293) (0.00295) (0.00398) (0.00382) (0.00411) (0.00430)
Listed parent 0.02038 0.02044 0.02507 0.02587 0.01123 0.01146
(0.01931) (0.01941) (0.03701) (0.03762) (0.04444) (0.04258)
Multi-firm 0.00120 0.00129 -0.00733 -0.01129 0.00872 0.00806
(0.01010) (0.01018) (0.02097) (0.02036) (0.00811) (0.00840)
Diversification -0.01665 -0.01668 0.00031 0.00733 -0.02674 -0.02456
(0.01847) (0.01852) (0.02576) (0.02606) (0.01912) (0.01981)
Financial development
Credit ratio affiliate -0.06078** -0.05988** 0.00296 -0.01764 0.07149 0.08704
(0.02832) (0.02861) (0.01983) (0.01760) (0.19805) (0.20310)
Credit ratio parent 0.00977 0.00924 0.00392 -0.00001 0.01145 0.01517
(0.00780) (0.00871) (0.01550) (0.01720) (0.01170) (0.01399)
Credit ratio affiliate* -0.00630 0.03078 -0.03449***
External finance dependence affiliate (0.00696) (0.02145) (0.01286)
Credit ratio parent* -0.00103 -0.04915** 0.02881
External finance dependence affiliate (0.01399) (0.02074) (0.02051)
Industry characteristics
Entry costs 0.23193 0.24205 0.66597 0.55288 -0.46308 -0.54490
(0.54501) (0.53554) (0.78995) (0.72491) (0.45144) (0.46259)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 3,133 3,133 1,418 1,418 1,548 1,548
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 5.17: Foreign manufacturing affiliate exit and financial constraints - excluding Spain
and the Netherlands
2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2007 2004-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010
Affiliate characteristics
Size -0.00741** -0.00751** -0.01613*** -0.01645*** -0.00615 -0.00618
(0.00356) (0.00357) (0.00465) (0.00481) (0.00840) (0.00840)
Age -0.00021 -0.00021 -0.00029 -0.00039 -0.00021 -0.00021
(0.00015) (0.00013) (0.00055) (0.00060) (0.00043) (0.00042)
Wage 0.00976 0.00963 -0.01063 -0.01459 0.02198 0.02158
(0.01988) (0.02010) (0.03269) (0.03391) (0.02469) (0.02451)
Productivity -0.00620 -0.00625 -0.00527 -0.00515 -0.00918 -0.00907
(0.00579) (0.00582) (0.01604) (0.01639) (0.01192) (0.01188)
Capital intensity -0.00257 -0.00248 -0.00263 -0.00263 0.00008 0.00011
(0.00424) (0.00414) (0.00967) (0.00990) (0.00516) (0.00512)
Vertical -0.01619 -0.01602 -0.03476*** -0.03689*** -0.01122 -0.01084
(0.01312) (0.01347) (0.01002) (0.01105) (0.02007) (0.02007)
Distance -0.01281** -0.01299** -0.00276 -0.00529 -0.02049** -0.02034**
(0.00619) (0.00550) (0.00534) (0.00498) (0.00848) (0.00849)
Parent characteristics
Size 0.00261 0.00259 0.00990*** 0.00962*** -0.00221 -0.00218
(0.00284) (0.00269) (0.00227) (0.00200) (0.00640) (0.00636)
Age -0.00033* -0.00033* -0.00037** -0.00035** -0.00034 -0.00033
(0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00018) (0.00023) (0.00024)
Wage 0.02299*** 0.02316*** 0.04173*** 0.04448*** 0.00875 0.00864
(0.00777) (0.00814) (0.01208) (0.01431) (0.01130) (0.01109)
Productivity -0.00237 -0.00241 -0.00299 -0.00324 -0.00287 -0.00290
(0.00396) (0.00392) (0.00550) (0.00565) (0.00648) (0.00656)
Capital intensity -0.00288 -0.00286 -0.00028 -0.00093 -0.00548 -0.00545
(0.00314) (0.00313) (0.00437) (0.00451) (0.00419) (0.00432)
Listed parent 0.03583*** 0.03558*** 0.10396*** 0.09774*** 0.01157 0.01048
(0.01311) (0.01326) (0.03361) (0.03199) (0.04782) (0.04659)
Multi-firm -0.00490 -0.00512 -0.03450*** -0.03644*** 0.01187 0.01174
(0.00990) (0.01005) (0.00968) (0.01033) (0.01057) (0.01046)
Diversification -0.00171 -0.00198 0.05882*** 0.05524*** -0.02262 -0.02247
(0.01548) (0.01543) (0.01957) (0.01924) (0.01921) (0.01913)
Financial development
Credit ratio affiliate -0.11411 -0.11390 0.02591 0.00624 -0.08213 -0.08388
(0.11283) (0.11395) (0.07990) (0.08341) (0.20156) (0.20463)
Credit ratio parent 0.02229 0.02272 -0.15972*** -0.16182*** 0.10648*** 0.10520***
(0.02867) (0.02840) (0.04412) (0.05037) (0.03688) (0.03648)
Credit ratio affiliate* 0.01661 -0.03932 0.01321
External finance dependence affiliate (0.03627) (0.05697) (0.04445)
Credit ratio parent* -0.03056 -0.20934*** 0.04082
External finance dependence affiliate (0.09029) (0.04789) (0.15015)
Industry characteristics
Entry costs -0.12104 -0.16089 0.31517 0.17868 -0.49126 -0.51728
(0.77628) (0.71953) (0.91414) (0.88283) (0.57416) (0.52136)
Country, Industry, Year controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 1,970 1,970 788 788 1,045 1,045
The table present estimation results in form of marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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5.5. Conclusion
We find that for the entire sample the domestic credit abundance variable matters for
affiliate survival. Moreover, the interaction of domestic credit with financial dependence
of the industry of affiliate is significant during the crisis, indicating that affiliates had to
rely on home credit for their financial needs in order to improve survival. Nonetheless,
this is not the case for the credit ease in the country of the parent. To make sure that
the results are not driven by the inclusion of Spain or the Netherlands, we repeat the
analysis without these two countries.
Looking at the sample without Spain and the Netherlands we observe that in this
case only the credit ease in the parent’s country matters, especially in pre-crisis years.
Moreover, the interaction of parent financial development with affiliate’s industry
dependence on external finance is also significant and improves survival prior to
2008. However, we find that affiliates of parents from financially developed countries
have had higher exit rates after 2008, suggesting a pro-cyclical behaviour of parents.
We therefore cannot confirm that parents that have more access to credit were able
to finance their affiliates throughout the crisis, therefore improving their chances of
survival. If anything, there was a negative impact at work, with affiliates being closed
down precisely from parents that are located in countries with higher levels of credit to
consumers.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the role of parent characteristics in predicting affiliate exit. First
we look at whether multinational and multi-firm parents are more ‘footloose’ than their
domestic and single-firm counterparts, taking into account traditional characteristics
such as size, age, productivity and capital intensity of both the parent and the affiliate.
Moreover, we test whether listed and industrially diversified parents impact affiliate
survival. We find that older, more productive and more capital intensive affiliates
are less likely to exit. Moreover, due to stronger relationship with the parent, vertical
affiliates are also less likely to be shut down. However, even controlling for similar
characteristics of the parent, we do not find any evidence that multinational and multi-
firm parents are more ‘footloose’. On the contrary, MNEs decrease affiliate exit due to
potentially being better diversified against shocks. Moreover, parents with affiliates
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active in different industries are also better for affiliate survival especially during
2008-2010 period, again a sign of the benefits of diversification.
Conducting multinational activity requires access to capital, with financial linkages
between parents and their affiliates playing a potentially important role. In a second
step we check whether parents coming from relatively more financially developed
countries can influence affiliate exit by providing assistance if need be. We test this
by using the level of private credit as percentage of country GDP. We find that indeed,
parents from countries with larger private credit ratios reduce probability of exit in
a significant way. This effects is however primarily visible prior to 2008. Looking at
foreign affiliates only, we confirm that these are not financially constrained and do not
rely on the level of credit in own countries or that of their parent. Zooming in on foreign
manufacturing affiliates, our results indicate that credit ratio’s matter in the country
of the parent, but again only prior to the crisis. We also find some evidence that firms
in industries more dependent on external finance are more sensitive to the financial
development of their parent’s country. This suggests that investment is pro-cyclical
and that while in good times more investment will result in lower exit rates, in times of
crisis MNEs are not able to transmit the ease of getting credit at home to their affiliates
abroad by improving their survival chances.
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Carrying the (Paper) Burden: A Portfolio
View of Systemic Risk and Optimal Bank
Size?
6.1 Introduction
As a result of the financial crisis, the health and safety of the financial system is at the
heart of many policy agendas. Concerns regarding the financial system tend to relate
mostly to commercial banks and their parent holding companies. Policy discussions
focus either on the riskiness of individual financial institutions, or on what is broadly
termed systemic risk. Regarding individual banks, the key question debated is whether
some banks are too big: too big to fail, too big with respect to their country’s GDP
(Bertay et al., 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013), too big to produce at minimum
average costs (see e.g. Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Hughes and Mester, 2013), or even
too big to rescue. Systemic risk discussions are much broader, and may consider the
stability of the financial system itself, the macro effects of a shock to that system, or the
?This chapter is based on joint work with Jaap W.B. Bos (Maastricht University) and Martien Lamers
(University of Groningen).
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optimal supervisory setup for dealing with and minimizing the likelihood of such a
shock.
In this chapter, we combine these two discussions and investigate whether the size
of the largest banks in the system has contributed to an increase in systemic risk. We
do so by engaging the reader in a thought experiment. We imagine a bank supervisor
as an investor holding a portfolio of banks. Each bank aims to maximize profits, but
thereby incurs a certain amount of risk. Given that banks’ profits are not all perfectly
correlated, the risk-return relationship of the portfolio that the supervisor holds is
expected to be better than that of the riskiest banks in the system on their own. Taking
the long-term view, the bank supervisor not only wants to minimize risk but is certainly
also interested in return, as high charter values may boost the stability of individual
banks.
Although we consider our view of the bank supervisor a thought experiment,
recent events have shown that its experimental nature is closer to the reality of a crisis
than one may at first suspect. In theory, the bank supervisor mainly represents the
interests of deposit holders and deposit insurance guarantees those interests to a large
extent. However, during the recent crisis, most supervisors went above and beyond
that objective. In the U.S., the Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP) initially provided
support in terms of bank equity share purchases valued at more than three times the
total amounts of deposits in the system, although much of these funds were later
reclaimed as shares were sold in the market. Moreover, many assets were purchased
well above their actual value, resulting in an implicit subsidy of the banking sector
(Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 2013).
Finally, the Safe, Accountable, Fair & Efficient (SAFE) Banking Act proposed in 2012
gives regulators additional powers to limit bank size in order to lower systemic risk.
Nevertheless, unlike the typical investor, the bank supervisor is seriously limited
in buying and selling assets in order to reach or remain at the optimal frontier as
depicted in Figure 6.1. As the crisis has shown, even this highly constrained investor
can rebalance the weights of the banks in the portfolio, through orderly liquidation and
other interventions by the Financial Stability Board such as the capital surcharge for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).
Using this scenario, we pose three questions, each related to the situation depicted in
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Figure 6.1: The supervisory view: Markowitz efficient frontier, systemic risk and bank size
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Figure 6.1. First, we ask whether large banks offer attractive investment opportunities
for the bank supervisor or in other words, whether large banks are characterized by a
risk-return relationship superior to that of the other banks in the system. This should
establish whether the inclusion of large banks has brought the supervisory portfolio
closer to the efficient frontier, e.g., moving from C to B in Figure 6.1.
Second, we examine what would happen to the portfolio’s return if the bank super-
visor held the minimum variance portfolio. In light of the example in Figure 6.1, would
the return move from B to A, thereby requiring the supervisor to give up return in
order to hold a less risky portfolio, or would it move from C to A, allowing the choice
of a less risky portfolio without sacrificing returns?
Third, we examine whether the bank supervisor should reduce investments in large
banks in order to achieve the minimum variance portfolio. In light of the example in
Figure 6.1, we ask whether the supervisor has to increase or reduce the share of large
banks (sL) in the portfolio by moving to A. We also examine whether the differences
in risk and return between the original portfolio held by the bank supervisor and the
new minimum variance portfolio merely reflect a change in the weights of banks, or
whether they are driven by high correlation of the returns of the largest banks in the
original portfolio.
To perform our experiment, we examine developments in the U.S. banking market
since 1984. Using quarterly data on banks’ assets and profits, we construct two types
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of bank supervisory portfolios. For each Federal Reserve District, we include all
unconsolidated commercial banks located within the district. For the U.S. as a whole,
we construct a portfolio comprising all Bank Holding Companies. In both cases, we are
interested in the design of the minimum variance portfolio and how it compares with
the actual portfolio.
Our findings indicate that the current portfolios are not located on the efficient
frontier, as risk can be reduced without sacrificing return in order to attain the minimum
variance portfolio. Moreover, we find that the largest banks in the Federal Reserve
portfolios consistently have a significantly lower weight in the hypothetical minimum
variance portfolio. In addition, the minimum variance portfolio does not allow for
large levels of concentration in the first place, with its weights being much more evenly
spread across banks. These results hold even after relaxing some assumptions and
allowing the correlation structure to change with the size of banks. In obtaining the
minimum variance portfolio, we assume that the supervisor is able to alter the relative
weights of the individual banks in the portfolio, along the lines of the Safe, Accountable,
Fair & Efficient (SAFE) Banking Act proposed in 2012. The Act was designed to make
banks small enough to fail without causing global panic, using regulatory caps. We
argue that our results provide important insights into the optimal design of a portfolio
of banks, held by a risk-averse supervisor who prefers to incur the least possible amount
of risk. The findings suggest reducing the size of the largest banks in the financial
system may not only make individual banks safer and easier to fail or rescue, but can
also contribute to a reduction in the riskiness of the system as a whole.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 6.2 we discuss our methodology
and data, followed by Section 6.3 which contains our results. Extensions and policy
implications are addressed in Section 6.4, after which we conclude.
6.2 Data and methodology
6.2.1 Methodology
We regard banks as assets having both a return and a risk component. By placing
the banks in this risk-return framework, we analyze not only the profitability of the
banks but also the risk inherent in profit maximization. When considering a portfolio of
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these assets and assuming that returns are not perfectly correlated, a supervisor holding
this portfolio can diversify and enjoy a better risk-return trade-off. The diversification
opportunities of the supervisor are constrained by the variety of banks available. Of
course, banks themselves also individually diversify their loan portfolios, business
lines or geographical markets served. However, the dimensions along which banks
can diversify are correlated with their size, as larger banks can be assumed to have
greater geographical reach and a different mix of activities compared with smaller
banks. Moreover, if enough banks diversify along the same lines, the system as a
whole becomes more susceptible to common shocks, even though individual banks
themselves seem safer from a micro-prudential point of view. This observation is
not new, being noted for instance by Rajan (2005), Wagner (2008), Acharya (2009),
Ibragimov et al. (2011) and Allen et al. (2012), who also draw on Modern Portfolio
Theory (Markowitz, 1952, 1959) and the insight that portfolio risk can be reduced by
choosing assets that are not perfectly correlated with each other.
We contribute to this line of thinking by applying portfolio theory to the banking
system in order to investigate the role of large banks in determining systemic (portfolio)
risk. The supervisor in our case is able to change the portfolio’s risk-return trade-off by
altering the size of banks with respect to the system. Although this ability goes beyond
the existing mechanisms in place (such as ‘Cease and Desist’ orders and other ‘Prompt
Corrective Actions’), we argue that this thought experiment can, at the very least, give
us insights into the optimal design of a portfolio of banks. Applying portfolio theory to
the banking system is not however all that straightforward, due to some of its strict
assumptions. First, the return distribution is assumed to be fully characterized by the
first two moments and disregards any tail dependence, even though financial market
returns are found to be skewed and fat-tailed. To (partially) mitigate this issue, we
use lower-frequency quarterly returns. Second, market participants are assumed to
have no influence on prices and return structures of assets in their investment universe,
regardless of the weight they are given. In reality, if a bank supervisor were to reduce
the size of a bank, its risk-return trade-off would be bound to change as well, as would
its correlation structure. Third, an investor is assumed to be able to purchase assets
in parcels of any size, meaning that bank sizes could fluctuate heavily between the
investor’s decision moments. Under a more realistic scenario, the supervisor would
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be able to change the size of a bank in a limited way, e.g. by only a certain percentage
of the bank’s assets. Although we initially proceed under the strict setup, the last two
assumptions are relaxed at a later stage.
In order to apply portfolio theory and build the regulator’s portfolio, we first need
to define the return and weight of the assets under consideration. Previous studies
have relied mainly on market-based measures when assessing systemic risk (see e.g. De
Jonghe, 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Acharya, Engle and Richardson, 2012;
Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson, 2012; Bisias et al., 2012; Brownlees and
Engle, 2012; Engle et al., 2014). Unlike these studies, we instead use the return-on-assets
from book data for the returns of the banks. We do so for several reasons, the first being
that the aggregated risk concerning the supervisor is not based on the returns and risks
of the shareholders of banks, but rather on those of the (productive) assets that they
hold. In the event that the regulator has to bail out a bank, saving or guaranteeing its
liabilities will be equivalent to saving or guaranteeing its assets. Second, as shown by
Allen and Carletti (2008), in financial crises market prices tend to reflect the amount
of available liquidity instead of future earnings. Since these episodes are of particular
interest to this analysis, market-based measures might not be appropriate as they
could capture liquidity risk instead of systemic risk. Third, accounting data enable
us to explore a more extensive sample since market data is only available for a small
subset of banks. While listed banks do account for a large percentage of the total
banking assets, small banks are potentially a source of (liquidity) contagion through the
interbank market (see e.g. Furfine, 1999, 2003; van Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006; Degryse
and Nguyen, 2007). Finally, return-on-assets is a cleaner measure of the underlying
profitability, as return-on-equity incorporates management choices with regards to
leverage. While our baseline results are based on the book value of the return-on-assets,
they are robust to using market-based measures.
The weight that the regulator holds in each bank is calculated as the bank-level total
assets divided by the sum of all bank-level total assets available in the portfolio.
According to portfolio theory, the investor’s return and risk are calculated as:
rp,t = w′tµt (6.1)
σ2p,t = w
′
tΣtwt (6.2)
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where wt is a column vector representing the weights of all banks in period t and µt
represents the expected return of the banks, usually defined as the average return of the
previous quarters. Furthermore, Σt represents the expected covariance matrix of these
returns and is often replaced by its sample equivalent. The average expected return of
the portfolio is given by rp,t, while the variance of this set of returns is given by σ2p,t and
represent the measure of portfolio (or in our case: systemic) risk at time t.1
The supervisor is considered to be risk averse, and to prefer to hold the portfolio with
the least amount of risk according to the objective function in Equation 6.2. Moreover,
the supervisor is able to influence systemic risk by changing the weights in the portfolio,
assuming that this does not impact the matrix Σt.2 Minimizing the objective function
allows us to compare the differences in portfolio design between the initially realized
and the hypothetical minimum variance portfolio.
To achieve the minimum variance portfolio (MVP), the supervisor solves for:
argmin
wt
w′tΣtwt (6.3)
s.t. wi,t ≥ 0
1′wt = 1
w′tµt ≥ 0
with the addition of several further constraints. First, the supervisor cannot go short
in a bank, i.e. no bank can have a negative weight. Second, the weights of banks
have to add up to 1 as the existing assets are merely reshuffled, without any being
created or destroyed. This is equivalent to assuming that the banks under consideration
constitute the entire investment universe of the supervisor. Finally, a supervisor is also
assumed to choose the weights such that the portfolio does not have negative returns.3
It follows from these non-linear constraints that no analytical solution is possible, and
1Since the source of risk in a portfolio selection problem is correlation of returns, portfolio risk mainly
measures the endogenous build-up of risk due to exposure to a common factor. This follows recent
literature which focus on the trade-off between individual diversification and systemic diversification
(see, e.g., Wagner, 2008; Acharya, 2009; Ibragimov, Jaffee and Walden, 2011). However, the portfolio
risk measure is less suited to capture exogenous shocks to the financial system, since these shocks have
to materialize before showing up in the data and can spillover to other parts of the system that are
connected through interbank-linkages.)
2As the recent crisis has shown, it is not unusual for supervisors to intervene through liquidation, (hidden)
bailouts or forcing banks to sell off assets to maintain a competitive environment.
3The inclusion of this constraint does impact our results as will be shown later.
177
6. BANK SIZE AND SYSTEM STABILITY
we therefore rely on a numerical solution.
Using this approach, we investigate the following questions. First, we ask whether
systemic risk can be reduced and if so, by how much. To do this, we compare the
standard deviation of the initial portfolio with that of the MVP. Second, we investigate
whether the supervisor would have to sacrifice returns in order to achieve a lower risk,
by comparing the average return of the initial portfolio with that of the MVP. Within
the framework described in the introduction, we therefore ask if, in order to reach the
MVP, the supervisor has to move along the efficient frontier or shift towards it. Third,
we compare the dispersion of weights within each of the two portfolios, by looking at
the share of the largest 5% of banks in the initial portfolio and in the MVP.4 Finally, we
ask whether the largest 5% of banks in the initial portfolio have retained their relative
importance in the MVP by comparing their initial share with the weight they receive in
the MVP.
6.2.2 Data
We perform our analysis on the U.S. banking system, which has several regulatory
bodies at different levels. Depending on location, membership status and type, a bank
can be regulated by the Federal Reserve System (FED), the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). While the
main supervisory task at district level is carried out by the 12 Federal Reserve Banks,
depicted in Figure 6.2, at the national level the main regulatory task is performed by the
Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. As a consequence of this division, we consider
the regulatory portfolio both at national level and at district level.
Bank data are obtained on a quarterly basis from the Call Reports for Income and
Condition provided by the Federal Reserve System. For the national (FED) portfolio,
we consider consolidated Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) as the assets in which
the regulator can invest. Data for the BHCs are obtained from the FR Y-9C Forms,
between 1986Q3 and 2012Q1. We select only Holding Companies and exclude In-
surance/Securities brokers, Utilities and other Non-Depository institutions. At the
4An alternative measure of concentration would be the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, although using the
portfolio weights of the largest banks is more intuitive in this setting. The 5% concentration measure is
preferred, since it allows for a better comparison in different-sized banking systems (see Alegria and
Schaeck, 2009).
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Figure 6.2: The Federal Reserve Districts
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Federal Reserve District (FRD) level, data on unconsolidated Commercial Banks are
retrieved from the FFIEC 031/041 Forms between 1984Q1 and 2010Q4, excluding
Savings/Cooperative/Industrial banks as well as Non Deposit Trust companies.
We use balance sheet data instead of financial market data, allowing us to consider
all banks that are required to file reports and not only those that are listed on an
exchange. Moreover, lower frequency returns are preferred to daily or even weekly
returns, in order to comply with the assumption of normality of returns. We collect
total assets (bhck/rcfd2170) and net income (bhck/riad4340), deflate both to 2005Q1
dollars using the Producer Price Index provided by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank,
and filter out banks with return-on-assets exceeding +100% or -100%. This leaves us
with 4,694 BHCs across 154,577 bank-year observations and 19,225 commercial banks
over 1,132,425 bank-year observations.
Summary statistics for the BHCs and commercial banks are shown in Table 6.1. In
any quarter in our sample, there are between 964 and 2,333 holding companies active
in the United States. Due to inflation and a wave of consolidation, the total assets
reporting threshold for BHCs was raised from $150 million to $500 million in 2006,
causing a drop in the number of banks in the sample. Banks controlling less than $500
million in total assets prior to 2006 are kept in the dataset, since, as will be shown at a
later stage, their exit does not affect our results. Given that the distributions of assets
and returns are highly unequal, we report percentiles instead of means and standard
deviations. The median BHC controlled $500 million in total assets and reported a net
income of $1.3 million. The table shows the skewness in the distribution of total assets,
with the largest 5% of BHCs having total assets ranging between $14.5 billion and $2.1
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trillion. While the net income of the median holding company is $1.3 million, again
there is a large disparity: the highest earning 5% of BHCs recorded profits ranging from
$44 million to $6.4 trillion. At the other end of the spectrum, losses are equally large,
partly due to the recent financial crisis, with one holding company reporting a net loss
of $15 trillion in the third quarter of 2008. Since the return-on-assets takes into account
the size of the BHC, its values are less extreme compared with those of returns and
assets separately, with the mean (0.257%), median (0.292%) and mode (0.325%) lying in
close proximity.
The number of reporting commercial banks lies between 6,477 and 14,474 over the
12 districts. Regarding net income and total assets, commercials banks follow a similar
pattern to that of Bank Holding Companies, although smaller on average. The total
assets disparity is even larger than at the national level, with some banks dwarfing
their competitors.
We proceed by placing every bank in its respective FRD portfolio, defining its weight
as the total assets of the bank divided by the sum of total assets in the FRD. The BHCs
are analyzed at the national level in a similar manner: the weights are calculated as the
individual level of total assets divided by the sum of all total assets of the BHCs. As we
have quarterly data over a period of 25 years at our disposal, we perform the analysis
using a window of 8 consecutive quarters on which we calculate the expected return
and sample covariance matrix, thereby taking into account time-varying correlation.5
As a consequence, assets need to have posted data in each consecutive quarter of the
window to be included in the analysis.
6.3 Results
In this section we present the results of our analysis. We first examine the risk-return
trade-off between the FED portfolio and the MVP. In a second step, we look at the
differences in portfolio allocation between the two systems before comparing their
other features. We present the results of the analysis at BHC level graphically, referring
the reader to the Online Appendix for the results on FRD level as they are quantitatively
similar, and conclude this section with several robustness tests.
5In Section 6.3.5 we show that our results are robust to a different window size.
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Bank Holding Companies
Percentiles
Min. 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th Max.
Net Income (in $ million) -15132.20 -0.72 0.64 1.30 3.09 44.0 6414.61
Total Assets (in $ million ) 5.33 156.32 284.62 500.37 1184.04 14456.24 2115728.50
Return on Assets (in %) -39.29 -0.14 0.18 0.29 0.39 0.58 82.81
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of Banks 1502 387 964 2333
Panel B: Commercial Banks
Percentiles
Min. 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th Max.
Net Income (in million $) -11168.98 -0.20 0.08 0.24 0.58 2.94 4682.32
Total Assets (in million $) 0.14 15.91 39.48 79.39 171.95 896.35 1594746.30
Return on Assets (in %) -78.23 -0.34 0.19 0.33 0.46 0.72 90.85
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of Banks 10115 2655 6477 14474
The table presents summary statistics for Net Income (bhck/riad4340), Total Assets (bhck/rcfd2170)
and the Return-on-Assets of the banks in the analysis. Panel A displays these descriptives for Bank
Holding Companies between 1986Q3 and 2012Q1, while Panel B summarizes them for Commercial
Banks between 1984Q1 and 2010Q4. Due to the highly skewed distributions, we summarize the data
according to their percentiles as well as the minimum and maximum values.
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Figure 6.3: Are large banks more risky?
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The figure shows density plots of the average 8 quarter variance of the return-on-assets and average
pairwise covariances of the smallest 95% and the largest 5% of Bank Holding Companies between
1988Q2 and 2012Q1. Due to long tails for both large and small banks, the variance is truncated at its
90th percentile as it is strictly positive, while the covariance is truncated at its 5st and 95th percentile
for graphical purposes.
6.3.1 Are large banks more risky?
However, before reporting the results we first need to establish the similarities in the
return structure between large and small banks. Should large banks have (co)variances
different from those of small banks, the assumption that the covariance matrix is
independent of size means we would impose an unrealistic structure when large banks
are reduced in size, or small banks are made larger.6 In Figure 6.3, we show the two
dimensions of the covariance matrix by plotting the densities of the average 8 quarter
variance and average 8 quarter pairwise covariance for the largest 5% and the smallest
95% of BHCs. From the Figure, it becomes clear that despite the differences in size, there
is ample common support in the individual and common riskiness of bank returns as
the distributions overlap almost entirely. These results hold for different time samples,
and for both BHCs and Commercial Banks.7
Of course, even if large and small banks share a common support in the covariance
matrix, it does not mean that a bank that changes size will maintain its return structure.
At a later stage, we therefore look at banks that have seen large increases or decreases in
6In this respect, our approach is similar to verifying whether the assumption of a ‘common support’ holds
in propensity score matching (Heckman et al., 1998). If there is enough ‘common support’ between small
and large banks, the assumption that the supervisor could change assets without having these actions
leading to a different return structure is more realistic.
7Full results available upon request.
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size, and analyze how this changed the elements of the covariance matrix. Using these
average changes in turn allows us to alter the covariance matrix during the numerical
optimization, leading to a more realistic portfolio allocation. However, since there are
only a limited number of cases on which we can base this analysis, we first proceed
by assuming that changing a bank’s size does not influence the structure or level of its
returns, and later revisit this assumption.
6.3.2 What role does inequality play in the risk/return trade-off?
It is quite straightforward to obtain the risk, return and weight distributions for the
initial portfolios. By contrast, obtaining the respective MVPs is more cumbersome, as a
minimum of 964 and a maximum of 2,333 BHCs are present during the sample period.
The Chicago, Kansas City and Dallas portfolios typically contain well over 1,800 banks.
The solution is computationally intensive, but is nonetheless obtained after a lengthy
optimization process.
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Figure 6.4: Efficient frontier - MVP and FRD Boston Portfolio
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The figure shows the risk-return trade-off for the Federal Reserve District of Boston at 4 time
periods. It plots the efficient frontier and places the MVP and FRD portfolios in the risk-return space.
Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the risk/return trade-off for the Federal Reserve District of
Boston in a selected number of years using the 8 quarter rolling window approach. For
graphical purposes, we show the trade-off at 4 moments: 1995Q1, 2000Q1, 2005Q1 and
2010Q1. We choose the district of Boston for computational reasons as it has the least
number of active banks throughout the sample period.8
Figure 6.4 plots the empirical efficient frontier and places the MVP and Boston FRD
portfolio’s in the mean-variance space. The shape of the frontier reveals that even when
few banks are present, the maximization process is non-linear and a consistent frontier
is difficult to obtain. We see that in each of the four periods the FRD portfolio is not
located on the efficient frontier, as the MVPs have similar returns but a lower aggregate
risk. Furthermore, the FRD portfolio’s seem to be moving away from the MVPs over
8Plotting the efficient frontiers entails multiple minimizations while holding the return constant and is
therefore computationally more intensive than simply finding the MVP.
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Figure 6.5: Boston Portfolio Diversification Possibilities – Comparison 1995Q1 and 2010Q1
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The figure plots the efficient frontier for the Federal Reserve District of Boston at the beginning and
the end of the sample period.
time: in 1995 the MVP has a return of 0.31% and standard deviation of 0%, while the
FRD has a return of 0.33% and a standard deviation of 0.06%. Meanwhile, in 2010 the
MVP has a return of 0.12% and its standard deviation remains at 0%, while the FRD
portfolio now has a return of essentially 0% and a standard deviation of 0.34%.
Two further remarks are in order here. First, the hump-shaped frontier in the
beginning of the sample seems to indicate that, in point B in panel 6.4a, a portfolio
return of 1.4% is possible with a portfolio standard deviation of essentially 0% compared
to the MVP which has similar risk but a lower return. Analyzing the outcomes of the
frontier, we find that the risk is nonetheless lowest in the MVP, albeit marginally.
Moreover, the weight distributions between these two points are quite similar. The
cumulative weight of the largest 5% of banks in point B is 12%, while it is 17% in the
MVP.
The second remark is that when comparing the steepness in panel 6.4a and panel 6.4d,
it seems that diversification possibilities were more plentiful in the beginning of the
sample period. This is emphasized in Figure 6.5, where the efficient frontiers from
1995Q1 and 2010Q1 are plotted simultaneously. Figure 6.5 shows that the efficient
frontier turns inward, indicating that the risk-return trade-off has worsened over time.
Considering the difficulty in obtaining the frontier, and the amount of time periods
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where we would have to perform these minimizations, we obtain only the MVP next to
the respective FRD or FED portfolio in the rest of the analysis.
Figure 6.6 shows the results of the portfolio optimization based on BHC data:
panels 6.6a and 6.6b display the risk-return trade-off for the FED portfolio and the
MVP. They show that with different weights, portfolio risk is effectively eliminated
in the MVP. Whereas the standard deviation of the FED portfolio spikes during the
Savings-and-Loans and subprime mortgage crises, that of the MVP remains stable at
around zero. One would expect a portfolio with lower (minimized) risk to have a lower
return as well. However, this less risky system has positive returns throughout the
sample period with values that closely track the actual returns. Therefore, we conclude
that the initial portfolio does not lie on the efficient frontier, as risk is reduced while the
level of returns has been maintained. Panel 6.6c shows that the lower risk is achieved
in the MVP through a markedly lower concentration than in the FED portfolio. While
in reality the weight of the largest banks lies between 65% and 90%, the concentration
in the MVP is on average 13% and at most 52%. More interestingly, the largest banks in
the FED portfolio see their cumulative weight reduced to at most 15% of total assets in
the MVP.9
The same picture as for the BHC data emerges if we look at the separate FRD
portfolios, reported in the Online Appendix. Table A.1 summarizes the differences in
risk and return between the FRD portfolios and their MVPs. Evidence of returns over
the whole period is mixed: some FRDs outperform their MVPs, whereas others exhibit
lower returns. One interesting fact is that in the boom period of 1994Q1 - 2006Q4, we
find that all FRDs outperform their MVP counterparts in terms of returns. Regarding
size disparity, Table A.2 shows that the MVPs consistently have a much lower level
of concentration compared to their FRD portfolios, the difference ranging on average
between 44% and 78% throughout the sample period.
Two further remarks are in order. First, the portfolio standard deviation in Figure 6.6
seems to be higher during the S&L crisis than in the subprime crisis. This result can be
explained by the fact that a standard deviation, unlike a correlation coefficient, is not a
dimensionless number and can only be interpreted as a function of its mean. Given that
the returns of the FED portfolio and the MVP are of similar size throughout the sample,
9Although not reported in the Figure, the Gini coefficient exhibits the same pattern, as the average
coefficient of the FED portfolio is 0.9 compared to 0.2 for the MVP.
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Figure 6.6: What role does inequality play in the risk/return trade-off?
(a) How much is systemic risk reduced in the
MVP?
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(b) Do returns have to be sacrificed to achieve
this lower risk?
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(c) How unequal is the MVP compared to the
FED portfolio?
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(d) How does the systemic risk measure evolve
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP: panel 6.6a
and 6.6b display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.6c shows how the
weights are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as well as the weights
that the current largest banks have in the MVP. Panel 6.6d shows the demeaned risk measure from
Panel 6.6a to allow for a comparison over time. Instead of using the standard deviation, which
is a reflection of the mean, we show the normalized range defined as (max-min)/median and is
independent of the mean return.
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we can compare their standard deviation in each quarter, but not between quarters. To
allow for comparison over time, we de-mean the risk measure, although this leads to a
loss in direct interpretation.10 Figure 6.6d displays the de-meaned risk measure, and
portfolio risk now shows a higher peak in the subprime crisis than in the S&L crisis.
The second issue we want to address is the MVP’s high concentration during 2008
and 2009. This spike can be explained by the fact that up to 87% of BHCs reported
lower average returns than in the previous quarter and 40% of all BHCs recorded losses.
Given the number of banks involved, it is possible that concentration rose because of
this increase in correlation between average returns. However, it is also possible that
the MVP weights are chosen to avoid violating the no-loss constraint. To test the latter
possibility, we ran the analysis excluding the no-loss constraint but still find the same
spike, indicating that, indeed, higher weights are given to banks that share a lower
correlation. Since these are few in number, they therefore have to receive a higher
weight in order to minimize portfolio risk.
The results here suggest that inequality and concentration play an important role
in the risk-return trade-off with which a regulator is faced. In this simple exercise,
reducing inequality drives down risk without significantly affecting returns at both
FED and FRD level. These findings indicate that regardless of the regulatory level,
supervisors need to be concerned when looking at the optimal design of their portfolio
not only with a bank’s individual size but also its size relative to the system. Moreover,
the rebalancing of weights does not appear to be random. We find that in order to
obtain a less risky portfolio, a supervisor has to reduce holdings of the currently largest
banks and create a more equal system. In reality, the largest banks have had a much
higher share in the portfolio compared with that in the MVP, and even increased
their weight from 65% to 90% during the sample period. Moreover, the financial
industry as a whole has also grown in relation to GDP, to the extent that Carvalho
and Gabaix (2013) attribute the recent rise in macroeconomic volatility mainly to this
growth in combination with idiosyncratic shocks to the largest banks. Indeed, the share
of the largest banks in the current portfolio relative to GDP has increased from 35%
at the beginning to 75% at the end of the sample. Given the evidence presented here,
10We do so by calculating the normalized range of returns. Since the portfolio standard deviation is the
standard deviation of the weighted average returns during the last 8 quarters, we define the normalized
range as the (maximum-minimum)/median of this set.
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combined with the finding of Carvalho and Gabaix (2013), large banks do seem to play
an increasingly important role not only in the banking system, but also in the broader
economy and its volatility.
However, one important caveat needs to be acknowledged. In the methodology
section, we assumed that the banks under consideration represent the entire investment
universe for the supervisor, mimicking the current regulatory set-up. Therefore, we
exclude financial institutions that fall outside of the regulator’s jurisdiction, such as
for instance investment banks and money market funds that played a big role in
the propagation of risk during the 2008 crisis. Similarly, while U.S. subsidiaries of
international banks have to file financial statements and are therefore included, their
international parents are not considered. While on a global scale their activities can
impact the profitability and risk of the banks under consideration, we are only able to
observe their indirect effect on the U.S. system. As a consequence, if the supervisor
would set his weights according to the minimum variance portfolio, he might force
banks to move their activities abroad or into the shadow banking realm where they are
unsupervised. Given the data at hand and our assumption that assets are redistributed
and not moved outside of the portfolio, we can not consider this outcome. The results
presented here and in the following sections therefore correspond only to a partial
equilibrium.
6.3.3 What are the other features of the Minimum Variance Portfo-
lio?
Given that we have seen that lower portfolio risk is achievable in a less concentrated
banking system, this raises the question of what causes the largest banks in the FED
portfolio to have such consistently low weights in the MVP, and how they differ from the
largest banks in the MVP. The two components that determine the weighting decision
are on the one hand individual bank risk, as measured by the standard deviation of
the returns, and on the other hand the correlation between these returns.11 Figure 6.7a
shows the average standard deviation of return-on-assets for the largest 5% of banks in
the FED portfolio and MVP, while Figure 6.7b displays the average pairwise correlation
among the largest 5% of banks in their respective portfolios. We see that the standard
11In this section, we show the correlation of returns instead of the covariance as it is easier to interpret.
189
6. BANK SIZE AND SYSTEM STABILITY
Figure 6.7: What are the other features of the Minimum Variance Portfolio?
(a) Is there a large share for low-risk banks?
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(b) Is there on average less correlation among
banks?
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The figure shows the average bank level standard deviation of the return-on-assets, as well as the
average pairwise correlation between these returns for the largest 5% of banks in both MVP and
FED portfolio.
deviations of the returns of these largest banks are on average twice as high in the
MVP, yet the average correlation coefficient is much more stable compared to the FED
portfolio. In the two crisis periods, the FED portfolio pairwise correlation spikes to
average values of 0.6, almost three times larger than the MVP. Nonetheless, even when
the individual risk and correlation are lowest in the FED portfolio, its risk is still higher
than that of the MVP.
These observations add to the evidence that in this context, weight plays a significant
role in determining the level of risk, as it magnifies the effect of increased correlation
and individual riskiness. When both components have low values, systemic risk
is low, even in a highly concentrated market. However, when they increase in crisis
periods, systemic risk increases dramatically if size inequality is high. As already shown
in Gabaix (2011), individual shocks to firms have the potential to lead to aggregate
volatility when the size distribution of an economy is heavy tailed, something that
also holds for the banking system (see e.g. Janicki and Prescott, 2006; Blank et al.,
2009). In terms of portfolio theory, the variances will dominate the covariances in crisis
periods due to the large disparity in weight. Since the movements in correlation can
be extremely volatile and difficult to control or even predict, the best tool for keeping
systemic risk low in this context is to limit concentration.
We note, however, that these results do not necessarily imply a cap on the size of
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banks. On the one hand, a system with only small banks is subject to the Too-Many-
To-Fail problem since they could herd, thereby acting as one large entity (Acharya and
Yorulmazer, 2007; Claeys and Schoors, 2007; Brown and Dinç, 2011). In this setting,
herding would be picked up via an increase in correlation of returns, posing a systemic
threat despite a lack in concentration. Our results, however, indicate that the correla-
tions of small banks are relatively stable over the sample period, and would therefore
not pose a systemic threat. On the other hand, the system can also be diversified by
limiting activities that banks can undertake and/or markets it can serve, provided
they operate in their own (uncorrelated) niche. This point was also touched on by
Loutskina and Strahan (2011), who found that increased geographic diversification
went hand-in-hand with a decline in loan monitoring by lenders prior to the financial
crisis.
To determine the characteristics of banks which have been heavily reweighted, we
construct a crude industry level balance sheet for both the FED portfolio and the MVP.
We use the weights allocated to each bank to construct this weighted average balance
sheet, which is shown in Figure 6.8. The allocation of assets in the FED portfolio shows
the increasing importance of trading assets at the expense of loans, whereas this trend
is less evident in banks favored in the MVP. While the FED balance sheet has less than
40% of assets invested in loans at the end of the sample, that of the MVP remains
close to 50%. On the liabilities side, the FED portfolio is more reliant on non-deposit
funding than the MVP balance sheet. We observe that at the end of the sample, the FED
portfolio uses about 10% more of these non-deposit liabilities than the MVP, although
this difference was much more apparent before the recent crisis.
As a reflection of the industry asset composition, the non-interest income/total
income ratio for each portfolio is shown in Figure 6.8e. We observe that with exception
of the crisis years, there has been a significant increase in reliance on non-interest
income in the FED portfolio. On the other hand, banks favored in the MVP have a more
constant share of non-interest income throughout the sample period. Notwithstanding
the financial crisis, the gap between the portfolios has been steadily increasing since
1990.
Given these results, we conclude that the fictitious banking industry in the MVP is
characterized by retail banking, as higher weights are given to banks that are mainly
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Figure 6.8: What happens to the intermediary role of banks in a safer banking system?
(a) FED - Assets
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(b) MVP - Assets
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(c) FED - Liabilities
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(d) MVP - Liabilities
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(e) Is there a difference in income characteris-
tics?
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The figure compares the intermediary role of the FED portfolio and MVP, by showing weighted average industry level balance
sheets in panels 6.8a-6.8d and the different weighted non-interest income/total income ratios in panel 6.8e. To construct the
balance sheet we use the following data series: Loans (BHCK2122); Trading Assets up to 1994 (BHCK2146); Trading Assets after
1994 (BHCK3545); Liquid Assets up to 1994 (BHCK0081 + BHCK0395 + BHCK0397 + BHCK3365 + BHCK0390); Liquid Assets
after 1994 (BHCK0081 + BHCK0395 + BHCK0397 + BHCK3365 + BHCK1754 + BHCK1773); Fixed & Other Assets (BHCK2145
+ BHCK3163 + BHCK2160); Core Deposits (BHCB3187 + BHCB2389 + BHCB6648 + BHCB2210 + BHOD3187 + BHOD2389 +
BHOD6648); Large Time Deposits (BHCB2604 + BHOD2604); Non-Deposit Liabilities (BHCK2948 - Core Deposits - Large Time
Deposits); Equity (BHCK2948 + BHCK3210). Non-interest income (BHCK4079); Total income (BHCK4107).
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funded by deposits, make loans, and therefore rely less on non-interest income. Since
banking activities are not a direct input in the minimization of the portfolio risk, it is
their influence on the behavior of the returns which drives these findings. Indeed, this
is in agreement with a growing literature emphasizing the role of income diversifica-
tion in financial instability. For instance, Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006)
find that non-interest income reduces aggregate profits while increasing risk. More
recent evidence by De Jonghe (2010) shows that systemic risk is exacerbated by banks
diversifying into activities other than lending, due to increasing correlations between
income streams. This finding was also corroborated by Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011), Brunnermeier et al. (2012), DeYoung and Roland (2001) and DeYoung and Torna
(2013). Huang and Ratnovski (2011), meanwhile, argue that wholesale lenders have
lower incentives for costly monitoring, leading to large (and inefficient) fluctuations
of loans on negative public signals, a problem not encountered in relationship banks.
Finally, Boot and Ratnovski (2012) find that although there are initial benefits for banks
from starting trading activities, beyond a critical point inefficiencies dominate and
trading becomes increasingly risky. On the funding side, Fahlenbrach et al. (2012)
emphasize that banks with increasing balance sheets through the use of short term
non-deposit liabilities performed poorly during the last crises.
6.3.4 How easily is the Minimum Variance Portfolio obtained?
In our baseline scenario, the supervisor is able to switch assets rapidly from one
bank to another on a quarterly basis to obtain the MVP. Although reweighting also
occurs naturally in the FED portfolio via mergers and acquisitions, bank entry and exit
or bailouts, the MVP would not be a realistic approximation if reweighting was much
higher than in reality. In order to assess how stable the MVP is over time compared
with the FED portfolio, we therefore calculate both of their turnovers. Turnover is
defined as the sum of absolute weight changes in the portfolio between period t− 1
and t, taking values ranging from zero (no change) to two (where all assets that were
held are sold, and all assets that were not held bought). Figure 6.9 plots the turnover
for both portfolios. We observe that the MVP turnover is on average 3 times as high
as that of the FED portfolio. The spike in turnover in 2006Q1 is due to changes in the
reporting threshold, as the banks that reported in 2005Q4 were considered to be sold in
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Figure 6.9: How much more intervention would be required for the MVP?
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The figure shows the difference in reweighting between the FED and the MVP by plotting the
turnover of each portfolio.
2006Q1 and proceeds reinvested in the other banks. The MVP can only achieve low risk
through a higher level of reweighting, especially in the crisis period. For the district
portfolios, the average MVP turnover is around 3 times higher than the actual portfolio,
ranging from 2 times for the least concentrated to 6 times for the most concentrated
districts. In Section 6.4, we therefore explore alternative MVPs where the reweighting
is restricted, in order to achieve a more realistic turnover.
6.3.5 Robustness
To find out how robust our results are, we test several of our assumptions. The
results of these tests are summarized in Table 6.3, where we evaluate how well risk
was reduced while limiting concentration. To this end, we define the ratio (σFED −
σMVP)/σFED, which measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual
and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively
eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements were possible. A test is
regarded as successful when this ratio averages 0.9 or higher throughout the sample
period, and when the level of concentration of the largest 5% of banks in the MVP is on
average below 50%.
Covariance matrix – 1 We begin with the assumption that the covariance matrix is
independent of the size of banks. In Section 6.3.1 we showed that large and small
banks share a common support in the variance and average pairwise covariance. This
however, does not imply that a bank which changes in size will maintain the same level
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Table 6.2: Changes in the return and its covariance matrix
ROA Variance ROA Covariance ROA
Pre-Jump Post-Jump Pre-Jump Post-Jump Pre-Jump Post-Jump
Positive Jump Value 0.341 0.259 0.023 0.111 0.002 0.005
Average Difference -0.082 0.088 0.004
Percentage Difference -23.97% 379.70% 233.70%
P-value T-test 0.000 0.007 0.010
Negative Jump Value -0.142 0.213 0.281 3.249 0.007 -0.015
Average Difference 0.355 2.967 -0.022
Percentage Difference 249.52% 1054.64% -324.52%
P-value T-test 0.110 0.359 0.293
The table shows the average differences in ROA, its variance and its average pairwise covariance pre-
and post-jump for both negative jumps and positive jumps using the procedure described in the text and
the Online Appendix.
of returns or the same structure with regard to other banks. If we knew how the return
structure changes due to a change in size, we would be able to adjust the covariance
matrix in each iteration of the optimization. To this end, we have identified 15 cases in
which BHCs experience a negative jump in bank size, and 287 where they experience a
positive jump in bank size.12 A jump is defined as an increase/decrease of bank assets of
25% or greater from one quarter to the next, provided that the preceding and following
8 quarters did not show jumps larger than 10% in each of the quarters, nor a cumulative
change in the preceding and following 8 quarters of 25%. These last two conditions are
imposed to make sure that bank size before and after the jump was relatively stable
and that the change in the elements of the covariance matrix can be chiefly attributed to
the one-time jump. The banks receiving a negative shock lost 40% of their total assets
on average, while banks receiving a positive shock gained 60%. The average changes in
the return and covariance matrices are displayed in Table 6.2. T-tests show that banks
experiencing a positive jump in assets have a statistically significant lower return-on-
assets, which is likely due to the construction of the variable, and a higher average
variance and covariance of these returns. On the other hand, banks experiencing a
negative jump do not see changes in their average variance and covariance, and only
see a marginally significant higher return-on-assets.
Using the statistically significant changes for positive and negative jumps, we incor-
porate the effect in the sample covariance matrix and the return matrix, such that
12Full details on this identification can be found in the Online Appendix.
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these matrices change dynamically with the weights of the banks.13 We perform two
additional robustness tests. In the first test, the vector of expected returns is adjusted
according to the changes in weight, and a new sample covariance matrix is estimated
with which portfolio risk will be minimized. In the second test, we adjust both the
return and covariance matrix based on the changes in weight. Changes in the return
and covariance matrices are interpolated if the proposed change in portfolio weight
lies between -40% and +60%. As there was no data on changes in assets larger than
these bounds, we use any proposed changes beyond them as if they were -40% or +60%,
i.e. while a bank can receive an increase in weight higher than +60%, its variance and
covariance terms are adjusted as if the weight has only been increased by +60%.14 In
both cases, however, this adds more complexity to the optimization and indeed we find
that there are cases in which no improvement in portfolio risk is found. Fortunately
an improved solution is still possible in most of the sample period, as can be seen in
Figure 6.10. Interestingly, the findings in the baseline specification seem to be robust
and are not influenced by our original assumption. The concentration in the MVP
remains much lower than that of the FED portfolio, while simultaneously maintaining
a smaller portfolio risk and returns of a similar level.
Covariance matrix – 2 Another issue in our baseline setup is that optimization can be
quite unstable when using the sample covariance matrix: small changes in the return
structure can lead to large differences in the outcome of the portfolio choice. To counter
these unstable solutions, Brodie et al. (2009) use regularization of the optimal mean-
variance portfolio by including a penalty in the objective function. They show that
while introducing this penalty can lead to a sparse choice of weights, opting for a high
penalty is equivalent to a constraint that does not allow shorting. Since our supervisor
is already assumed not to be able to go short in any banks, we therefore consider the
optimization problem stabilized. However, as Jobson and Korkie (1980) have pointed
out, a considerable amount of noise is introduced in a sample covariance matrix in
a small T and large N setting like ours. In response, Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004)
proposed a shrinkage based estimator of the covariance matrix to reduce this noise. We
13As the change in return-on-assets for the banks experiencing a negative jump is marginally significant at
11%, we also regard this change as significant.
14A scenario under which reweighting of each bank was limited to -40% and +60% yielded no improve-
ments over the actual portfolio. Results are available upon request.
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Figure 6.10: Can portfolio risk be minimized when taking into account a changing covari-
ance matrix due to weight changes?
How much is systemic risk reduced in the MVP?
(a) Dynamic Return Matrix
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(b) Dynamic Covariance Matrix
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Do returns have to be sacrificed to achieve this lower risk?
(c) Dynamic Return Matrix
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How unequal is the MVP compared to the FED portfolio?
(e) Dynamic Return Matrix
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The figure presents two robustness tests, in which the return and/or covariance matrices are dynamically
updated. In the first robustness test (Dynamic Return Matrix), we adjust only the return matrix and then
estimate a new sample covariance matrix. In the second test (Dynamic Covariance Matrix), we adjust
both the return matrix and the covariance matrix with which the portfolio risk will be minimized. More
information on how we perform these tests can be found in the Online Appendix. Panel 6.10a and 6.10b
display the difference in the risk of each portfolio, while panel 6.10c and 6.10d display the difference in
return. Panel 6.10e and 6.10f show how the weights are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their
concentration ratios, as well as the weights that the current largest banks have in the MVP.
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use their proposed estimator of the covariance matrix instead of its sample equivalent
and re-run the analysis.15 The full results are reported in the Online Appendix and are
similar to the baseline specification. We find that the standard deviation of the MVP is
now higher compared with the baseline specification, although still lower than that of
the FED portfolio, while returns are at a similar level. The levels of concentration in the
MVP are basically unchanged, as the largest banks on average still have a weight of
10%, while the largest banks in the FED portfolio have a weight in the MVP of 5%.16
Starting values Third, we explore the optimization starting values and choice of the
length of the moving window. Given the fact that we are dealing with many banks, the
minimization of the portfolio risk is likely to be a complex, highly nonlinear problem
comprising multiple minima/solutions. The starting values, which are selected as the
weights in the original portfolio, can have a substantial impact on whether a global or
local minimum is found and in what direction the distribution of weights will move.
To account for this possible bias, we run two robustness tests. In the first, we choose
starting values based on an equally weighted portfolio. In the second, we run, for the
BHC data only, 100 repetitions per quarter using randomized starting values.17 Both
tests show that the results are almost identical to the baseline specification, and we
therefore refer the reader to the Online Appendix for the full results.
Length of rolling window Finally, we explore alternative lengths of the rolling win-
dow. So far we have taken an 8 quarter time frame to estimate the sample covariance
matrix. However, it could be argued that using more data to estimate it would be less
noisy and less prone to outliers. Taking this into account, we rerun the analyses using
a 16 quarter window and report the full results in the Online Appendix. For both the
BHCs and commercial banks, results follow similar patterns to those using 8 quarter
windows: the largest banks are still shown to be consistently overweighted compared
with their MVP counterparts, where lower risk is achieved while keeping returns at
15The code for estimating the covariance matrix is obtained from:
http://www.ledoit.net/honey_abstract.htm
16As portfolio risk is not minimized by at least 90%, however, we do not consider this test to be successful
in Table 6.3.
17The random starting values are drawn from a half-normal distribution and then divided by its sum, such
that they add up to 1.
198
6.4. Extensions and Policy implications
Table 6.3: Robustness tests
Risk minimized without large banks?
Issue Robustness test BHC COMM
(1) Independence of covariance matrix Dynamic return matrix 3 n.a.
(2) Independence of covariance matrix Dynamic covariance matrix 3 n.a.
(3) Noise in sample covariance matrix Shrinkage estimator 7 0/12
(4) Multiple minima Equal starting weights 3 12/12
(5) Multiple minima Randomized starting weights 3 n.a.
(6) Length of rolling window Analysis on 16 quarters 3 12/12
The table presents a summary of the three robustness tests that were performed, indicating whether
portfolio risk was successfully minimized while keeping the levels of concentration of the largest 5% of
banks low. To see if a test is successful we define the ratio (σFED − σMVP)/σFED, which measures the
relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1
indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements
were possible. A test is regarded as successful when this ratio averages 0.9 or higher throughout the
sample period, and when the level of concentration of the largest 5% of banks in the MVP is below 50%.
The second, fifth and sixth tests are only performed on BHC data due to their computationally intensive
nature.
a comparable level. Table 6.3 summarizes the results of the robustness tests in this
section.
6.4 Extensions and Policy implications
As we have seen in Section 6.3.4, the amount of turnover needed to lower systemic
risk is three times higher in the MVP. In this section, we therefore explore some more
realistic scenarios, and discuss implications for policy resulting from the analysis. We
first look into several weighting alternatives. Besides analyzing these other weighting
methods, we repeat our analysis on a smaller and more realistic sample of banks. Finally,
we discuss whether optimization at district level also results in a lower countrywide
systemic risk. Similar to Section 6.3.5, we summarize all results in Table 6.4, where we
again define a test successful if the ratio (σFED − σMVP)/σFED averages 0.9 or higher
throughout the sample period.
6.4.1 Can portfolio risk be minimized while limiting portfolio turnover?
Equally weighted portfolio Given that the MVP seems to favor a more equal distri-
bution of assets, a natural course of action would be to analyze an equally weighted
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Figure 6.11: What is the risk/return profile of an equally weighted portfolio?
(a) Can we reduce systemic risk in an equally
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The figure presents results of the risk and return in an equally weighted portfolio, compared to the
MVP and FED portfolio.
portfolio. As noted by DeMiguel et al. (2009), equally weighted portfolios still outper-
form many optimizing portfolio choice models and have a very low turnover. The
turnover in our setup would indeed be lower than that of the FED portfolio, albeit not
zero as bank entry and exit would still take place. Figure 6.11 shows the risk-return
trade-off that the equally weighted portfolio (EWP) would have in comparison with
the other two. In terms of returns, the EWP performs similarly to the MVP and FED
portfolio, except for the last crisis period in which it records losses. Regarding risk,
the EWP has levels similar to that of the FED portfolio, albeit marginally lower. All
in all, this suggests that there is an optimal level of concentration, as neither a highly
concentrated nor an equally weighted portfolio are able to significantly reduce systemic
risk in the same way as the MVP.
Limited reweighting – 1 Since a high turnover is costly for the supervisor and there-
fore not very desirable, we consider several alternatives involving limited reweighting
that could reduce turnover. We do this by setting lower and upper boundaries to the
weights banks can take, conditional on their true weights. First, we allow banks to
grow/shrink by 10% and 20% of their initial weight. Second, we construct a measure
of asset growth in the previous quarter and allow changes equal to either the mean
or standard deviation of this growth measure. Whereas the first constraint is static in
nature, the second allows for business cycle effects to determine how much reweighting
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can take place. To ensure the no-loss constraint does not influence the results, we
run the limited reweighting scenarios with and without this requirement. However,
regardless of the specification, the risk in the MVP is practically unchanged compared
with the FED portfolio in all time periods.18
Limited reweighting – 2 Another way of reducing turnover would be to keep the
largest 5% of banks at their current cumulative size, allowing unlimited reweighting of
the remaining banks while still adhering to the no-shorting and no-loss constraint. The
results of this exercise are shown in Figure 6.12, where we see that for most of the sample
period it was possible to decrease systemic risk significantly while maintaining large
banks. However, during the S&L and subprime crises periods, this MVP variant has a
risk which is barely below that of the initial portfolio. This finding can be explained
by the high correlation of returns for the largest banks, as seen in Figure 6.7b. During
sudden increases in correlation between these largest banks, the high concentration of
assets in a few banks will inevitably affect risk. In terms of optimal portfolio design, it
seems to point to a trade-off between concentration and correlation: if the supervisor
wants to keep the large banks at their current size, it would be necessary to ensure
that correlation between them remains relatively low to avoid the Too-Many-To-Fail
problem. This could, for instance, be achieved by limiting the geographical markets in
which a bank can be active or the activities it can engage in, as used to be the case prior
to e.g. the Riegle-Neal and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley acts.
Repeating this analysis on the FRD portfolios shows that there are 3 districts which
are able to reduce systemic risk to a minimum in each of the three sub-samples.19
Interestingly, a common feature is that they have the lowest levels of concentration
among all districts. This relationship is shown in Figure 6.13, where we plot the average
concentration ratios against the extent to which they are able to reduce systemic risk in
three time periods. The horizontal axis represents the amount by which they reduce
risk and is again constructed such that 1 stands for a reduction of risk effectively to zero,
18Since the standard deviation of asset growth was extraordinarily large in 1997Q4, this allowed the
optimization to apply larger changes to the banks and therefore managed to reduce risk. A dynamic
approach was also considered for the scenarios where banks are allowed to grow/shrink by 10% and
20% of their weights in the MVP in time t− 1; however, portfolio risk was not significantly reduced. Full
results can be found in the Online Appendix.
19Full results are shown in the Online Appendix.
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Figure 6.12: How much can we lower systemic risk when we keep the largest banks at their
actual size?
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The figure displays how well the portfolio risk can be minimized while keeping the largest 5% of
banks at their actual size and reweighting the remaining 95%.
and 0 indicates that no improvements in risk are possible. The Figure clearly shows
the trend in consolidation, with most districts becoming more concentrated over time.
As they become more concentrated, they find themselves less able to achieve low risk
while maintaining their largest banks.
Limited reweighting – 3 Since the weight of the 5% largest banks in the three success-
ful districts never exceeds 60%, this leads us to a final test using limited reweighting.
Is it possible to reduce portfolio risk while maintaining the cumulative weight of the
largest 5% of banks between 50% and 60%? The results for the FED portfolio are plotted
in Figure 6.14. We observe that under this limited reweighting scheme, it is possible to
effectively eliminate risk while maintaining similar returns. Concerning the concentra-
tion in the portfolio, the share of the largest banks always hits the lower bound of 50%.
Consequently, the level of concentration in the MVP also lies close to 50% except for
2008 and 2009, with similar results for the analysis at commercial bank level as shown
in the Online Appendix. As in the previous scenarios, the high concentration in the
MVP in 2008 and 2009 is likely due to increasing correlation of returns. To minimize
portfolio risk, a small number of banks need to receive a higher weight, such that their
concentration approaches that of the FED portfolio.
We have shown in Section 6.3 that minimizing systemic risk requires an extremely
powerful and active regulator, who would have to intervene three times more than is
currently the case. In practice, this could only be achieved by increasing the regulator’s
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Figure 6.13: Can inequality explain why some FRDs can reduce systemic risk while keeping
the largest banks at their actual size?
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(c) 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
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The figure shows the relationship over time between the average weight of the largest 5% of banks
and the ability of the FRDs to reduce portfolio risk when the largest banks are allowed to keep their
initial weight. (σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between the
actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively
eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements were possible. The threshold for
successfully minimizing portfolio risk is set at 0.9. The weights of the largest 5% of banks are
averaged over each time period.
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Figure 6.14: By how much is the risk minimized when the largest banks hold between 50%
and 60% of assets?
(a) How much is systemic risk reduced in the
MVP?
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
St
an
da
rd
 D
ev
ia
tio
n 
(in
 %
)
1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
MVP FED
(b) Do returns have to be sacrificed to achieve
this lower risk?
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
R
et
ur
n 
(in
 %
)
1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
MVP FED
(c) How large are the largest banks in the MVP?
0
20
40
60
80
100
W
ei
gh
t (i
n %
)
1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
MVP 5% FED 5% FED 5% in MVP
The figure shows the risk and return characteristics of an MVP where the largest 5% of banks in
the FED portfolio are kept between 50% and 60% of assets, and how the weights in this MVP are
distributed.
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discretionary power. Such a proactive position was also included in the proposed SAFE
Banking Act of 2012, under which a maximum bank size relative to the system would be
imposed. Notwithstanding a range of limited reweighting schemes, our results indicate
that in our setup, systemic risk could not be reduced while maintaining the current
size of the largest banks. However, in terms of optimal portfolio design, bringing
their cumulative weight down from 90% to 50% yielded a significant improvement in
systemic risk.
6.4.2 Does the result hold for a system where only listed banks are
considered?
One assumption we have consistently made is that the regulator is able to move
substantial amounts of assets from large banks to very small ones. However, small
banks might not be able to sustain such an increase in assets in the first place. Moreover,
previous research has shown that start-up banks only behave as mature banks after
their first nine years of existence (see e.g. DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). Because these
small banks might not be realistic investments for the supervisor, we select only those
BHCs which have publicly traded equity, using the CRSP-FRB link provided by the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013). We thereby also remove those banks that do
not file reports after 2006 due to the increase in the reporting threshold. The selected
banks are considered to be the entire portfolio in which the supervisor can invest. The
results in the Online Appendix show that removing these banks does not quantitatively
or qualitatively change our results: It is possible to minimize portfolio risk by relocating
assets from the largest listed banks to smaller listed ones. Moreover, in this new MVP,
the actual largest 5% of banks would still receive a very low weight.20
Next, we use the CRSP-FRB link to obtain the market valuation of assets for listed
BHCs by downloading equity prices as well as the number of outstanding shares
from CRSP, and match them to the Call Reports. The quarterly market valuation of
assets is obtained by adding the book value of the liabilities to the average market
capitalization during that quarter. Compared with book value, which gives information
on the past performance of a bank, the market valuation should indicate what market
participants believe to be the value of the bank going forward, notwithstanding liquidity
20A scenario in which the smallest 60% of banks were removed yielded similar results.
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Figure 6.15: What role does inequality play in the risk/return trade-off when taking into
account the market valuation of assets?
(a) How much is systemic risk reduced in the
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP: panel 6.15a
and 6.15b display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.15c shows how
the weights are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as well as the
weights that the current largest banks have in the MVP.
considerations during crises (Allen and Carletti, 2008). To perform our analysis on
this subsample, we define returns as the quarter-to-quarter percentage changes in the
market valuation of assets, and a banks’ weight as the relative share in the portfolio. As
in the baseline scenario, we obtain the MVP using an eight quarter moving window. If
a merger takes place during this time, the assets of the acquired bank are added to the
acquiring bank before the merger takes place for the appropriate quarters, while the
acquired bank is removed from the investment universe.21 The results are reported in
Figure 6.15.
21Similar to the analyses on book data, banks that report a return below -100% or above +100% are not
considered.
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Table 6.4: Extensions and policy implications tests
Risk minimized?
Issue Policy test BHC COMM
(1) High turnover Equally Weighted Portfolio 7 0/12
(2) High turnover Reweighting limited to 10% or 20% of assetsa 7 0/12
(3) High turnover Reweighting limited to mean/std. dev. of growtha 7 0/12
(4) High turnover Largest 5% keep their weighta 7 5/12
(5) High turnover Largest 5% are weighted between 50% and 60% 3 12/12
(6) Small/DeNovo banks Only BHCs with publicly traded equity – book value 3 n.a.
(7) Small/DeNovo banks Only BHCs with publicly traded equity – market value 3 n.a.
The table presents a summary of the seven policy tests that were performed and how well they worked
in reducing systemic risk on FED and FRD level. To see if a test is successful we define the ratio
(σFED − σMVP)/σFED, which measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and
minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a
score of 0 indicates that no improvements were possible. A test is regarded as successful when this ratio
averages 0.9 or higher throughout the sample period.
a To avoid the no portfolio loss constraint driving these results, we also performed the tests without the
no-loss constraint. The results however do not change.
Figure 6.15 shows spikes in the portfolio risk of the FED portfolio at the beginning
of the 2000s and during the subprime crisis, whereas that of the MVP is essentially
zero. While the returns of the MVP are slightly higher prior to 2005, they are similar
to the FED portfolio thereafter. Regarding the weight distribution of both portfolios,
we again see a steady increase in the weights of the largest banks in the FED portfolio.
The MVP based on market valuation shows a higher concentration than before, as the
largest banks on average are assigned 33% of the assets compared with 13% in the
baseline scenario. Similar to the baseline scenario, concentration in the MVP peaks in
the subprime crisis when the largest banks have a weight of 69%. However, it appears
that the largest banks in the actual portfolio are still overweighted, as they see their
weight reduced to an average of 4.4% in the MVP. Table 6.4 summarizes the results of
all scenarios in this section.
6.5 Conclusion
The last two decades have seen a major wave of consolidation and concentration of
assets in the banking industry. In the same period, the sector has experienced two major
crises with a significant impact on the real economy, of which the subprime crisis had
global repercussions. As a consequence of recent bailouts and government-forced sales,
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the sector is now even more concentrated than before the crises. In the light of moral
hazard and Too-Big-To-Fail banks, we have investigated how the high concentration in
the industry impacts systemic risk.
In the absence of counterfactuals, we consider a thought experiment in which
we view the supervisor as a constrained investor in a portfolio of banks. As profit
maximization by banks is inherently risky, but is not perfectly correlated with that of
other banks, the portfolio of the supervisor will have a better risk-return profile. By
applying elements of Modern Portfolio Theory, we derive a hypothetical distribution
of weights that the supervisor should have held to arrive at the minimum variance
portfolio in order to give us insights into the optimal design of the banking system.
Our results consistently show that the hypothetical minimum variance portfolio had
a lower risk than the actual portfolio, achieved by reducing the level of concentration in
the portfolio. Moreover, it was not necessary to sacrifice returns in order to achieve this
lower risk. The minimum variance portfolio favors more traditional banks as measured
by the non-interest income/total income ratio and balance sheet items such as loans,
trading assets and deposits. In contrast, an equally-weighted portfolio would perform
similarly to the actual, concentrated, system. These findings are robust to different
starting values, time windows, covariance matrices and the exclusion of the smallest
banks.
However, to achieve lower risk, the supervisor would have to adjust weights in each
quarter, leading to a portfolio turnover three times higher than that of the real portfolio.
Since this might not be possible or even desirable within the current regulatory frame-
work, we tested several alternatives involving limited reweighting which were largely
unsuccessful. These findings indicate that in times of crisis, an increase in systemic risk
was unavoidable while keeping the concentration at current levels. Nonetheless, our
analysis did show - ceteris paribus - that when the weight of the largest banks was kept
at a sufficiently low level, systemic risk was reduced significantly in the hypothetical
minimum variance portfolio.
The policy implications flowing from these findings are that supervisors should
seriously consider the effects of concentration on systemic risk. A reduction in disparity
of size could create a more competitive environment, similar to provisions of the
proposed Safe, Accountable, Fair & Efficient (SAFE) Banking Act of 2012, which would
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limit individual banks’ funding strategies to 10% of the total industry. Other measures
could include imposing higher equity capital demands for the large banks as are
currently being implemented, or separating investment from retail banking as proposed
by Paul Volcker, and the Vickers and Liikanen reports in Europe. Forcing large banks
to hold more capital could lead to a relative reduction in their size only if their assets
are ‘redistributed’ to smaller banks in order to maintain a safer and more competitive
environment. Our findings show that we should not only consider the size of each
bank individually, but also consider each bank’s size with respect to the whole system.
However, given the data at hand which mirrors the current regulatory set-up, the
results presented here can only be interpreted as a partial equilibrium effect as we can
not consider the shifting of bank activities abroad or into the shadow banking realm.
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Dit proefschrift beantwoordt drie vragen met betrekking tot de invloed van multi-
nationale ondernemingen op lokale ondernemingen en de rol van de ontwikkeling van
financiële markten hierin. Ten eerste onderzoekt het proefschrift de impact van natio-
nale grenzen en afstand op indirecte effecten van de aanwezigheid van multinationale
ondernemingen op lokale, binnenlandse bedrijven. Ten tweede kijkt het naar de directe
impact van multinationale ondernemingen op hun dochterondernemingen. Ten slotte
kijkt het naar de rol die het bankwezen hierin speelt, en hoe de gevolgen van financiële
instabiliteit kunnen worden beperkt.
Om deze vragen empirisch te beantwoorden wordt grotendeels gebruik gemaakt
van de database Amadeus, welke winst- en verliesrekeningen en balans-informatie
bevat voor bijna 21 miljoen Europese ondernemingen. Deze database wordt verzameld
en onderhouden door Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing. Vanuit Amadeus worden
twee nieuwe datasets gecreëerd: AUGAMA, een panel van Europese bedrijven gedu-
rende de periode 1996-2011, en EUMULNET, een dataset van netwerken van Europese
multinationale ondernemingen. Hoofdstuk twee van het proefschrift beschrijft hoe
deze datasets vanuit de ruwe Amadeus data voor 26 landen opgebouwd worden, en
toont aan dat AUGAMA en EUMULNET de structuur van de Europese economie zeer
goed benaderen.
Het derde en vierde hoofdstuk analyseren de indirecte effecten van multinationale
ondernemingen op lokale, binnenlandse bedrijven. Hier ligt de nadruk op de studie
van mogelijke productiviteitswinsten van binnenlandse bedrijven als gevolg van de
vestiging van een multinationale onderneming in de buurt. Voorgaande literatuur heeft
gemengde resultaten opgeleverd, in sommige gevallen zijn de indirecte effecten positief,
in andere gevallen negatief. Welke kant deze effecten opgaan blijkt afhankelijk van de
relatie van de multinationale onderneming tot de lokale onderneming. Als concurrent
bijvoorbeeld kan de multinationale onderneming binnenlandse bedrijven dwingen om
meer productief te worden, terwijl zij als afnemer van intermediaire goederen op de
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binnenlandse markt hogere kwaliteitseisen kan stellen. Waar voorgaande literatuur er
van uitging dat deze indirecte effecten zich onmiddellijk en voor elke binnenlandse
onderneming zouden manifesteren, nuanceert hoofdstuk 3 deze impliciete assumptie.
Meer bepaald toont hoofdstuk drie aan dat binnenlandse bedrijven die dicht bij een
nieuwe vestiging van een multinational gelegen zijn snel productiviteitswinsten laten
optekenen. Binnenlandse bedrijven die echter verder weg gelegen zijn ervaren pas later
én in mindere mate productiviteitswinsten ten gevolge van de aanwezigheid van de
multinationale onderneming.
Gelet op de belangrijke rol voor afstand inzake de omvang van de indirecte effecten
op de productiviteit van lokale ondernemingen van multinationals gaat hoofdstuk
vier na of indirecte effecten door landsgrenzen beïnvloed worden. Voorgaande litera-
tuur heeft enkel effecten binnen landsgrenzen geanalyseerd. Er is echter geen reden
om a priori aan te nemen dat een lokale onderneming niet beïnvloed kan worden
door een multinationale onderneming die zich voldoende dichtbij, doch in een ander
land bevindt. Hoofdstuk vier toont aan dat landsgrenzen echter niet poreus genoeg
zijn, en dat mogelijke productiviteitswinsten gehinderd worden door landsgrenzen.
Hoofdstuk vier toont echter ook aan dat grenzen tussen landen die deel uitmaken van
het Schengengebied productiviteitswinsten door technologietransfer niet significant
verminderen, terwijl niet-Schengen grenzen dit wel doen.
Terwijl hoofdstuk drie en vier indirecte effecten van multinationale ondernemingen
behandelen, bestudeert hoofdstuk vijf directe effecten. Met name wordt in hoofdstuk
vijf geanalyseerd welke factoren een rol spelen bij de beslissing van multinationale
hoofdkwartieren om tot sluiting van een dochteronderneming over te gaan. In tegen-
stelling tot voorgaande literatuur bestudeert hoofdstuk vijf deze beslissing voor, tijdens
én na de financiële crisis, en wordt er ook rekening gehouden met de prestaties van
andere dochterondernemingen binnen hetzelfde multinationale netwerk. De analyses
in hoofdstuk vijf tonen aan dat multinationale ondernemingen met een groot netwerk
van gediversifieerde dochterondernemingen in het algemeen minder snel hun dochter-
ondernemingen zullen sluiten. Daarnaast zullen multinationale ondernemingen met
een meer geavanceerd financieel systeem in hun thuisland hun dochterondernemingen
minder snel sluiten in tijden van hoogconjunctuur. Tijdens de financiële crisis speelt
het financieel systeem in het thuisland geen rol meer.
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Ten slotte, waar hoofdstuk vijf vind dat een gezond financieel systeem gunstige
gevolgen heeft voor economische groei, multinationale ondernemingen en productivi-
teitsgroei, analyseert hoofdstuk zes de rol van alsmaar groeiende banken in diepere
economische integratie en de gevolgen hiervan voor financiële stabiliteit. De resultaten
in hoofdstuk zes suggereren dat net kleinere banken goed zijn voor financiële stabiliteit,
en - door meer leningen te verschaffen aan bedrijven en huishoudens - ook voor de
reële economie.
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